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Chapter 1
Introduction
The general topic of this doctoral dissertation is the debate on scientific
realism, structural realism and theory change, with a primary focus on
linguistics. Broadly speaking, scientific realism is the view that our sci-
entific theories are true, that the terms in our theories do refer to entities
which exist in the "real" world and that our best scientific theories can
give us correct predictions and explain the phenomena correctly. As op-
posed to scientific realism, the so-called antirealist view consists of the
negation of the realist theses. For the antirealist, it is enough to assume
that our scientific theories are tools which help us to obtain certain results
through experiments. There are no statements made about the truth of
a theory, the reference of the terms which occur in a theory, nor is there
made any statement about predictive success of our theories. They are
merely seen as a tool for obtaining certain results.
Given the fact that our scientific theories change over time and some
of them turn out to be false, the view of scientific realism is challenged.
Two main accounts of how to conceive a scientific theory have risen from
this discussion: the so-called syntactic, and the semantic or sometimes
7
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also called model-theoretic conception of theories. In the former, a theory
is understood as the deductive closure of a set of formulas in first-order
logic. In opposition to this view, the semantic conception holds that
theories are to be represented best as a class of mathematical structures.
The latter, as its adherents argue, provides a more detailed representation
of inter-theoretical relations and is therefore more adequate to explain
structural continuity between different theories through theory change.
Structural realism, as a form of realism, asserts that our knowledge of
the world can best be provided by knowledge of structures, which aim to
represent the world adequately, this view is also called the epistemic form
of structural realism. In a different way, ontic structural realism states
that the fundamental ontological entities are in fact not individuals but
structures. Objects, as we speak usually of them, just occupy places in a
structure, in which they occur. One assumption I make is that, by adapt-
ing a semantic conception of theories, much of the subject concerned by
structural realism changes in an important way, for it would now be the
case that the semantic approach is especially useful because it contains
an emphasis on structures. One form of semantic views on scientific the-
ories that has been developed, is often known as the structuralist view
of theories, or the structuralist meta-theory. A special emphasis in this
dissertation will be on this form of structuralism.
One central research aim of this dissertation is to investigate, by re-
constructing model-theoretically some exemplar scientific theories, whether
structural continuity between models of different scientific theories does
exist. Specifically, I will search for the applicability of structural realism
to the field of linguistics. A research of this kind would provide new
insight and indicate possible developments for both epistemic and on-
9tic structural realism. As an exemplar case for my reconstruction, I will
search for connections between the following three theories that had been
developed in linguistics: Leonard Bloomfield’s structural linguistics, Zel-
lig Harris’ transformational theory and Noam Chomsky’s early theory of
generative grammar.
In the linguistic scientific community, the common view is that these
theories are different in many senses, and that the shift from Bloomfield’s
theory to Harris’ theory, and more famously, the shift from Harris to
Chomsky has been a groundbreaking event in the history of linguistics1.
It seems at first sight that important concepts were introduced in each
of the three theories, and that there were radical shifts in the ontologies
of each theory. I will analyze this in detail in my dissertation.
What exactly changes from Bloomfield to Harris, and from Harris
to the early Chomsky, is not easily recognizable. Specifically, it is not
sufficient to provide a conceptual analysis of the theories and their his-
torical development only, as it has been done by Seuren and Newmeyer.
From the perspective of the philosophy of science, and especially within
the framework of the structuralist meta-theory, it is a core assumption
that only a rational and logical reconstruction of empirical theories can
provide full insight into both their inner- and their intertheoretical re-
lations. In this sense, I will reconstruct these theories and answer the
question whether there is a form of structural continuity from Bloomfield
over Harris to the early Chomsky, or not. If any structural continuity
can be found, it will give us reasons to argue for structural realism, in
this specific case for structural continuity in linguistics.
1See Seuren’s 1998 and Newmeyer’s 1986 and 1996 analysis of this episode of the
history of linguistics.
10 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Until now, it has not been investigated whether structural realism
also applies to a branch of science like linguistics, where theories pre-
dominantly contain qualitative concepts and do not employ a devel-
oped mathematical apparatus, as in physics, economics, geology, and
many other scientific disciplines. In the sense of Ladyman and Ross
(2007), I will also argue for the applicability of structural realism to non-
mathematized fields of science. The logical reconstruction of the above
mentioned theories of linguistics will give further results and, if success-
ful, it can strengthen a version of structural realism that is focussed on
the notion of structural continuity. It would be possible to show its appli-
cability to the field of linguistics and therefore also to theories radically
different from those of physics.
With this, the immediate question of a certain "primacy" of physics
as the exemplar science arises. I will discuss in which sense it might be
fruitful to search for structural continuities in most fields of empirical
science or whether it might be more plausible to argue for a form of
reductionism to physics, or at least of a primacy, which physics might
occupy. The complex question of reductionism plays an important role
because we might think of fields of empirical inquiry that are far different
from physics, as linguistics. In consequence, it might become extremely
difficult to motivate a "primacy of physics position" and to show in which
sense a linguistic theory might be reducible to physics, or at least some-
how "dominated" by physical theories.
In chapter 2, I will trace the origin of the debate on structural real-
ism by outlining and discussing problems of traditional scientific realism.
I will present the main obstacles for scientific realism. Furthermore,
the historical development of structural realism will be discussed. I will
11
present the views of Poincaré, Russell, and with great detail, the view of
Carnap and his early epistemology.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation concerns the formal framework in which
I aim to work, i.e. the structuralist meta-theory. I present the formal
framework of this view, before I present a discussion of the historical
development of this view, and how the early epistemology of Carnap and
Kuhn’s views on scientific change influenced this view. I argue that these
influences make the structuralist meta-theory already a predestined view
for applying it to questions of structural realism and theory change. After
this, I outline one formal notion of this view (the notion of reduction). I
argue that for the ellucidation of structural continuity, it will be especially
helpful to employ this notion.
After that, I will discuss the so-called Newman objection in chapter
4. This objection presents a core problem for structural realism. As will
become clear below, I present a way out of the Newman objection, by
modifying structural realism in a pragmatic way.
Chapter 5 addresses exclusively the view of ontic structural realism.
I discuss this view and show how it could be formulated plausibly for
linguistic theory. For this purpose, I will argue that ontic structural
realism can be formulated in the framework of Harris’ transformational
theory. In this chapter, I also respond to a critique that has been made
against structural realism in the special sciences.
In chapter 6, I present the already mentioned case study of theory
change from the discipline of linguistics. There, I first present arguments
which support my view that I chose the case study. Generally, the phase
of theory change in linguistics I have chosen presents precisely a phase
of theoretical development when a scientific discipline passes from a pre-
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mature status, to a status of full maturity, as I will show. After this,
I present a conceptual and logical reconstruction of the three theories
under issue. I will show the logical structure of these theories, by repre-
senting them in the framework of the structuralist meta-theory. For the
case of the reconstruction of Bloomfield’s theory, I also show that Bloom-
field’s theoretical approach is strongly analogous to Carnap’s method of
quasianalysis, developed in the Aufbau. After the structuralist recon-
struction, I will show how structural continuities between these theories
obtain, by referring to the formal notion of reduction.
After this, I will respond to open questions and critiques that have
been made to structural realism in chapter 7. I have characterized the
most important critiques that have been made to structural realism, and
my aim will be to respond each of these critiques in detail.
In chapter 8, I discuss how structural realism leads us to a form of
neutralism with respect to the debate on scientific realism. I will argue
that, after moving to the camp of structural realism, and after employing
formal tools for the description of the structure of our knowledge about
scientific theories, one should take a neutral stance in the debate. In
this sense, I propose to move first from scientific realism to a form of
structural realism, then to a form of neutralism.
Chapter 2
Towards structural realism
2.1 Introduction
Worrall’s (1989) approach is the locus classicus to the debate on struc-
tural realism in contemporary philosophy of science. This view affirms
the following. Given that our theories change, what is retained is their
structural content and that there is structural continuity between our
theories, even through revolutionary theory change. After Worrall’s orig-
inal proposal, there have been several developments concerning a for-
mulation of mainly two views within the debate on structural realism,
so-called epistemic and ontic structural realism. The epistemic form of
structural realism affirms that our epistemic access to the world occurs
through structural descriptions and that all our knowledge of the unob-
servable world is structural. Historically, this view can already be found
in Poincaré (1905 and 1913), Russell (1912, 1927), Carnap (1928), or
Maxwell (1962), amongst others. According to ontic structural realism,
all that exists is structure and individual objects do not exist indepen-
dently of the structures in which they appear. For the ontic structural
13
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realist, the ontologically basic entities are structures, not objects. On
the one hand, there is a discussion about structural realism that focusses
completely on contemporary physics, for instance Lyre (2004), Esfeld
(2004), or French and Ladyman (2003). On the other hand, works from
Psillos (2001, 2006), Worrall (1989), or Votsis (2003, 2004) approach it
in a way that clearly has a focus on general philosophy of science and
epistemology.
In this chapter, I will discuss and outline the historical development
of structural realism, before providing a general characterization of struc-
tural realism. For this purpose, I will first discuss the development of the
scientific realism debate, and argue that the formulation of several open
questions in this debate lead to structural realism in its modern version.
Secondly, I will discuss the development of early structuralist epistemolo-
gies, specifically those of Poincaré and Russell, and with more detail, the
position of Carnap. I end this chapter with a brief characterization of
structural realism.
In a first approach, we can say that structuralism is a position that
gives more importance to relations than to objects. We can think of a
structure as a system of relations. A structuralist position is then one
which is more interested in the whole system of relations than in single
objects, one that emphasizes on the whole structure. For a structuralist,
it is the case that one cannot study whatever domain of knowledge by
individuating single objects and not taking into account the whole struc-
ture. There exist many different structuralisms, in fields such diverse
as linguistics, literary theory, psychology, anthropology or philosophy.
This first intuitive understanding of structuralism is what can be called
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a starting point for all forms of structuralism. Soon, it gets more concrete
and the different forms depart quickly from each other.
Whenever I will talk about a structure, I will rely on the standard
formal notion that can be found in logic textbooks: A structure, in a
precise sense, is the following entity: 〈D1, ..., Dm, R1, ..., Rn〉. The
Di are so-called basic sets and the Rj are relations constructed on these
sets. The Di contain what is taken to be the ontology, i.e. they contain
the objects of which one speaks. Note that these objects are part of
a structure. The existence of the entities which are taken to be the
elements of the basic domains of our structures is merely a posit. For
the structuralist, objects do only exist within these domains, which are
itself a constitutive part of a structure and specified by the Rj, which
are usually functions. As a simple example, one could think of objects
such as chairs, as elements of a domain D, and then define relations R1
to Rn that describe in which spatial relation the chairs are located to
each other. This would be a structural description of our knowledge of
the spatial location of these chairs.
2.2 Scientific realism and structural realism
2.2.1 Components of scientific realism
To begin this section, I will characterize the components of traditional
scientific realism. As usually formulated (see Putnam 1975a and 1975b,
Boyd 1983, or Psillos 1999), scientific realism is presented as a view about
the aim of science, with accompanying semantic and epistemological the-
ses. Scientific realism is the view that our scientific theories are true (or
at least approximately true) descriptions of the relevant aspects of the
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external universe. As is well known, the classical formulation of scien-
tific realism involves the combination of three different, simpler realist
positions, namely, metaphysical, semantic, and epistemological realism.
For a comprehensive formulation of scientific realism, these three com-
ponents are needed. The first component, metaphysical realism, is the
most general and intuitively the most basic feature of realism.
Metaphysical realism: According to this doctrine, the world exists
mind-independently. It is not constituted by our imagination or our
inquiries, it is not a construction or a creation of our thoughts. Meta-
physical realism is not only presupposed by all scientific realists, it is
normally assumed also by standard antirealists.
Semantic realism: This view states that all terms of a (scientific) lan-
guage refer, whether they stand for observable or unobservable entities.
Epistemological realism: On this view, scientific theories provide an
accurate description of the world. In this sense, we obtain knowledge of
the world (in part) through the accounts provided by our scientific theo-
ries, which in turn depend on particular interpretations of these theories
and their conceptual underpinnings.
The term ‘approximately true’ is used, because scientific realists ac-
knowledge the fact that our scientific theories change over the course of
time, sometimes they are replaced by radically different successor the-
ories. To accept a scientific theory is not the same as believing that
its truth is certain. It should also be clear that our scientific theories
are open to refutation by rival theories at all time, or by the discovery of
some new evidence that can be incompatible with a currently held theory.
Scientific realism usually applies degrees of acceptance to theories. For
example, to accept the scientific theory of molecular biology is not the
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same as believing that it is impossible for the theory to be false,. Instead,
it means to assign to it a high degree of acceptance, since it is a theory
that gives truthful predictions and that explains certain phenomena.
Furthermore, scientific claims are always open to falsification. In
scientific realism, it is believed that our successful theories reflect the
true “nature" of reality. In this sense, all scientific realists are aware of
the fact that our theories are fallible, but nevertheless sometimes we gain
correct accounts of how the universe is.
Scientific theories can be wrong, but they still give us an accurate
model of what there is. In the nineteen-seventies of the twentieth century,
scientific realism was famously developed by Hilary Putnam (1975b). At
his time, Putnam aimed to defend a realist picture against historicist,
relativist and constructivist arguments by Thomas Kuhn (1962) and Paul
Feyerabend (1975), amongst others.
Putnam (1975b: 69-73) argued for scientific realism by claiming that
the following central assumptions are true:
1. Sentences of our scientific theories make true or false claims. These
sentences are true because of something external to us.
2. The terms of our scientific theories typically refer.
3. In a mature science, accepted theories are taken to be at least
approximately true.
4. With our theoretical terms, we can refer to the same entity, even
when it occurs in different theories.
18 CHAPTER 2. TOWARDS STRUCTURAL REALISM
One further adherent of classical scientific realism is Richard Boyd. Ac-
cording to him, reality is prior to thought, and the theories of mature
sciences (such as physics or biology) approximately represent the fea-
tures of the world. We can think of such a representation by means of
a successful act of reference. We will now take a look at several core
assumptions and also problems for scientific realism. This is required for
the purpose of formulating structural realism and for the understanding
of its development out of this context.
2.2.2 The no-miracles-argument
The main arguments for scientific realism make use of the so-called “In-
ference to the best explanation" (IBE). Ladyman and Ross (2007: 69)
explain these arguments as the ‘local’ and ‘global’ appeals to the IBE to
defend scientific realism. This means that, once we make an inference,
we seek to explain a fact, by positing another fact, where the first is a
sufficient condition for the second one, and the first is the ‘best’ option
from the set of sufficient conditions for the second. This criterion gives
plenty of room for interpretation, because there might not be a consensus
regarding the question of what the ‘best’ option from the set of sufficient
conditions for the second inference is.
In oder to determine which are the ‘best’ options, one usually makes
use of notions such as coherence with other data, or plausibility. These
criteria are similar to criteria of the debate of theory choice in epistemol-
ogy. IBE-arguments are clearly not sufficient for the scientific realist, as
is famously addressed by one of the most important opponents of real-
ism, Bas van Fraassen (1980). He argues that any theory can in principle
be interpreted in pragmatic terms such as coherence or plausibility, and
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that we are not obliged to infer that a given theory is true, only because
it is the best explanation for some phenomena. Any given theory could
also be regarded as an empirically adequate explanation of the phenom-
ena. Such an empirically adequate explanation is an explanation that
accounts for the empirical data “as if it were true". This would be more
elegant than the realist view, given that one need not commit to the
theory being true. One would only continue to investigate the domain
with the resources of the theory at hand, and remain agnostic regarding
the existence of the objects and processes of the theory.
Let us turn the focus now to what has been known as the strongest
argument in favour of scientific realism (according to Psillos 1999 and
Worrall 1989), the so-called no-miracles argument (NMA): In the discus-
sion about scientific realism, the NMA is known as a strong argument
for standard scientific realism. This global version of an IBE-argument
goes back to Smart (1963, 1979), Putnam (1975b) and Boyd (1983). As
a logically valid argument, the NMA can be formulated as follows:
(i) Our empirical theories are successful.
(ii) If our empirical theories are successful and our empirical theories are
false, then it is a miracle that our empirical theories are successful.
(iii) It is not a miracle that our empirical theories are successful.
∴ Therefore, our empirical theories are true.
The basic assumption that is made by the NMA is that it would seem a
complete miracle if we would obtain correct predictions from false theo-
ries, if for example, an airplane would fly, but the theory that the engineer
would use to build it would be false, etc. The NMA assumes implicitly
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that science has formulated already plenty of successful theories. The
issue of novel prediction needs to be scrutinized further, since it is in
principle possible that a theory gives us accurate descriptions and cor-
rect predictions merely by chance. But NMA is not explaining the fact
that our scientific theories can in fact produce novel predictions. For a
scientific realist, if a theory gives us a correct model of reality, it fol-
lows that it will also entail novel predictions. But for the anti-realist, on
the other side, this is not clear. From the anti-realist perspective, it is
required that one gives an alternative explanantion.
The scientific realist could argue that our scientific theories should be
understood to consist of two parts. First, there is an empirical part that
collects the data from the phenomena, so to speak. The other part could
be called theoretical. In this part, we build a model of the phenomena,
which connects the results of our measurements and attempts to explain
them. If the theoretical part of the theory contains a correct explanation,
the predictions that are entailed by the theory will be correct as well.
The fact that our theories produce novel predictions is widely ac-
cepted. In order to illustrate this, we can think of a new piece of technol-
ogy as a particular predictive success of the theories on which its construc-
tion is based. For example, an airplane would not fly, or a smartphone
would not work, if certain underlying theories of fundamental physics
would not be correct. In a sense, the inventor of a new technological de-
vice predicts that a certain assemblance of parts will construct a device
that will have certain functions. In this sense, technology gives us many
concrete examples of novel predictions in science.
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An objection to NMA
One of the most important criticizers of scientific realism, Bas van Fraassen
(1980: 38), rephrases NMA as follows: Since science needs to explain its
success and certain regularities in the world need to be explained as well,
the remaining question is if the realist explanation for the success of sci-
ence is the only non-miraculous explanation that is available. He suggests
that one could also think of a Darwinian explanantion, and explain this
success without committing to scientific realism.
From the Darwinian account, science is successful in a selectionist
sense. This means that, analogously to evolutionary biology, where cer-
tain organisms with more favourable traits than others produce more
offspring than those with less favourable traits, the dynamics of scien-
tific theories work the same way. During the course of time, favourable
traits proliferate, and the less favourable traits disappear. At the end of
an evolutionary process, one can observe a set of organisms with many
favourable traits. Analogously, science gives us many predictive theories,
and those with the most favourable traits will proliferate as well. Traits
in this sense would be virtues such as coherence, elegance, economy, ex-
planatorial success or simplicty, amongst others. In this sense science is
full of predictive theories, but this does not mean that we are in need of
a realist interpretation, or a miracle. According to van Fraassen, it only
means that the success of science can be explained as well in a Darwinian
sense, without a need of NMA. There is no need of considering it mirac-
ulous that there are rival theories. Why not think that there are many
theories out there which can give us correct predictions, but that some
of them are, “evolutionarily speaking", more fit than others?
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We have seen that NMA gives scientific realism a strong ground, but
that there is also a way to criticize NMA, as van Fraassen did. However,
I consider van Fraassen’s critique of scientific realism as weak, since it
stays at a metaphorical level with the Darwinian account. His critique
falls short of giving more detail. In any case, NMA itself is not enough if
one aims to defend scientific realism. Unfortunately, there are still more
problems for scientific realism that would need to be addressed, if one
wants to defend this view.
2.2.3 Holism and underdetermination
The discussion on the general problem of underdetermination of theories
by data is older than the philosophy of science. In a sense it can be
understood as a modern and scientistic version of a Cartesian Demon,
so to speak. In more recent times, John Stuart Mill was the first who
formulated the problem of underdetermination, a problem which has been
famously formulated by Willard Van Orman Quine in the proper context
of epistemology and the philosophy of science. Mill states:
Most thinkers of any degree of sobriety allow, that an hypoth-
esis . . . is not to be received as probably true because it ac-
counts for all the known phenomena, since this is a condition
sometimes fulfilled tolerably well by two conflicting hypothe-
ses . . . while there are probably a thousand more which are
equally possible, but which, for want of anything analogous
in our experience, our minds are unfitted to conceive. ([1867]
1900: 328)
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For standard scientific realism, certain theoretical mechanisms within a
successful scientific theory help us to refer to “reality" successfully. The
problem of underdetermination undermines this realist thesis. Following
this argument, it is not possible to specify one single theory, but many
of them. This means that we are in principle not able to formulate one
particular theory that reflects reality. This argument goes back to Quine
(1975) and we can explicate it as follows.
According to Quine, for every observation in science, there is the
possibility to formulate an infinte number of theories and these theories
can in principle be formulated in a way that they are contradicting each
other. Let us think of a hypothesis H, and of an observational statement
B. If we aim to revise this hypothesis, we can infer a prediction from this
hypothesis, let us call this prediction P , such that H ⇒ B. We observe
in the following step if B is in fact the case. If B does not obtain, we can
infer the falsity of H, by modus tollens. However, in order to infer B,
we need background assumptions. This means that we are not able to
infer from the falsity of the observational statement B the falsity of the
hypothesis H. We are only in the position to infer the falsity of H and
at least one background assumption A. Formally speaking, this means
the following:
H ∧ A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An ⇒ B ¬B
¬(H ∧ A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An)
¬H ∨ ¬A1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬An
Quine argues that we can never pick out a hypothesis in isolation from
others, but only in the context of the whole of a system of background
assumptions. This thesis is widely known as the Duhem-Quine-Thesis,
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going back to Pierre Duhem (1914) as well as to Quine. Despite the
fact that Quine’s critique is now older than half a century, the problem
of underdetermination is still an open question. Holism as a thesis has
proven to be sustainable, but in a restricted way, since Quine’s original
form was too radical (see Fodor and Lepore 1992, and Moulines 1986 for
an exhaustive discussion of holism).
For a scientific realist, the thesis of underdetermination presents a
problem. Since there is always a logical possibility for this problem to
arise, we can not put it beside in our debate on scientific realism. The
main consequence of this is that the scientific realist is not justified in
asserting that one particular theory uniquely reflects reality, but several
of them.
In order to overcome the problem of underdetermination, it is useful
to distinguish between weak and strong underdetermination. The first
case is called weak, since it occurs only in situations when a theory is
consistent with all the evidence, and another theory is consistent with
the same evidence as well. But since it is usually about two theories that
are both consistent with the evidence, one is not driven to reject scientific
realism. Weak underdetermination is not strong enough, since one could
easily choose between two theories. One theory might just be fulfilling
an epistemic virtue in a better way, and the scientist can easily choose.
Theories that are weakly empirically equivalent can be distinguished by
such a move.
In the case of strong underdetermination, this problem becomes big-
ger. The stronger form of underdetermination relies on a stronger notion
of empirical equivalence, where this latter notion is understood as follows.
Strong empirical equivalence means that two theories produce exactly the
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same empirical consequences, including all possible future data, not only
the actual ones. More precisely, this means that for every theory there
exists an infinite number of strongly equivalent, but incompatible the-
ories. There is no way that any evidence could ever distinguish these
theories. In this way, theory-choice is not possible anymore. Thus, it fol-
lows that there is in fact no way of justifying the selection of a particular
theory as the true representation of the world.
Objections to the problem of underdetermination
However, the scientific realist can defend her view by alluding to the
following problems for underdetermination. First, from the fact that
theories can have the same evidential support, it does not follow that
they also have the same epistemic virtues, such as their simplicity, the
explanatory power, elegance, etc. In this sense, one could still choose
between theories. However, this appears to be too weak for a fully fledged
realist, and these epistemic virtues can also be used by an instrumentalist
or a constructive empiricist, such as van Fraassen.
Secondly, when we test our theories, we are in fact able to use auxiliary
hypotheses in our derivations. By doing so, the empirical equivalence
of our theories may be affected as well. Quine showed us that it is
highly plausible to understand theories as complex constructs, normally
including many auxiliary hypotheses. In this sense, one can think of
two theories that are empirically equivalent at first sight, and taken in
isolation. But once the respective auxiliary hypotheses are included in the
evaluation of these theories, they might turn out to be actually different.
Thirdly, for two theories to be empirically equivalent, it is required
that we have a clear distinction between the observable and the unob-
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servable consequences of a theory. In fact, the distinction between the
observable and the unobservable is not always sharp and can sometimes
not be established. In this sense, on could undermine the problem of
underdetermination by just appealing to this fact.
Despite these possible answers to the problem of underdetermination,
it is not entirely clear that we are still scientific realists if we approach
underdetermination in one of these ways. After all, the standard scientific
realist picture is significantly weakened. I will offer an answer to the
problem of underdetermination from the perspective of structural realism
in chapter 7.
Concerning the debate on underdetermination and epistemic virtues,
one problem is that scientific theories are distinguishable by these virtues,
even if the empirical equivalence between theories tells us otherwise. For
instance, we might even prefer a theory with less empirical relevance over
another one, only because it might have a higher explanatory power, or
more elegance or simplicity. In this sense, relying on such epistemic or
superempirical virtues does not appear to help the scientific realist. An
anti-realist could use these virtues as well, since from that perspective,
such virtues can be seen as being entirely pragmatic, and in this sense
not realist. We could choose between theories without any reference to
the notion of truth. In this sense, underdetermination cannot be fully
undermined by appealing to epistemic virtues from a realist perspective.
2.2.4 Theory change
In the scientific realism debate, what has been taken to be a strong indi-
cator against scientific realism, is the fact that our theories change over
the course of time (see Laudan 1981). Before the challenge of answering
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issues connected with theory change, scientific realism could be defended
in its classical way by the NMA. To recall it quickly, the central claim of
the NMA is that the best explanation for the predictive success of our
theories is that they are (at least approximately) true, for it would be
a miracle if the predictions would be correct and rely on false theories.
However, Laudan challenges NMA by arguing that there is no necessary
connection between reference and predictive success. A theory can be
predictively successful, but still not refer to anything, Laudan argues.
Furthermore, he argues that approximate truth cannot be defined coher-
ently. He also argues that there are many cases in the history of science
where theories that were believed to be true turned out as false. This
last part of Laudan’s arguments is famously known as the pessimistic
meta-induction (PMI).
The pessimistic meta-induction
Laudan (1981) formulated PMI and referred to the history of science.
He argues that by looking at the historical development of our scientific
theories, it is clearly recognizable that the empirical success of a theory
does not entail its (approximate) truth. His argument can be stated as
follows:
(i) In the course of history, all our past empirical theories have turned
out to be false. They have always been abandoned and/or replaced
by successor theories.
(ii) If this has always been the case in the past, it is at least very likely
that this will also be the case for actual and future empirical theo-
ries which we currently hold as being true/correct.
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∴ Therefore, it is very likely that our currently held empirical theories
are not true and that our future empirical theories will turn out to
be false as well.
The debate on scientific realism has taken several different directions. By
formulating arguments such as the NMA or PMI, the classical scientific
realist picture is only upheld if one develops a promising account of refer-
ence of scientific terms, as Psillos intents to do (1999). However, theories
of reference of scientific terms ultimately have to be accomodated within
the group of theories of direct reference (such as Kripke 1970, 1980, or
Putnam 1975a, 1975b, 1981), or within the group of its opponents, such
as classical theories of indirect reference (Russell, 1905). This leads to
different problems in the philosophy of language, and moves the debate
into a different branch of philosophy. In the light of this results, in order
to defend scientific realism, one needs to come up with a new account
of the reference of scientific terms and, furthermore, should be able to
answer to the strong problem of underdetermination as well. This task
seems nearly impossible, I argue. In this sense, one might be better off
with moving towards a stance that has been famously introduced by John
Worrall in 1989, namely, structural realism.
Worrall develops structural realism with the background of taking
into account what he calls “the best of both worlds", by including parts
of both the NMA and PMI. Within the proposal of his version of struc-
tural realism, it does not seem a miracle that our theories make correct
predictions on the one hand, and it does not seem problematic that our
theories often change radically over time on the other hand either.
Before I will discuss contemporary structural realism in Worrall’s
sense in the following chapters, I will now outline what I consider to
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be the most influential work that has been done on structural realism
and structuralist epistemologies within the analytic tradition. This be-
comes important if we aim to formulate a version of structural realism
that can be upheld in the contemporary debate, and especially in the last
chapter of this dissertation, where I argue that structural realism leads
to what has been called neutralism by Psillos (1999).
2.3 Early structuralist approaches
In this section, I will outline what I interpret to be the figures which
developed structuralist positions in epistemology and in the philosophy
of science. These developments gave birth to our contemporary structural
realist view.
2.3.1 Poincaré and Russell
We can think of Poincaré as the first structural realist. Of course, the
name structural realism was introduced many years later to the debate
(by Maxwell in 1962). But this does not really change the fact that many
of Poincaré’s positions concerned with general questions on theory change
in the philosophy of science are very similar to contemporary structural
realists. Let us consider the following, famous passage:
At the first blush it seems to us that the theories last only a
day and that ruins upon ruins accumulate... But if we look
more closely, we see that what thus succumb are the theo-
ries properly so called, those that pretend to teach us what
things are. But there is in them something which usually sur-
vives. If one of them taught us a true relation, this relation is
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definitively acquired, and it will be found again under a new
disguise in the other theories which will successively come to
reign in place of the old (Poincaré 1913: 351).
Here it becomes clear that Poincaré was already focussing on relations
that we can find again through radical theoretical shifts. He refers to
true relations and states that these will definitely be found again in later
theories. This is exactly what was later called structural continuity (see
Worrall 1989). And it is exactly the polemical point about this position,
since what is needed is more detailed case studies of theoretical change
where it is shown that such relations are in fact found again. Even more
important and clearer, Poincaré states in 1905:
Fresnel’s theory enables us to do today as well as it did before
Maxwell’s time. The differential equations are always true
. . . they express relations, and if the equations remain true, it
is because the relations preserve their reality. They teach us
now, as they did then, that there is such and such a relation
between this thing and that; only, the something which we
then called motion; we now call electric current. But these
are merely names of the images we substituted for the real
objects which Nature will hide forever from our eyes (Poincaré
1905: 160-161).
This famous quote is also the passage to which Worrall (1989) refers when
he mentions that structural realism can already be found in Poincaré. I
fully agree with Worrall that Poincaré was in fact one of the first struc-
tural realists, without calling himself so. Anyhow, there is no difference
in Poincaré’s and Worrall’s positions concerning theory change. Both
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appeal to the continuity of structure. It is also clear that both refer to
equations as structures.
A primarily epistemological approach to structuralism was developed
by Bertrand Russell. Already in his 1912 The Problems of Philosophy, it
becomes quite clear that he endorses an epistemic structuralism:
Assuming that there is physical space, and that it does thus
correspond to private spaces, what can we know about it?
. . . That is to say, we can know nothing of what it is like
in itself, but we can know the sort of arrangement of phys-
ical objects which results from their spatial relations . . .We
can know the properties of the relations required to preserve
the correspondence with sense-data, but we cannot know the
nature of the terms between which the relations hold (ibid.:
15-16).
We can see that Russell focusses on a direct epistemic structuralism, by
not mentioning any empirical theory concretely, as Poincaré does. It is
worth to note that both Poincaré and Russell mention a nature or reality
of the things as they are, which is unknowable. This is a strong similarity
to what Kant called the Ding an sich, which was also unknowable in his
epistemology. Though it might not be possible to defend the view that
even Kant was a structural realist, the similarity between these authors is
remarkable and it can at least be said that Poincaré and Russell were at
least influenced by what could be called a Kantian air. More obviously
and less surprising, the same holds for Carnap, as we will see in the
following section.
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2.3.2 Carnap: Objectivity and structure
The early philosophy of Rudolf Carnap suggests a structuralist episte-
mology as well. Carnap calls his project in the Aufbau constitutional
system. Carnap’s idea was to extend the logicist project of reduction of
all mathematics to logic to the field of empirical science. According to
Carnap, a pure relational theory is best applied with his constitutional
system.
For his project, what counts as real is the content of our basic expe-
riences. This reality can only be individuated through the introduction
of formal operators that build objects. It is through the construction of
classes and relations, how this succeeds. By applying this procedure of
analysis, different types of objects are constituted. These types of objects
represent the different domains of the particular sciences.
According to Carnap, all propositions of science refer to structural
properties of the relations that define their objects. To this, one might
immediately object that in mathematics, we formulate propositions only
about structures, but the empirical sciences have to be capable of giv-
ing criteria for distinguishing the different entities they speak of. This
means that the propositions of empirical science need to serve as criteria
for individuating particular phenomena. By only giving a structural de-
scription, we are not able to do so, it appears. Carnap’s aim was precisely
to develop a system for the description of objects where one is able to
individuate the objects of a domain via purely structural descriptions.
Carnap mentions that the purpose of the constitutional system is not
only to classify concepts, but to construct all concepts of science from
certain basic concepts. Its task is to establish the nature of each concept
that belongs to what we call science. In this sense, constitution is a form
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of reduction. The logically complex things are constituted by logically
simpler ones. The idea of reduction consists of finding a general rule
that indicates the way in which a statement about one object can be
transformed to a proposition about other objects.
Influences on Carnap’s structuralism
Carnap’s structuralist epistemology was influenced by several other au-
thors. In this section, I will outline and discuss those influences. Michael
Friedman (1999) explains the historical context of Carnap’s early struc-
turalism as follows:
Carnap’s conception of knowledge and meaning is Kantian
. . . objective meaning can only be derived "from above" -
from formal or structural relations within the entire system of
knowledge. The conception plays an important role, for ex-
ample, in Moritz Schlick’s (1918) Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre,
Russell’s (1927) The Analysis of Matter . . . All of these works
disengage meaning and knowledge from ostension, and lodge
them instead in the system of logical relationships among our
concepts . . . All of these writers, including Carnap, are clearly
indebted to the notion of "implicit definition" deriving from
Hilbert’s (1899) axiomatization of Euclidean geometry (ibid.:
99-100).
What Friedman calls “disengage" meaning from ostension is a central
aspect in Carnap’s structuralism. In the Aufbau, §16, Carnap introduces
his purely structural definite descriptions of knowledge. Following him,
only such descriptions guarantee objectivity:
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Every scientific statement can in principle be so transformed
that it is only a structural statement. . . . For science wants
to speak about the objective; however, everything that does
not belong to the structure but to the material, everything
that is ostended concretely, is in the end subjective . . . If we
aim, in spite of this, at agreement in the names given for
the objects constituted on the basis of the experiences, then
this cannot occur through reference to the completely diverg-
ing material but only through the formal indicators of the
object-structures (ibid.: all translations from the Aufbau in
this dissertation are mine.).
By disconnecting descriptions from ostension and by introducing his
purely structural definite descriptions, Carnap aims to provide a method
that guarantees objectivity in the language of science. Whatever is expe-
rienced and then formulated as a statement, is only described in terms of
purely structural definite descriptions, i.e. statements about its relation
to other events.
This bears an interesting connection to David Hilbert. In his formal-
ization of geometry, Hilbert said that concepts such as ‘point’ or ‘line’
were whatever make the axioms of euclidian geometry true. In this way,
the concepts used in the axioms are implicitly defined by general truths
that hold of these concepts. Hilberts method of implicitly defining con-
sisted in the postulation of certain axioms. In these axioms, there appear
concepts that are not independently defined. They state that those con-
cepts are simply whatever makes those axioms true. For example, ‘point’
and ‘line’ are partially defined by the general truth that, for any two dis-
tinct points there is a line, such that those points lie on that line. Implicit
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definition determines concepts in relation to one another. But implicit
definitions are not meant to be used for the determination of the connec-
tion between such concepts and empirical reality. In other words: The
concepts mentioned in the axioms are defined by their role in the axioms.
As an early logical empiricist witness for Hilbert’s influence, I mention
Schlick’s General Theory of Knowledge, where concepts of geometry are
understood as entities that are bearers of the relations laid down by the
system of axioms. Schlick (1918) makes it clear that implicit definitions
are in no connection to empirical reality:
Implicit definition, . . . never stands in community or connec-
tion with reality, it denies this intentionally and in principle,
it remains in the realm of concepts. A framework of truths
constructed with the help of implicit definition never rests on
the ground of reality, but, as it were, floats free, bearing, like
the solar system, the guarantee of its stability within itself.
None of the concepts appearing therein designate, in the the-
ory, a real thing; rather, they mutually designate one another
in such a way that the meaning of one concept consists in
a determinate constellation of a number of the others (ibid.:
§7, p. 37; the translation is mine.).
The mere abstract mathematical structure is given by Hilbertian im-
plicit definitions, but Carnap’s purely structural definite descriptions are
explicit definitions: they pick out a definite object in the domain of the
constitutional system by specifying it as the unique such object satisfying
purely formal conditions (see also Richardson 1997 for this). Carnap was
certainly inspired by implicit definitions. Nevertheless, with his purely
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structural definite descriptions, he aimed to distinguish his method from
Schlick’s and Hilbert’s, since he also pursued a different aim, i.e. the de-
scription of a purely empirical domain by making use of purely structural
descriptions.
In the Aufbau, the empirical domain is given as the set of elemen-
tary experiences on which the basic relation of “recollection of similarity"
(Ähnlichkeitserinnerung) is defined. In contrast to a system of implicit
definitions, then, Carnap’s constitutional system is concerned with the
description of the empirical world from the beginning. By relying on the
fundamental relations (Grundrelationen) (§75), Carnap argues that by
taking these as the undefined basic concepts of his constitutional system,
it becomes possible to unify positivism and neo-kantianism:
The achievement of the revelation of the necessary basis of
the constitutional system is therefore due to two totally dif-
ferent philosophical positions, which are often hostile to each
other. Positivism highlighted that the only material of knowl-
edge lies in the unprocessed and knowledgeable given; the
fundamental elements of the constitutional system are to be
searched there. Transcendental idealism, especially in the
style of neo-kantianism (Rickert, Cassirer, Bauch) has argued
rightly that these elements do not suffice; because posits of
order need to be added, our "fundamental relations" (ibid.:
§75).
Carnap’s neo-Kantian motivation for his system in the Aufbau becomes
clearer here, §177:
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Constitutional theory and transcendental idealism agree in
representing the following position: all objects of cognition
are constituted and, the constituted objects are only objects
of conceptual cognition in the sense that they are logical
forms, constructed in a determinate way. The same holds fi-
nally also for the fundamental elements of the constitutional
system. They are put as undecomposable units at the ba-
sis, but then, as the constitutional system proceeds, they be-
come occupied (belegt) with several properties and decom-
posed into quasi-components (ibid.).
Carnap aimed to overcome traditional philosophical disputes with his
constitutional theory, (see his §5) where he argued that his theory uses
a neutral language and does not fall into either, realism or idealism. He
argues for a neutralist stance in such philosophical disputes. Still, the
introduction of the fundamental relation is inspired by the neo-kantians.
Carnap’s neutralism and its relation to structural realism and to the
structuralist meta-theory will be discussed in detail in chapter 8 of this
dissertation.
2.4 Structural realism characterized
After having discussed the development of structural realism, I will now
characterize the general view of structural realism, as it is widely ac-
cepted in a standard version. It should be clear that besides Poincaré,
Russell and Carnap, there have been many other authors that made sig-
nificant contributions to the development of structural realism, such as
Grover Maxwell (1962). For the purpose of this dissertation, I only men-
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tioned these three authors, since I consider only their views to be directly
relevant to my own work.
However, despite a considerable sophistication and bifurcation of the
debate on structural realism (see Frigg and Votsis 2011, or French 2014),
I think that there are still two main currents of this view, i.e. the ontic
and the epistemic current. On the one hand, the epistemic variant of
structural realism (abbreviated as ESR) can be expressed as follows:
All we can know of the unobservable world is its structure.
On the other hand, there is the perhaps more controversial and meta-
physically more polemical view of ontic structural realism (abbreviated
as OSR), which states that:
All that exists at the ontologically most fundamental level is structure,
and there are no individual objects.
After having characterized structural realism and after having shown
where one should place its development in the history of the philosophy
of science, I will discuss what is often seen as the main problem for
structural realism, the so-called Newman objection in chapter 4. In what
follows, I will outline the framework of the structuralist meta-theory and
its possible applicability to questions of structural realism.
Chapter 3
The structuralist meta-theory
In this section, I will outline and present the formal framework of the
structuralist meta-theory. In this view, empirical theories are not under-
stood as sets of statements closed under deduction, it is a non-statement-
view. Moreover, empirical theories are understood as classes of model-
theoretic structures. As it is expressed in the following passage:
The fundamental intuition underlying our approach is that
the smallest significant or interesting parts of empirical sci-
ence - things like empirical laws - are best characterized, not
as linguistic entities, but as model-theoretic entities - classes
of set-theoretic structures (Balzer, et al. 1987: xxi).
First applied and developed by Joseph D. Sneed in his 1971 The Logical
Structure of Mathematical Physics, this approach was called Emended
Ramsey-View, since Sneed referred to Ramsey as a predecessor, espe-
cially concerning the question of theoretical terms. It was also Wolfgang
Stegmüller who developed the structuralist approach, later together with
Sneed and others. The central motivation of the development of the
structuralist meta-theory was a critical stance towards the received view
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(or statement-view) of scientific theories, which had been developed and
held by philosophers of science since logical positivism. Opposing to
the conception that scientific theories should be understood as sets of
statements, inferentially connected, Stegmüller (1973/1976) introduced
the name non-statement view of theories. The main difference to the
received view is that in the structuralist meta-theory, scientific theories
are axiomatized by means of set-theoretic predicates (this method goes
back to Patrick Suppes’ Introduction to Logic, from 1957).
3.1 The framework
The development of this approach goes back to works with a primary
focus on physics by Sneed, and an analysis of the Kuhnian approach
to scientific change by Stegmüller. Historically, there have been mainly
two influences on the structuralist meta-theory. First, the set-theoretical
approach in the philosophy of mathematics, developed by the group of
French mathematicians, called “Nicholas Bourbaki" (1970), and second,
Suppes’ method of defining set-theoretic predicates.
The structuralist meta-theory shares important assumptions about
the logical structure of scientific theories with other well known ap-
proaches like those of Bas van Fraassen (1980), or Steven French and
Newton Da Costa (2003), all being part of the so-called semantic con-
ception of scientific theories. All versions of the semantic conception
reject the view that scientific theories are best conceived as sets of state-
ments, closed under deduction. The adherents of the different semantic
approaches rather argue that an empirical theory is considered to be
given by its models.
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The structuralist meta-theory has developed detailed case studies of
different areas of empirical science, such as physics, biology, chemistry,
economics and linguistics, that have been worked out during the last
decades (see Diederich et al. 1989, 1994 for an overview). But it has
also diversified and developed promising approaches to the discussion
about the dynamics of theories (see Moulines 2011), theoretical terms
and belief revision theory (see Andreas 2011, 2013), and the debate on
scientific realism (see Sneed 1983).
As I have already mentioned above, the structuralist meta-theory
makes use of set-theoretic predicates. We can characterize a set-theoretic
predicate P as a predicate that specifies:
• the type of a structure 〈D1, . . . , Dk, R1, . . . , Rn〉, where k is the
number of base sets, and n the number of relations;
• the typification of the relations R1, . . . , Rn;
• the axioms that the relations R1, . . . , Rn need to satisfy.
As a result, the structure 〈D1, . . . , Dk, R1, . . . , Rn〉 will eventually satisfy
the set-theoretic predicate P . This methodological tool allows one to
represent the structure of scientific theories. In the structuralist meta-
theory in particular, a theory is given by its models, which are sequences
of the following form:
〈D1, ..., Dm, R1, ..., Rn〉
The Di are so-called basic sets and the Rj are relations constructed on
these sets. The Di contain what is taken to be the ontology of the
42 CHAPTER 3. THE STRUCTURALIST META-THEORY
theory, i.e. they contain the objects assumed by the theory as real. The
objects in the respective domains are specified by the Rj, which are
usually functions. In empirical theories which make use of quantitative
tools, they usually are functions mapping empirical objects into the real
numbers, or some other mathematical entities.
Potential models
In the structuralist meta-theory, theories are understood as tuples. More
specifically, an empirical theory is understood to consist of sets of models:
A so-called set of potential models (Mp) fixes the general framework, in
which an actual model of a theory is characterized. All entities that can
be subsumed under the same conceptual framework of a given theory are
members of the sets of the potential models of this theory. Let’s consider
an example of such a potential model, expressed as a set-theoretic pred-
icate, which makes the structure of an empirical theory explicit. We will
look at a potential model for Classical Collision Mechanics (see Balzer
et al. 1987: 26-27), which is a simplified system of mechanics, such as a
billiard game. We can think of colliding billiard balls:
A potential model of Classical Collision Mechanics : Mp(CCM) =
〈P, T,R, v,m〉
1. P is a finite, non-empty set
2. T contains exactly two elements
3. v : P × T → R3
4. m : P → R+
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The intended interpretation of this example is as follows: P is a set of
discrete bodies that can be called “particles" (in our example, we can
think of two billiard balls), T is a set of two instants, one time instant
before the collision, and the other time instant after the collision. v
is the velocity function, assigning to each particle p and point of time
its velocity as an element of R3. Velocity is a time-dependent vectorial
function whose range are triples of real numbers. It assigns a three-
component vector (one component for each direction in space) to each
particle at each time. m is the mass function, assigning to each particle
its mass.
Theoretical terms
As in many other approaches within the philosophy of science, the ques-
tion of theoretical terms is addressed within the approach of the struc-
turalist meta-theory. In this approach, the criterion for theoretical terms
is relativized to theories. By doing so, its adherents aim to escape some
of the problems that other approaches to theoretical terms have (as fa-
mously discussed in Sneed, 1971). The essential point in Sneed’s crite-
rion is that terms can be theoretical for one theory, but non-theoretical
in other theories. In the structuralist meta-theory, “The "empirical ba-
sis" of a given theory T should include those concepts which, in a sense
still to be made precise, are not specific for T . T ’s other concepts will
belong to T ’s theoretical "superstructure" (ibid.: 48)". This criterion
relativizes the notion of theoreticity and makes the status of theoreticity
of a term always dependent on a concrete empirical theory, in which it
occurs. More specifically, the structuralist criterion for theoreticity is as
follows: A term is T-theoretical if the set of all T -determining models
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is included in M(T ). More loosely, we can say that a term is theoreti-
cal if it can only be determined if the fundamental laws of a theory are
presupposed.
Partial potential models
Once the potential models are determined, the next step is to determine
the so-called partial potential models (Mpp). Partial potential models rep-
resent the framework for the corroboration or refutation of the theory in
question, they represent the framework of data, which shall corroborate
or refute a theory. The concepts inMpp can be determined independently
of a theory. Terms which are theoretical (and proper to T ) in the po-
tential models of the respective theory are cut out. In other words, this
means that partial potential models are the pure data-models within the
framework of the structuralist meta-theory. These sets of models do not
contain any theoretical terms or functions.
Actual models
Models which belong and which in addition satisfy the laws of a theory,
are called actual models (M) of a theory. The following is an example of
an actual model, (Balzer et al. 1987: 27):
x is an actual model of classical collision mechanics (x ∈M(CCM))
if and only if there exist P, T,R, v,m, such that:
1. x ∈Mp(CCM)
2.
∑
p∈P
m(p) · v(p, t1) =
∑
p∈P
m(p) · v(p, t2).
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In the actual model of CCM , the fundamental law of this theory is
added, the law of conservation of momentum, expressing that the sum of
the products of mass and velocity of each particle must remain the same
before and after a collision.
Global constraints
Furthermore, local applications of a scientific theory may overlap in space
and time. For this purpose, the formal notion of global constraint is in-
troduced. Global constraints (GC) are formal requirements that restrict
the components of a model in dependence of other components of other
models. Constraints express physical or real connections between dif-
ferent applications of a theory, i.e. the inner -theoretical relations. To
explain it intuitively, we can think of a physical object that is part of
a system. This object, say, a certain train wagon, must have the same
weight, no matter to which physical system that wagon belongs. It may
stand on a railroad somewhere in Nebraska, or on a railroad close to
Berlin. The same wagon will have the same weight, if we think of phys-
ical systems on earth (and under idealized conditions). Because of such
overlaps, the notion of constraint is required in the structuralist meta-
theory. In what follows, I will give the formal definition of a constraint
in the framework of the structuralist meta-theory.
The definition of a constraint, (see Balzer et al. 1987: 47) is as
follows:
If Mp is a class of potential models, then
(a) C is a constraint for Mp, iff
1. C ⊆ P(Mp)
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2. C 6= ∅ and ∅ /∈ C
3. ∀x ∈Mp : {x} ∈ C
Some empirical theories deal with the same or very similar domains of
objects. Particles will have the same mass in classical collision mechanics
and in classical particle mechanics. Anyhow, these are different theories.
Global links
The global links (GL) represent the intertheoretical connections between
such theories. They are important for the determination of theoretical
concepts, since non-theoretical terms can only be determined by means
of other theories which do not presuppose an earlier theory. This has as
a consequence that the partial potential models of a theory can get their
interpretation and their meaning only through other theories, which in
some sense "precede" that theory. The links represent some transfer of
information between theories. This information consists mainly of data
which are obtained in the course of some determination of a term which
is non-theoretical in a theory. Such transfer of data contributes to the
interpretation of the partial potential models. It is part of the deter-
mination of the meaning of the terms occurring in the partial potential
models, and therefore it is an essential component of a theory itself.
To take into account the functions linked with each other we shall not
denote these functions directly but rather the places they occupy in the
tuples constituting the potential models. I will now quote the definition
of a link (Balzer et al. 1987: 61):
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It is expedient to introduce the following notation: For any
given natural numbers i1, . . . , in let pi(T, i1, . . . , in) denote the
class of all tuples 〈Ri1 , . . . , Rin〉 for which there is some x ∈
Mp(T ) such that for j = 1, . . . , n : Rij = Rxij
That is, pi(T, i1, . . . , in) is the set of all sequences of functions
(or predicates) appearing in the places i1, . . . , in of potential
models of T .
(a) L is an abstract link from Mp to M ′p, iff L ⊆Mp ×M ′p
(b) L is a (concrete) link between Mp and M ′p, iff:
1. Mp and M ′p are classes of potential models with m and
m′ relations, respectively
2. There are i1, . . . , is ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j1, . . . , jt ∈ {1, . . . ,m′}
such that
3. L ⊆Mp × pi(T, i1, . . . , is)×M ′p × pi(T ′, j1, . . . , jt)
After having introduced the core parts of what an empirical theory is
taken to be, within the structuralist meta-theory, I will pass on to present
the global concept of an empirical theory in this approach.
3.1.1 The concept of an empirical theory
In the structuralist meta-theory, an empirical theory T consists of its
core K and of the intended applications I. K is itself a complex struc-
ture and consists of sets of potential modelsMp, partial potential models
Mpp, actual modelsM , global constraints GC and the global links GL. In
the structuralist meta-theory, a single empirical theory is usually called
theory-element, since it is always a part of a bigger structure, a so-called
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theory-net. Furthermore e.g. the theory-holon of classical mechanics
would have several theory-nets and theory-elements, such as classical
collision mechanics, rigid body mechanics, and others (see Balzer et al.:
pp. 167-205 for more detail). A theory is then, formally, the following
tuple:
T = 〈K, I〉, where K = 〈Mp,Mpp,M,GC,GL〉. The I are the sets of the
intended applications of a theory. Formally, they are defined as follows:
Definition 1: I is a set of intended applications for K only if:
(1) K = 〈Mp,Mpp,M,GC,GL〉 is a theory-core.
(2) I ⊆Mpp.
The I are not formally characterized. Their determination depends on
pragmatic constraints. The pragmatic motivation behind the definition
of the intended applications of a theory are best explained by this quote:
It is most economical and most natural to assume that the
intended applications of T have the structure of partial poten-
tial models ... This assumption is not only reasonable on the
basis of general considerations, it also is backed by studying
how scientists talk and how they argue in the context of an
"application" of a theory. In the light of the previous discus-
sion Mpp might be called the set of all possible applications
of a theory. But among these there always will be undesired
applications which have really nothing to do with the theory
in question ... We can say something precise, namely that an
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intended application is a partial potential model, but we can-
not be precise about every feature of intended applications
(Balzer et al. 1987: 86-87).
This reflects that the authors were aware of trivialization objections to
structuralist approaches (see Newman 1928), which is why they decide to
take a pragmatic viewpoint on the question of the intended applications.
I will elaborate a response to the Newman objection by alluding to this
point in chapter 4.
3.1.2 The empirical claim of a theory
In the framework of the structuralist meta-theory, theories have empir-
ical claims. This means that all the intended applications can be sup-
plemented by theoretical terms such that the resulting structures are
models. If we want to avoid trivialities, constraints and links become im-
portant. This is why normally, mature empirical theories do have links
and constraints (as I mentioned above), and are usually understood as
theory-nets:
What we need in addition, and what in most cases renders
empirical claims non-trivial, are the constraints and links.
They express cross-connections among potential models and
among theories, and they allow only for combinations of po-
tential models subject to certain restrictions (ibid.: 90).
Empirical claims are usually expressed after the logical reconstruction of
a particular empirical theory. This is considered to be the formal result
of a structuralist reconstruction, and therefore a central part within the
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whole approach. If no empirical claim is formulated, it is still informative
to have a structuralist reconstruction of a specific theory, since the general
conceptual framework of any theory can be outlined in clear terms by the
tools of this approach (in the case study of linguistics I provide in chapter
6, we will see this with more detail. There, I only formulate an empirical
claim for one theory).
3.2 Historical influences
In this section I present a historical investigation of the methodologi-
cal and conceptual connections that exist between Carnap’s early work
in the Aufbau, Kuhn’s conception of theory change in empirical science
and the structuralist meta-theory. This becomes relevant, especially be-
cause one aim of this dissertation is to analize the relations between
structural realism and the structuralist meta-theory. And since Carnap
was a strong influence on both structural realism, and on the structural-
ist meta-theory, his influence on the structuralist meta-theory is a crucial
point that needs to be analyzed. Furthermore, as it will become clear
in chapter 8, Carnap’s supposed neutralism plays a crucial role in the
development of my own neutralist account, and in my interpretation of
the ontological commitments of the structuralist meta-theory.
The connection between the structuralist meta-theory and Kuhn’s
philosophy of science is better known than the connection between Car-
nap’s early work and this view. At first sight, there might not be an
obvious connection between Carnap’s early work and the structuralist
meta-theory, I will argue here that the program of the Aufbau should be
understood as one mayor influence on Stegmüller and other adherents of
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the structuralist meta-theory, such as Moulines. This will show that the
early structuralism of Carnap has not only a connection with contempo-
rary epistemic structural realism, but also is deeply connected with the
methodology of the structuralist meta-theory. Considering this connec-
tion, it gives us reason to believe that the structuralist meta-theory has
a high affinity to represent structural realism.
I think that Carnap’s program of knowledge description from the Auf-
bau is analogous with the structuralist program of knowledge description
of scientific theories, in at least two senses. First, from a methodological
point of view, it emphasizes on relational descriptions of our knowledge.
Second, both Carnap and the adherents of the structuralist program de-
clare themselves to be objective and neutral in questions of realism and
antirealism, both generally and more specifically in the philosophy of
science. My second thesis is that Kuhn’s ideas find their precise formal
reformulation in the framework of the structuralist approach.
3.2.1 Carnap’s influence
There exist many interpretations of Carnap’s Aufbau. Clearly, Richard-
son’s (1997) reconstruction stands out for its rigor in clarity and ex-
haustiveness. Since I will focus on Carnap’s structuralist epistemology, I
argue that the Aufbau is, generally, a program for logically reconstructing
our knowledge of the world in structuralist terms. This means that the
descriptions of our knowledge are purely structural definite descriptions,
as explained in §16.
The principal aim of Carnap’s method is, as he says, to provide an
objective way of describing our knowledge of the world. Only what can
be described in relational terms, can be known objectively. All that is
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not described in purely relational terms, is in the end subjective and
should not be the subject-matter of scientific inquiry. For my purpose, I
will now turn the focus on a connection between Carnap’s method and
the structuralist meta-theory. This is a connection that has been left
implicit so far. I argue that this connection constitutes indeed an essential
part of the methodological motivation of the structuralist meta-theory.
There is only sparse textual evidence of structuralists referring directly
to the Aufbau. Interestingly, two main figures of the structuralist view,
Stegmüller and Moulines, have both written monographies on Carnap’s
early epistemological program. Early work by Stegmüller (1969) and
Moulines (1973) provides a detailed analysis of Carnap. This reveals
at least that some main figures of the structuralist view had a strong
interest in Carnap’s early epistemological pogram.
Considering the date of publication of these works, it is easy to notice
that the structuralist meta-theory had been developed later, mainly be-
tween 1971 with Sneed’s The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics,
and closing a first phase of consolidation with Balzer, Moulines, and
Sneed’s 1987 An Architectonic for Science. As one main figure of the
structuralist program, Moulines expresses as follows about the Aufbau:
To be more precise, the use of Carnap’s Aufbau I propose here
consists in reinterpreting Carnap’s "Konstitutionstheorie" as
a formal explication of the notion of an ideal observer, i.e.
an epistemic subject provided with the essential constituents
of an ideal "observational language" to check any empirical
statement made in theoretical science (Moulines 1991: 265).
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This interpretation of Carnap is strongly analogous to the purposes of the
structuralist meta-theory. Moulines’ interpretation of Carnap’s program
in the Aufbau is similar to the motivation of the structuralist meta-theory
in the following sense. Both approaches have as a central aim to explicate
the constitution of our experience about the world, with formal methods,
and in a scientistic spirit. The early Carnap developed a formal frame-
work in the Aufbau that allowed him to provide a system of definitions in
purely relational terms. The adherents of the structuralist meta-theory
aim for the same, but they start by analyzing empirical theories, not our
experience directly, as Carnap did. This is the main difference between
both approaches.
The structuralist meta-theory aims mainly to provide a program for
analyzing science, by means of a detailed logical analysis of scientific
theories. In addition to the logical reconstruction of theories, this ap-
proach also intends to describe the social phenomena of the scientific en-
terprise, by incorporating many of Kuhn’s original interests (see Balzer et
al. 1987). In the framework of the structuralist meta-theory, at no point
we can find the postulation of an ideal observer in the sense of Carnap.
However, in the structuralist program there exists also the motivation of
applying logical tools in order to reconstruct our knowledge of the world
in purely structural (i.e. relational) terms.
Let us now turn the focus on Carnap’s structuralism in the Aufbau.
In §66, he gets more concrete on the background motivation and the aim
of pursuing an epistemic structuralism:
How should science come to objectively valid statements, if all
its objects are constituted by an individual subject? . . . the
solution to this problem lies in that of course the material
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of the individual streams of experience is completely diverg-
ing . . . but certain structural features agree of all streams of
experience. Science has to restrict itself to such structural
properties, since it aims to be objective. And it can restrict
to structural properties, as we have seen earlier, for all the
objects of knowledge are not content, but form, and they can
be represented as structural entities (ibid.).
Following Michael Friedman’s (1999) interpretation, I understand the
Aufbau as an outline of one version of epistemological program of early
logical positivism. In the Aufbau, as in the structuralist view, there is an
emphasis on structural descriptions of our knowledge of the world. In the
structuralist meta-theory, these descriptions are made of our empirical
theories, but in Carnap’s program, structural descriptions are provided
directly of our knowledge, as I have already mentioned above.
Still, it is of central importance to acknowledge the fact that both
share the view that our knowledge should be best described in form of
structures. Where Carnap starts with structurally describing our knowl-
edge of the world, the structuralist meta-theory describes this knowledge
indirectly, through the structural description of our empirical theories.
Carnap starts at the lowest level, i.e. the level of an ideally constructed
epistemic agent, but in the structuralist view, the starting level is that
of scientific theories.
3.2.2 From Kuhn to Stegmüller
Let us now consider the connections between the structuralist meta-
theory and Kuhn’s (1962/ 1970) view on the dynamics of theories and of
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theory change. First, I will briefly mention the core ideas of Kuhn’s pro-
posal of theory change, before I outline the connection to the structuralist
meta-theory.
A central aspect in Kuhn’s work is the concept of scientific commu-
nity. In Kuhn’s system, a scientific community is a group of people that
shares and uses the same paradigms. He introduced the notion of normal
science as the activity of "puzzle-solving". In normal science, scientific
research is guided by a paradigm. Anomalies can occur; this can lead to
a crisis in a certain field. Such a crisis can, but must not lead to what
Kuhn called extraordinary science.
If a crisis leads to extraordinary science, it happens that one paradigm
is substituted by a new one, and, after some time, a scientific revolution
occurs. The scientists that were applying the old paradigm cannot suc-
cessfully communicate with the scientists of the new paradigm anymore.
This is what has been famosuly called incommensurability by Kuhn.
There is a potential impossibility of successful exchange of information
between these groups of scientists, and therefore, an apparent problem
for scientific rationality.
Furthermore, Kuhn described the four components of a paradigm as
follows:
The four components of a paradigm:
1. Symbolic generalizations: In order to comprise knowledge, cer-
tain symbols are introduced and generalized. One concrete example
are equations as they occur in practically all fields of mature sci-
ence.
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2. Models: There are heuristic models and ontological models. Heuris-
tic models are mere fictions; the ontological models do correspond
partially with the world. As an example: we usually imagine plan-
ets and stars to be actually round celestial bodies, but we do so
only for practical reasons.
3. Values: The methodological values shall guide the scientific re-
search and raise questions of technological applicability, ethic ques-
tions and also questions of the coherence of the research. For
instance, certain research areas might not be addressed for ethi-
cal reasons (genetic engineering, nano-technology, etc.). Another
example is that, normally, scientists and philosophers of science
accept the methodological values of theory-simplicity, formal ele-
gance, coherence, and economy.
4. Exemplars: These are the paradigmatic applications, the con-
crete instantiations of a paradigm. Such concrete cases show how
a paradigm actually works. These are the especially well working
intended applications of a paradigm.
I turn the focus now on the relation between Kuhn and the adherents
of the structuralist meta-theory. We will see that, despite Kuhn being
the one who influenced the development of the structuralist meta-theory
in an important way, it is also him who received a certain influence
back. Sneed (1971) explicitly mentions the relation between his work
and Kuhn’s proposals as follows:
It is certainly plausible to think that the initial successful
application of the core of the theory is essentially the same for
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all those who have the theory. Different people who have the
theory at a later time in its development may believe different
statements. They may be more or less clever in seeing ways to
extend the theory, and more or less successful in convincing
their colleagues what evidence supports the claims they make
with the theory . . . it is quite clear that Kuhn’s thesis strongly
suggests that we should modify our notion of what it is to have
a theory of mathematical physics so as at least, to require that
everyone who has the theory has it “because of" the same
initial success (ibid.: 292-293).
One can see here that Sneed recognizes the fact that radical theory change
can occur in some cases, and that he aims to include it to his framework.
Sneed and the other developers of the structuralist meta-theory did ex-
actly this, they modified the notion of what it means to have a theory
of mathematical physics. As we have seen above, by identifying a theory
with the formal notion of structure, a first step towards such a Kuh-
nian aim is done. It is clear that one formal representation of a model
of classical collision mechanics does not suffice to incorporate Kuhn’s
thesis of theory change into the structuralist framework, but within the
structuralist meta-theory, it was a first step towards an incorporation of
Kuhn’s ideas. This incorporation became stronger once the structural-
ist meta-theory developed. Today, there exist several formal notions that
serve to model Kuhn’s ideas. An example of work in this area is Moulines
(2011), where four types of theoretical development are presented, with
the mentioning of concrete historical examples.
Let us consider again the interpretation that Sneed gave to Kuhn’s
proposal:
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Again in Kuhn’s terminology, we have said very little about
"scientific revolutions" as they occur in mathematical physics.
I confess, at the outset, that this is a subject about which I
find it extremely difficult to say anything that is both pre-
cise and interesting. Nevertheless, the view of the logical
structure of theories of mathematical physics I have been de-
fending does appear to have some consequences relevant to
such questions . . . (ibid.: 296).
Sneed expresses his lack of interest in questions of radical theory change.
Nevertheless, he is clear that he thinks it is his apparatus of set-theoretic
formal reconstruction of physical theory, that leads to a better under-
standing of Kuhn.
The relative a priori
The notion of relative a priori has also been shaped by Kuhn, as I will
outline in what follows. In the structuralist meta-theory, besides the
purely formal aspect, Stegmüller’s (1973/1976) notion of a relativized a
priori reveals a close connection to Kuhn’s ideas. He expresses as follows:
The reason that we may only speak of a relative a priori is
that no core, be it ever so sophisticated and yield it ever
so many successful expansions, can be guaranteed never to
get caught in an a priori conflict with some future alterna-
tive and go down before it because this opponent can "deal
with anomalies which it cannot". . . Kant claimed that his the-
ory reconciled rationalism and empiricism, the a priori and
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the empirical components in the scientific process. The re-
construction of Kuhnian theory dynamics with Sneed’s con-
ceptual apparatus is perhaps a better candidate for this job
(ibid.: 218).
One can make an intent and translate this view into the framework of the
structuralist meta-theory. This goes as follows. The relativized a priori,
would be the theory-core K. And what is actually subject to changes
are the intended applications I of a theory. The applications change, but
a certain stable core always persists, despite any radical changes. Inter-
estingly, the theory-core K is itself a complex structural entity, built up
of complex structures as well. This fact has to be taken into account
by structural realism. The framework of the structuralist meta-theory
appears as being idoneous for representing structural realism in this way.
For the structural realist, “something" structural has to remain, even
in phases of radical theory change. This “something" can not only be
equations, as Worrall claimed, since structural realism should aim to be
applicable as a general view, and not only to highly mathematized scien-
tific disciplines. I propose that, if we adopt the underlying framework of
the structuralist meta-theory, the conception of empirical theories as the
tuple 〈K, I〉 gives us an ideal starting point in the debate on structural
realism.
Besides Stegmüller, also Friedman (2001) mentions a relativized a
priori in the philosophy of science. His conclusion about a stable core,
which can also undergo changes, is very much alike to the view advocated
by Stegmüller.
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Kuhn and formal methods
Furthermore, a connection between Kuhn and the structuralist meta-
theory can also be found in a paper by Kuhn (1976), where he refers to
the structuralist meta-theory and its influence on his own approach, and
recognizes explicitly the enriching contribution to his program provided
by Sneed and in a more systematic way by Stegmüller:
To a far greater extent and also far more naturally than any
previous mode of formalization, Sneed’s lends itself to the
reconstruction of theory dynamics, the process by which the-
ories change and grow . . . Sneed also suggests and Stegmüller
elaborates the possibility that at least some cases of change
of core correspond to what I have called scientific revolutions
. . . Though the Sneed formalism does permit the existence of
revolutions, it currently does virtually nothing to clarify the
nature of revolutionary change. I see, however, no reason why
it cannot be made to do so, and I mean here to be making a
contribution toward that end (ibid.: 184).
Kuhn leaves it open for future work to develop the structuralist meta-
theory more in the sense of his proposals. He recognizes explicitly that it
is the structuralist meta-theory as a formal approach in the philosophy
of science that gives tribute to his program and that allows to express his
ideas in a formal framework. In this sense, one can see that the struc-
turalist meta-theory was inspired by Kuhn in the beginning, especially
Stegmüller’s work. During the last decades, it has become more and more
apparent that one central research topic in the structuralist meta-theory
is indeed the dynamics of theories (see Moulines 2011, amongst others.).
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3.2.3 Conclusions
I have argued that in the Aufbau, Carnap’s main aim was to provide
a logical method for the reconstruction of our knowledge of the world.
Such a description is provided by purely structural descriptions. The
structuralist meta-theory aims to describe the logical structure and the
dynamics of scientific theories. As scientific theories are taken to be
our most sophisticated, elaborated and systematized descriptions of our
knowledge of the world.
It is, as in Carnap’s, a proposal for reconstructing our knowledge of
the world. It only starts from the reconstruction of our empirical theories
and is in this sense not a direct, but an indirect description.
Furthermore, Kuhn’s ideas about revolutionary theory change are re-
formulated in a logically precise sense in the framework of the structural-
ist meta-theory. Within this framework, it becomes clear how theories
actually change through time and how these are interrelated in every sin-
gle case, from a formal perspective. The dynamics of scientific theories
are modeled logically, not only metaphorically, as in Kuhn. Stegmüller
alludes to a relative a-priori, which he associates with the structuralist
conception of what a scientific theory is. The whole structuralist pro-
gram is addressing a wider range of questions than modeling theoretical
change. But one core part of Stegmüller’s contribution to the develop-
ment of structuralism is his analysis of Kuhn’s ideas on theory change
and also his application of a structural view of our knowledge about em-
pirical theories. It is clear that at no point, the structuralist meta-theory
refers explicitly to Carnap’s Aufbau as their primary source of informa-
tion and motivation. We have seen that the direct motivation for the
methodological tools for structuralism can rather be found in Suppes’
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(1957) method of defining set-theoretic predicates, and in the work of
the group of French mathematicians called Bourbaki. Notwithstanding,
there are many indices to suppose a connection between the early Car-
nap and the structuralist program. Although Carnap’s logical method of
expressing our knowledge in purely structural terms is strictly speaking
not equivalent to what in structuralism is usually taken to be the right
logical tool for analyzing empirical theories, in both approaches, there
is a primary focus on structures. Carnap aims to describe our knowl-
edge of the world in purely relational terms. Structuralism describes our
knowledge of scientific theories in structural terms.
3.3 Discussing structural continuity:
3.3.1 The Ramsey-view
Before I will start my explication of structural continuity by analyzing it
within the framework of the structuralist meta-theory, I want to argue
why I see this step as progressive in the debate. The main reason for this
is that an approach in terms of the Ramsey-sentence does not suffice to
capture structural continuities adequately. One can represent the struc-
ture of an empirical theory in terms of a Ramsey-sentence, but it is not
nearly as expressive as it would be in terms of the semantic conception.
The main problem for the Ramsey-view is that it is not developed to
show the dynamics of theories. It is of course a tenable view if we aim
to represent the structure of our theories, but for the modeling of theory
change, it seems to be too limited. Especially because it can not give
any account of scientific practice, theory change and general questions of
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diachronical studies of science.
I will quickly recall the Ramsey-sentence: Given an empirical theory
with theoretical and observational terms: TC(t1...tn, o1...om), we substi-
tute the terms for variables and existentially quantify over them:
∃x1...∃xnTC(x1...xn, o1...om).
By doing so, one gets rid of the surplus meaning of theoretical terms,
and generally does not have to make any ontological commitment to the
existence of theoretical entities, such as gene, or electron. The Ramsey-
sentence, as Worrall and Zahar (2001) argue, gives us a sufficient repre-
sentation of the cognitive content of a theory. However, it is not entirely
clear how a Ramsey-view representation of our theories in question could
provide a representation of structural continuity. Nevertheless, Zahar
argues how such a representation should look like:
Whereas referential continuity demands that as we move from
one hypothesis to the next, we continue to talk about roughly
the same objects, structural continuity more reasonably re-
quires that we talk, in similar terms, about one thing-in-itself
which is not directly accessible to us . . . there ought to be
a translation of the old system into the new one such that
all observational functions and predicates remain unchanged,
and the old axioms are transformed into theorems, or else into
limiting cases of theorems of the new theory (Zahar 2001: 54).
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However, to do as Zahar proposes is to move beyond a pure Ramsey-
view and to apply more complex formal tools for the purpose of theory
reconstruction. This step is necessary and goes towards the direction
of semantic conceptions of theories, where theories are generally taken
to be more complex entities, and where a significant sophistication of a
Ramsey-view of theories is realized.
3.3.2 Intertheoretical relations
One central methodological claim of the structuralist meta-theory is that,
after a logical reconstruction of some theories under issue, we gain results
about their relations to other theories. In the intertheoretical relations,
it is possible to identify structures that might appear in both related the-
ories. The respective potential models (i.e. their general frameworks) of
different theory-elements can be related through such relations. Such in-
tertheoretical relations can count as one version of structural continuity.
In the Fresnel-Maxwell case, the continuity would be that some differen-
tial equations appear in both the older and in the successor theory.
What could be said against this proposal is that, from the fact that
certain intertheoretical (and inner-theoretical) relations can be shown, it
does not follow that these structures are in any form real. This concern
seems in principle correct. Anyhow, I reply as follows: If certain struc-
tures persist again and again during radical theory change, this tells us
that at least our formal representation of the persisting structures reflects
the world correctly. The parts of a structure which would persist, would
then show that we got at least something of the world right.
It is correct that the persistence of some structures needs to be linked
somehow to the empirical level, i.e. the structures need to be empirically
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grounded. Within the approach of the structuralist meta-theory, this
occurs only if one builds such structures up, based on concrete empirical
theories. This means that the formal structures are always a metatheoret-
ical representation of a concrete empirical theory. We will see concretely
how this looks like in chapter 6, where I consider examples of structural
continuity in linguistics.
In the structuralist meta-theory, the general methodological approach
is to reconstruct some representative empirical theories logically. By
doing so, the aim is to provide clarity about the logical structure and the
ontological commitments of the reconstructed theory. Reconstructions
show the logical structure of scientific theories. These are identified with
structures in the above mentioned formal sense. I aim to show that the
methods of the structuralist meta-theory contribute to a clarification of
structural realism, for they enable us to show what structural connections
between empirical theories look like in a precise formal sense.
The somehow too restricted or insufficient approach of Worrall, which
is only about mathematical structure in the sense of equations (or in the
sense of the Ramsey-sentence), can be abandoned or, even better, am-
plified. Despite the fact that the structuralist meta-theory has been
formulated principally as a program for outlining the logical structure of
our empirical theories and to model the dynamics of scientific theories,
and that it is usually understood as being neutral to debates on scientific
realism, the acceptance of its framework as an instrument for logically
reconstructing our empirical theories, combined with the epistemological
assumption made above, help to model structural realism, especially the
notion of structural continuity. However, one can still be a representative
of the structuralist meta-theory without committing to structural real-
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ism. The step of accepting both structural realism and the structuralist
meta-theory requires a stronger ontological commitment, and does not
necessarily follow from my proposal.
3.4 Structural continuity
In this section, I will address the question of structural continuity, espe-
cially in the framework of the structuralist meta-theory. Before we can
move to this, I will discuss the relation between ESR and OSR, since I see
no consensus in the debate on this question. It is of central importance
to clarify this relation, if one wants to provide results in the debate on
structural realism.
3.4.1 The relation between ESR and OSR
As I have already mentioned above, Worrall’s structural realism is intro-
duced in the context of including both worlds, i.e. he aims to incorpo-
rate both, the no-miracle-argument (NMA), which goes back to Smart
(1963, 1979), Putnam (1975b) and Boyd (1983), and the pessimistic-
meta-induction (PMI), and to offer in consequence a new proposal to
scientific realism, namely, structural realism. In this sense, Worrall’s
approach seems to be much more on the side of epistemic structural re-
alism, since it focusses on theory change and the dynamics of theories,
and ultimately on epistemological questions concerning our knowledge,
more specifically, our knowledge of scientific theories.
To go even further, I argue that OSR can be criticized independently
of ESR. Since the adherents of OSR argue that at the fundamental onto-
logical level, there are no objects, but structures, it is primarily a meta-
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physical view on what there is. It is not necessarily connected to debates
on theory change and scientific realism.
One major objection to OSR is the problem of “relations-relata". This
problem can be formulated as follows. There can be no relations without
relata, in other words “one cannot intelligibly subscribe to the reality of
relations unless one is also committed to the fact that some things are
related" (Chakravartty 1998: 399). So if it is only relations that there
are, it can’t be without having relata as a necessary constitutive part of
the relations. However, some adherents of OSR offer the following answer
to this problem:
The best sense that can be made of the idea of a relation
without relata is the idea of a universal. For example, when
we refer to the relation referred to by ‘larger than’, it is be-
cause we have an interest in its formal properties that are
independent of the contingencies of their instantiation. To
say that all that there is are relations and no relata, is there-
fore to follow Plato and say that the world of appearances is
illusory (Ladyman et al. 2007: 152).
We can see this answer as an example of how the OSR-debate has shifted
away from ESR and generated its own problems. By appealing to the
debate on universals, one moves away into the field of metaphysics, which
is something entirely different from the focus on epistemic structural re-
alism. Now, the question would not be any longer about the structure
of our theories. It would be a question of purely abstract, logical possi-
bilities of formulating relations, etc. If we aim to stay within structural
realism in the philosophy of science, our aim is to focus on scientific theo-
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ries and theory change over time. It might be the case that relations can
be formulated without relata, but this, however, is unconnected from the
debate that on structural continuity, and gives us reason to think that in
the end, OSR is entirely different from ESR.
One further pivotal aspect is that OSR seems to be heavily grounded
on contemporary physics. In ESR, what is central is the claim that what
we can know is the structure of the world. At no point, ESR-adherents
claim that at the ontologically fundamental level, there are no objects.
For an adherent of ESR, it can be perfectly fine to accept that at the
ontologically fundamental level there exist objects. The crucial point
is that we can’t know them. What we can know, are the structures
that describe the behaviour of these objects. These structures can be
mathematical equations, scientific theories as a whole, Ramsey-sentences,
model-theoretic structures, or something else that one would need to
specify.
Moreover, if we want to address Worrall’s original proposal and if
we want to contribute to the debate on scientific/structural realism and
theory change, one can work separately on ESR, since OSR does not
have a concrete relation to this. The main questions about OSR do not
bear with theory change, but with the foundations of physics, causality
and the metaphysics of science. In any case, one can try to formulate
and to discuss OSR with respect to the special sciences (I will dedicate
chapter 5 of this dissertation to this question). On the other hand, ESR
is about our epistemic access to the world, and about the structure of
our scientific theories, but OSR is about the structure of the world at its
most fundamental ontological level.
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In his original work, Worrall bases his position on a case study of
optical theory. He mentions the theoretical change from Fresnel’s to
Maxwell’s theory of optics. He states that, though the referents and
names of the postulated entities in our theories change, the mathemati-
cal structure is preserved through theory change. Furthermore, what is
continuous is the mathematical structure, that is, some equations that
reappear in successor theories after theoretical change. Differential equa-
tions of Fresnel’s theory of the ether reappear in Maxwell’s theory of the
electromagnetic field. Worrall (1989: 118-119) illustrates this position:
Although Fresnel was quite wrong about what oscillates, he
was, from this later point of view, right, not just about the
optical phenomena, but right also that these phenomena de-
pend on the oscillations of something or other at right angles
to light. Thus if we restrict ourselves to the level of mathe-
matical equations - not notice the phenomenal level - there is
in fact complete continuity between Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s
theories (ibid.).
What is asserted by Worrall, is that our empirical theories are not com-
pletely overthrown when they change, the structural parts are retained.
Nevertheless, Worrall is not entirely clear on this point. He argues that
we do not notice the phenomenal level. But if we would not notice
the phenomenal level, there would be no connection to the empirical
anymore, it could be a purely mathematical structuralism, dealing with
equations that are not attached to reality in any form. This is why it
is important to note that the phenomenal level does also matter for the
structural realist. But there can be important changes at this level, and
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still, there can be a structural continuity through theory change, even if
the semantic status of the referents of the unobservable entities changes
radically. It is central that, for the structural realist, we do not have
epistemic access to the referents of the (theoretical) terms that appear
in our empirical theories. But we can have knowledge of the mathemat-
ical structures (equations), in which the (theoretical) terms appear that
we use to refer to these entities. If it occurs that the same equations
are part of radically different theories, for the structural realist it seems
reasonable to assume that what represents the world as best possible are
these equations.
But equations should not be necessary for structural realism to work.
Many mature scientific disciplines make no use of equations, or only
very little (e.g. linguistics, biology, or psychology). Disciplines which
deal more with qualitative concepts and are less mathematized need also
be reconstructable from a structural realist perspective. If this can’t
be done, structural realism cannot be fully extended to the whole of
empirical science, unless one wants to be a strong physicalist reductionist
about physics.
What we know in the discussion on structural realism, is that certain
structures are preserved through theoretical change (see Worrall’s 1989
case-study), and that other parts of our theories get lost. Now, the un-
derlying epistemologically fundamental idea behind this whole approach
can be made explicit as follows: If only structure is preserved, and if we
aim to be structural realists, only the structures can bear the connection
to the world.
Since it is the structures that appear again and again through the-
oretical change, only these can transmit the real part of our theories.
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This just follows if we accept that all other parts of our theories get lost
through time. So, the epistemic structural realist concludes: our best
epistemological access to theoretical entities is through the structures of
our theories about them.
For Worrall, structural realism is defensible, for having shown that at
least in the case of theory change from Fresnel’s to Maxwell’s theory, cer-
tain mathematical structures persist. However, this is not enough, since
one representative case-study does not convince us about the existence
of structural continuities in all areas of mature science. For epistemic
structural realism to get strengthened, it is necessary that further repre-
sentative case studies are carried out. The structural realist will have to
find such structural continuities in many other cases of theory change. As
I will show below, I aim to contribute to this by providing a case-study
of theory change in linguistics. This will be done by the application of
the formal framework of the structuralist meta-theory.
3.4.2 Reduction
In order to represent structural continuities between our theories, I pro-
pose to make use of the structuralist concept of reduction, as it is dis-
cussed and defined by Díez and Moulines (2003: 391-396):
Definition 2: Let Mp(t),M(T ), I(T ) respectively be the sets of poten-
tial models, actual models and intended applications of T .
Analogously, let Mp(T ∗),M(T ∗), I(T ∗), with respect to T ∗. T is re-
ducible to T ∗ iff there exist the relations ρ and ρe such that:
1. ρ ⊆Mp(T )×Mp(T ∗).
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2. ∀x, x∗(〈x, x∗〉 ∈ ρ ∧ x∗ ∈M(T ∗)→ x ∈M(T )).
3. ∀y(y ∈ I(T )→ ∃y∗(〈y, y∗〉 ∈ ρe ∧y∗ ∈ r[M(T ∗)]→ y ∈ r[M(T )]))).
The first condition establishes that both theories are connected through
their conceptual frameworks, their sets of potential models. Condition
two expresses the derivability of laws from the reducing theory T ∗ to the
reduced theory T . And condition three expresses the preservation of the
successful applications of the theories, where ρe is the relation ρ at the
t-non-theoretical level.
I want to propose that, if two theories are related through the struc-
turalist reduction relation, it can be seen as a case of a structural conti-
nuity. This criterion of structural continuity is of course not a necessary
one, but sufficient. It would be absurd to claim that all cases of structural
continuity should be cases of theory-reduction. As examples of reduction
in the structuralist framework, one can consider the cases of the reduc-
tion of Classical Collision Mechanics to Classical Particle Mechanics, and
the reduction of Rigid Body Mechanics to Classical Particle Mechanics
shown in Balzer, et al. (1987: 255-284).
In chapter 6, I will show that the structuralist concept of reduction can be
used to show structural continuities in the specific case of theory change
in linguistics that I discuss. Since the structuralist meta-theory offers
more notions that can represent the dynamics of theories, we can not
exclude the possibility that more technical notions might be applicable as
well to structural realism. This, however, is a task of future investigation.
Chapter 4
The Newman objection
The Newman objection is considered to be the strongest argument against
structural realism, more specifically, to structuralist epistemologies (see
Demopoulos and Friedman 1985, Ketland 2004, or Ainsworth 2009). In
this chapter, I will outline this objection. Then I discuss some responses
that have been formulated to this problem, before I develop my own
response, with which I aim to give a general solution to the Newman
objection in the debate on structural realism.
4.1 The objection
One can express Newman’s objection in the following way:
Structure is not sufficient to uniquely pick out relations in the world.
More specifically, the Newman objection can be expressed as follows:
Suppose that the world consists of a set of objects, and its structure is
W . W includes a family of relations R, but nothing else is known about
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it. Given any collection of objects, only the formal structure of these
relations can be established—provided that there are enough objects to
begin with. Given only the formal structure, it is not possible to identify
a unique referent for this class of relations. We could stipulate that we are
talking about the intended class of relations. But, as will become clear
below, this move goes beyond a purely structural description. Newman
himself expressed this very clearly:
Any collection of things can be organized so as to have the
structure M, provided there are the right number of them.
Hence the doctrine that only structure is known involves the
doctrine that nothing can be known that is not logically de-
ducible from the mere fact of existence, except (‘theoreti-
cally’) the number of constituting objects (Newman 1928:
144).
I will now outline Newman’s theorem formally:
Let S = (U,R1, . . . , Rk) be a structure, and D be a set. We can formulate
an injection ρ : U → D. It follows that there exists a structure S ′ whose
domain is D, and which has a substructure isomorphic to S.
The proof for Newman’s theorem2: First we define the image of mapping
ρ as ρ(U) :↔ {x ∈ D : ∃α ∈ U, ρ(α) = x}. We know that ρ(U) ⊂ D.
Furthermore, ρ is injective, and we know that ρ : U → ρ(U) is a bi-
jection. The inverse is ρ−1 : ρ(U) → U . It is now possible to define a
relation R′i, for each n-place relation Ri on U , on the set ρ(U) as follows:
2See Ketland 2004 for a detailed discussion of Newman’s theorem and the proof.
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R
′
i :↔ {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Dn : x1, . . . , xn ∈ ρ(U)&(ρ−1(x1), . . . , ρ−1(xn)) ∈
Ri}. In other words, R′i is an n-place relation on D. It follows from
the definition of each R′i that ∀α1, . . . , αn ∈ U, (ρ(α1), . . . , ρ(αn) ∈ R′i iff
(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Ri. If we repeat this for every relation Ri on U , we can de-
fine relations R′i on D and hence build a structure S
′
= (D,R
′
1, . . . , R
′
k).
If we now take the restriction of S ′ to the subdomain ρ(U) ⊂ D, we can
see that it is the substructure (ρ(U), R′1, . . . , R
′
k), and this substructure
is isomorphic to S. Hence, we can impose any structure on a set, save
for cardinality constraints.
It can now be seen that this result presents a problem of trivialization for
structuralism. There have been several proposals of how to avoid New-
man’s objection in the literature. For the purpose of this dissertation, I
will address three answers that I consider relevant for my own account.
4.2 Three answers to Newman:
4.2.1 French and Ladyman
For Steven French and James Ladyman, the Newman objection does not
arise in the framework of the semantic view of scientific theories: "the
Newman problem is obviated if one does not think of structures and
relations in first-order extensional terms (French and Ladyman 2003:
33)." Though it is possible to show logically that at least for one specific
form of the semantic view, the Newman objection does arise as well (see
Ainsworth 2009: 150-152), I will show that the structuralist meta-theory
does not get affected by the Newman objection. After all, Newman’s
formal result holds regardless of the mathematical framework that is in
76 CHAPTER 4. THE NEWMAN OBJECTION
use. In principle, it is important to note that the epistemic and the ontic
versions of structural realism are entirely different and that it is easily
possible that objections that affect the epistemic variant do not affect
the ontic one, and viceversa.
4.2.2 Votsis’ account
In his doctoral thesis (2004) and in his 2003 paper, Ioannis Votsis pro-
poses that we should distinguish between structures we build up a priori,
and structures we somehow ‘arrive at’ a posteriori, after an empirical in-
vestigation. I agree with Votsis that such a distinction is indeed helpful,
since in the philosophy and epistemology of science, one is primarily con-
cerned with empirical theories, and not just with the formulation of any
kind of abstract, purely mathematical and therefore a priori structure:
First of all, it should be made clear that if all the structural
realist is arguing for is the claim that there exist relations
with particular structures, then this is obviously trivial for the
reasons Newman mentions. But no structural realist makes
such a claim! (Votsis 2004: 122).
According to Votsis, a structural realist claims more. The structural re-
alist would indeed claim that there exist relations with particular struc-
tures, but furthermore, it would also be claimed that we can know these
structures, and that they represent a certain empirical domain.
Votsis gives the following example that highlights the limit of Newman’s
objection:
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Take the numbers 133 and 123. I can, restricting myself solely
to arithmetic, perform various operations on these numbers.
One such operation is addition. Similarly, if I had two col-
lections of 133 and 123 physical objects respectively, I could
count them one by one, and would reach the same result. De-
spite the similarities, there is an important difference between
the two cases. The latter case is one in which the result is a
property that is then ascribed to the physical world, in par-
ticular to the physical objects under consideration, and not
merely an exercise of arithmetic. This claim is warranted by
the employment of an empirical method to arrive at the given
number (Votsis 2003: 886).
By mentioning this example, Votsis aims to show that there is a difference
between structures that are formulated in purely logico-mathematical
terms, and structures that are formulated in order to represent empirical
knowledge. I agree with Votsis that this distinction is indeed necessary if
we want to make structural realism a coherent position in the epistemol-
ogy and the philosophy of science. Performing operations on structures
in purely formal terms permits the Newman objection to succeed, but
this changes once we specify structures about physical systems, that are
part of the world.
Nevertheless, Peter Ainsworth claims that Votsis’ proposal is unten-
able, for the following reason:
It is not obvious why the fact that some structures have been
arrived at a posteriori guarantees that these structures are
more important than those structures that have been arrived
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at ‘merely’ a priori. Simply being arrived at via an a poste-
riori method does not seem to be sufficient to make a result
important, especially if that result could have been arrived
at a priori. After all, if the claim ‘eggs is eggs’ had been dis-
covered to be true a posteriori, it would not thereby be more
important than those identity claims that had been arrived
at ‘merely’ a priori (Ainsworth 2009: 167).
In my view, Ainsworth fails to give a counterargument to Votsis’ pro-
posal. In general, but even more importantly in the debate on scien-
tific and on structural realism, it is absolutely crucial to distinguish be-
tween empirical and non-empirical systems, and hence between a priori
and a posteriori structures. This fact seems to be unacknowledged by
Ainsworth. There is a fundamental difference between structures we can
formulate a priori, and structures we ‘arrive at’ a posteriori. The former
can be formulated analytically and be based on logic and mathematics,
where the latter depend on how the world is. It is also the a posteriori
structures that should be of interest for the structural realist, since the
aim is to contribute to the debate on scientific realism, and in general to
the philosophy of science.
Votsis’ argument is in the same spirit as my own account, since I also
stress the importance of the fact that it is not the same to claim that epis-
temic structural realism does not hold, based entirely on a mathematical
result on the one hand, and to apply structural realism to concrete cases
of description of empirical phenomena. It is true that Newman’s objec-
tion is a formally correct mathematical result, however, once we move
to the application of formal methods in order to describe empirical phe-
nomena, this result shows its limits. Newman’s formal result simply does
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not have any impact on the actual reconstruction of an empirical theory
by means of a set-theoretic predicate, more specifically, by applying the
methodology of the structuralist meta-theory.
4.2.3 French and Saatsi
Before proposing their own account, French and Saatsi back up Vot-
sis’ proposal: “What saves the Ramseyfying structural realist is the fact
that the theoretical content captured by her use of Ramseyfication goes
well beyond the mere formal, logical structure of the unobservable world
(French and Saatsi 2006: 551)."
Furthermore, it goes along quite well with my own view that French
and Saatsi state “... we take it that in reality there has never been
... a purely structural view of theories (ibid.: 557)". It is in fact a
misinterpretation by the criticizers of structural realism to suppose that
structural realists account for a ‘purely’ structuralist view of theories.
We always need to say more about the empirical claim and the intended
applications of a theory, this feature makes my own structuralist view in
fact ‘only’ partially structural.
The misinterpretation that I have identified can be explained well in
historical terms, since Newman’s original critique was addressing Bertrand
Russell’s (1927) theory of perception. This debate originated in an en-
tirely different context than the current debate on scientific (and struc-
tural) realism. It seems that one is better off with acknowledging that
all structuralist views of theories and of structural realism in general are
quite different from Russell’s causal theory of perception, most impor-
tantly, they are always concerned with concrete empirical theories. For
French and Saatsi:
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It is not the case that any unobservable domain of suitable
cardinality can be extensionally ‘carved out’ into isomorphic
structure in a way that satisfies this constraint on the mem-
bers of the domain. Yet, provided that this constraint is sat-
isfied, it is meaningful to speak of representing the structure
of the domain ... the theoretical variables for which the si-
multaneous values and their change are given by the structure
are theoretically interpreted: they refer to physical properties
and relations. It is not the case that all the theoretical con-
tent about these variables is encoded in the structure of their
interrelations at each moment of simultaneity and over time
- there is interpretational content about these properties that
is captured linguistically (ibid.: 557-558).
I share the intuition that for any structuralist representation of an empir-
ical domain, there is always a reference to real existing physical relations.
What this exactly amounts to will de beveloped below, by making refer-
ence to Carnap’s concept of founded relations.
4.3 Towards a pragmatic account
All the different answers to the Newman objection, as well as my own,
have in common that they acknowledge that one should say more than
just that there exist relations within particular structures. One should
be clear by stating explicitly that one accepts, of course, the formal
result of Newman’s Objection, nevertheless, one can wonder about its
philosophical impact for structural realism. We can draw this picture as
follows:
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1. In debates on structural realism (mostly on ESR), we search for
cases of structural continuity between apparently radically different
theories.
2. Given these cases, one can employ a variety of different formal tools
to reconstruct them—such as Ramsey-sentence views, or semantic
approaches.
3. When we write down the structure of an empirical theory in a
specific formal framework, Newman’s problem doesn’t emerge. Af-
ter all, we need to state explicitly what the domain of the theory
consists of (particles, genes, markets, etc.), and it’s no longer a
trivial matter whether structures of the appropriate kind can be
constructed.
One could ask if this does not imply that structuralism is left behind. I
argue that it is a pragmatic move, which allows one to incorporate the
content of Newman’s result, while questioning its philosophical import.
However, if one stays at a very abstract level (disregarding the content
of the theories in question), Newman’s objection arises.
Concerning ontic structural realism, this view is indeed unaffected
by Newman’s objection, since it is not an epistemological position, but
rather a view about what there is. It seems that, since in ontic structural
realism there are no explicit claims about knowledge, and about knowl-
edge representation (such as the Ramsey-view, semantic views, etc.), the
Newman objection is in principle unable to affect ontic structural real-
ism. OSR is based on interpretations of contemporary physics. It’s basic
claim “all that there is at the ontologically fundamental level is struc-
ture" is grounded on the results of our contemporary physical theories.
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In this sense, OSR is more a metaphysical position, a metaphysics of sci-
ence, rather than a view that makes claims about our knowledge of the
world. Most importantly, in OSR, there are no explicit claims about ‘the
structure of our knowledge’ or, more specifically, about the structure of
the formal representations of our knowledge of the unobservable parts of
the world. Such questions are fully accomodated within the debate on
epistemic structural realism.
A pragmatic way out of the Newman objection
I will now procede to develop my own account of what I call “prag-
matic structural realism". As a first step, I will recall the concept of set-
theoretic predicates, as they were introduced in chapter 3. By making
use of such set-theoretic predicates, one is able to represent the structure
of our theories. This tool can be applied to represent the structure of our
theories, also in discussions about epistemic structural realism. For the
case of OSR, this view does not have to rely on any form of logical (or
formal) “meta-representation" of our empirical theories, since its adher-
ents normally directly interpret the claims of physical theories and give
metaphysical interpretations in this way (see Esfeld 2004, or Lyre 2004,
amongst others).
A standard example of a meta-representation within the formal frame-
work of the structuralist meta-theory is the one I have outlined in chapter
3, namely, the potential and actual models of classical collision mechan-
ics.
One can ask now: Why is the information provided by a theory repre-
sentation using a set-theoretic predicate trivial, as Newman would have
claimed? I do not see such a supposed triviality of information that is
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given by the potential model illustrated in chapter 3. The information
is not trivial for the following reason: one states explicitly what the ele-
ments of the basic domain are—in the case of our example from chapter
3, the elements are particles.
Furthermore, to provide a structuralist representation of an empirical
theory, with a set-theoretic predicate, is no trivial task: a structure of
the relevant kind (about the objects in question) may not be available.
Hence, my proposal is that, if the structural realist wants to be safe from
a trivialization charge, a pragmatic stance is needed. In more detail, the
pragmatic move consists in specifying explicitly the empirical system that
is being represented, and to determine concretely the domain of objects
and their relations. This is required to make sense of any structural
formulation of a scientific theory; otherwise, the theory becomes just a
piece of mathematics.
In the framework of the structuralist meta-theory, the pragmatic part
of a structuralist view is represented by the set of intended applications
of a theory, I (also introduced above in chapter 3). The determination
of the intended applications depends strongly on the scientists that actu-
ally do make use of the respective theories, and is therefore pragmatical.
For instance, we can think of a physicist in a laboratory, trying to carry
out an operation of measurement. She might, in a specific case, have
something similar in mind to the potential model of Classical Collision
Mechanics, when she is actually working, even as an underlying back-
ground assumption. But she will be certain about what the “things"
that will be measured actually are. These are not apples, shoes, or ele-
phants, but particles. In this sense, the elements of the basic domain are
individuated, and in this sense, my proposal is a pragmatic move.
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In purely formal terms, Newman’s objection presents a challenge to
those who make the abstract claim that "all our knowledge is struc-
tural", since a pragmatic component is required. In fact, the proper
understanding of the relevant theories requires attention to their prag-
matic counterpart. Thus, attention to particular case studies is central.
The crucial point is the following: by specifying explicitly what our set-
theoretic predicates represent in each case, the information about the
structure of our theories is not trivial anymore.
4.3.1 Carnap’s founded relations
To further outline my pragmatic proposal, I will now turn the focus on
Carnap. In §154 of the Aufbau, he introduces founded relations : “we
want to call relations that correspond to an experienceable, ‘natural’
relation, whose corresponding parts do have something experienceable in
common, ‘founded relations’ (ibid.)". I argue that the relations specified
by set-theoretic predicates are experienceable and "natural" in Carnap’s
sense. Following Carnap, founded relations are erlebbar, which means
that they are experienceable. Given this feature of founded relations,
it is possible to specify only those structures that are relevant for the
description of our empirical knowledge, namely, those corresponding to
experienceable relations. Thus, one begins by picking out real, existing,
physical relations, which means that when a structuralist representation
of a theory is provided, one has to restrict to the relevant, real existing
physical relations, and not to any kind of abstract structure. In this sense,
a description of such real relations in terms of set-theoretic predicates is
provided, and one is able to select those set-theoretic relations that stand
for the appropriate experienceable relations.
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This Carnapian proposal provides an answer to the Newman objec-
tion, for it restricts the possible structures only to experienceable rela-
tions. These are any relations that one can experience. Some are ex-
perienced directly (directly observable relations); others are experienced
indirectly (via instrumental access). But in none of these cases, one
is concerned with any abstract structure. But there is no doubt that,
as soon as one tries to talk about structure in a more general and ab-
stract way, the Newman objection may rise again. However, this presents
no problem for either, pragmatic structural realism, or the structuralist
meta-theory, for the reasons I have explained above.
4.3.2 Structural scrutability
David Chalmers (2012) proposes a way out of the Newman problem that
is similar to my pragmatic proposal. He identifies Carnap’s original intent
of pure structuralism as insufficient, and argues as follows:
. . . this leaves open the possibility of weak structuralism, on
which the basic vocabulary may include a limited number
of expressions for relations (such as phenomenal similarity)
plus logical expressions. Both theses have analogs in the
domain of scrutability. The analog of pure structuralism is
Logical Scrutability: the thesis that all truths are scrutable
from truths using logical vocabulary alone. The analog of
weak structuralism is Structural Scrutability: roughly, the
thesis that all truths are scrutable from truths using logical
vocabulary plus structural expressions, where (to a first ap-
proximation) a structural expression is one that expresses a
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basic relation. Logical Scrutability is undermined by New-
man’s problem, but Structural Scrutability remains on the
table (ibid.: 409).
Chalmers identifies an analogy between what he calls weak structuralism
and structural scrutability. Whereas my pragmatic structural realism
matches well a weak structuralism, it is clearly distinct from structural
scrutability, since my structuralism does not rely on any notion of truth,
nor does it aim at connecting any truthlike notions with structural re-
alism. This is an important difference. Once we include the notion of
truth, we would lean too much into the realist side. My aim, however,
is to focus on the structural descriptions, by alluding to a specific logical
vocabulary, in the above outlined, pragmatic sense.
Later on in the same section, Chalmers argues that by explicitly speci-
fying the physical system under issue, we are able to save our construction
from Newman’s problem (ibid.: 411). This move is very much analogous
to the one I propose in this dissertation, since I aim to specify the rel-
evant physical system under issue in each case, and argue that such a
specification endorses pragmatic virtues, such as relevance, objectivity or
elegance for a given physical system.
4.3.3 Structuralism, empiricism and realism
By making such a Carnapian move, one might ask whether pure struc-
turalism is given up by moving to experienceable relations? This depends
on what the requirements are on structuralism. If pragmatic considera-
tions are not considered part of the structuralist framework, then struc-
turalism is left behind. Without a pragmatic component, pure structural-
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ism makes very little sense, since one cannot specify what the structures
that are introduced in one’s theories are about. The intelligibility of
structuralism ultimately demands this pragmatic feature.
Consequently, one might then ask whether realism has been given up
by moving to experienceable relations? I have emphasized the empiri-
cist requirement on experienceable relations, but I have understood such
relations broadly (some are directly experienceable, others are indirectly
so). It is possible to distinguish the following three interpretations:
1. Constructive empiricist reading : The experienceable relations (those
to which one should assign an epistemic role) are restricted only to
directly observable relations.
2. Broadly empiricist reading : The experienceable relations include
directly observable relations and indirectly observable relations—
as long as one knows that the relevant instruments satisfy epistemic
conditions akin to observation (see Bueno 2011).
3. Realist reading : The experienceable relations include directly ob-
servable relations and indirectly detectable relations (that is, one
can detect them with instruments that need not be akin to obser-
vations).
Thus, depending on how one interprets the experienceable relations, re-
alist and anti-realist views can be accommodated within the framework
of pragmatic structural realism.
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4.4 Conclusions
I have argued that Newman’s objection holds if we make just abstract
structural claims. But understood in this way, the objection has no con-
nection to structural realism in the philosophy of science, where concrete
cases of actual theories are at issue. By invoking a set-theoretic predicate
formulation of the structure of a physical theory, we need to state explic-
itly the domain of objects the theory is about. By doing so, one is forced
to leave behind the territory of abstract knowledge claims. One has then
to emphasize the crucial role of experienceable relations, and provide a
broad framework in which these relations can be multiply interpreted,
such as the framework of the structuralist meta-theory. This leads to
different philosophical views (from constructive empiricism through a
broad form of empiricism to realism). In this way, we can acknowledge
Newman’s place, and claim that Newman is of course right, although the
philosophical impact of his result is, in the end, limited. His objection
presents a problem for the very abstract form of structuralism, when it is
applied to epistemology (such as Russell 1927), but not to structuralism
about scientific theories.
Chapter 5
Ontic structural realism
5.1 Introduction
So far, we have seen that since Worrall’s introduction of structural realism
to the debate on scientific realism, there have been several developments
concerning a formulation of mainly two views within the debate, so-called
epistemic and ontic structural realism. As I have already developed
above, ESR affirms that all our knowledge is structural, but we remain
ignorant with respect to the properties of the entities that are part of
these structures, where ontic structural realism asserts that all that exists
is structure. Following this view, objects only fill places in structures and
do not exist independently.
In this chapter, I will concentrate on the ontic version of structural
realism. The aim is to discuss the applicability of OSR in domains of
science other than physics, specifically in linguistics. I will show that in
fact, OSR is well applicable to linguistics. More precisely, I will show
that in Zellig Harris’ transformational theory, the predecessor theory of
Chomsky’s generative grammar, it is of central importance to have a
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structural ontology. Otherwise, I argue, it would be difficult to give the
theory a correct underlying metaphysical fundament. Before discussing
the case of OSR in linguistics further, I will outline Harold Kincaid’s and
Don Ross’ accounts of OSR in economics and the social sciences, as well
as Steven French’s proposal with respect to OSR in biology.
Since its introduction, OSR has been discussed vastly within the con-
text of the philosophy of physics, by numerous authors such as Cao
(2003), Dorato (2000), Esfeld (2004), Frigg and Votsis (2011), Lyre (2004),
Psillos (2006a), and Redhead (1999), to only mention a view. There is
vast literature on the topic, and the discussion has diversified and de-
veloped into several views. Some of these views on structural realism
don’t have much in common anymore, besides that they all employ the
term structure. This surely presents some problems, since our goal in the
debate should be to provide universally acceptable answers to the debate
on OSR.
Generally speaking, OSR states that what exists at the ontologically
most fundamental level are structures. For the adherents of OSR, there
exist no individuals, and all that there is, is structure. It is also well
known that many authors have been arguing in favor of this position by
relying on concrete results of contemporary physical theory. It is not
my aim to discuss OSR within the debate in the philosophy of physics.
Moreover, I aim to outline how OSR can be expanded to the special
sciences, such as biology (see French 2014), or in this case, linguistics.
Furthermore, the fact that OSR almost completely focusses on physics
brings the discussion of reductionism to the debate. Especially Ladyman
et al. (2007) and Lyre’s (2013) positions on a supposed “primacy of
physics" and some form of reducibility of all other sciences to physics are
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at issue here. The same holds for Ladyman (2008). In what follows, I
argue that ontic structural realism finds applicability in other domains
of empirical science as well.
5.2 The primacy of physics
Motivated by a naturalistic viewpoint, Ladyman and Ross propose a con-
straint on how to understand the relation between physics and the special
sciences, the so-called primacy of physics. In this section, I discuss this
principle, which is formulated as follows:
The primacy of physics contraint: Special science hypotheses that
conflict with fundamental physics, or such consensus as there is in fun-
damental physics, should be rejected for that reason alone. Fundamental
physical hypotheses are not symmetrically hostage to the conclusions of
the special sciences (Ladyman et al. 2007: 44).
Here it is argued that physics has a more important status than all other
scientific disciplines. This claim is made in order to lift physics on a
higher level than all other disciplines, by relying on a supposed scientis-
tic position á la Neurath and other adherents of the Wissenschaftliche
Weltauffassung. Ladyman (2008) explains the motivation for this princi-
ple as follows:
Some forms of physicalism imply that everything that exists
is physical . . . Thus understood, physicalism is in tension with
standard scientific realism. This kind of physicalism is also
in tension with naturalism, since naturalists allow questions
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of ontology to be decided by science. Hence they ought to
be realists about such entities as markets, fixed action pat-
terns, mating displays, episodic memories, evolutionarily sta-
ble strategies, and phonemes, because successful explanation
and prediction have been produced by special sciences that
refer to such entities, and such success is sufficient for ontolog-
ical commitment within science. Similarly, naturalism seems
to demand that the causal claims of the special sciences be
taken at face value, not least because, as mentioned above,
it is the causal relations in which the entities posited by the
special sciences feature that give us grounds for inferring their
existence (ibid.: 745).
For Ladyman, we are only justified to believe in the existence of those
entities of special science that are used to make causal claims. Any other
entity in the special sciences is not acceptable for a naturalist, as he
argues. This position is attractive. Nevertheless, sometimes it is better to
postulate (or to accept) the existence of such "more special" entities. For
instance, if we don’t accept the existence of entities such as phonemes or
markets, just because we don’t have an account that explains their causal
status, from a scientific realism perspective we might get into trouble
and end up at a point where we would be unable to affirm sentences in
economics, like ‘free markets exist’.
Also in linguistics, the question of the real status of the entities postu-
lated is complicated. Seen from a physicalist point of view, one can easily
ask questions like “What is real in linguistics?" This is a rather difficult
question to answer, and might depend on the type of linguistic theory
that one endorses. One could answer “The speech sounds that speakers
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produce are the real existing (and physically measurable) entities", or
“Some mental structures that allows us to be competent speakers of a
language".
We should be worried that by endorsing Ladyman’s view, we might
end up loosing too much entities in our ontology. I suggest that one
should rather go along with certain entities, despite their possible lack
of a direct causal relation between them. To assume the existence of
phonemes is central for linguistic theory, no matter if one is a structural,
a cognitive or a generative linguist. Furthermore, a central part of theory-
building and of the postulation of entities occurs through idealization and
abstraction. And if we want to stay with the strong demand of the causal
role that all our real entities need to play, we might be left without almost
all entities we currently take to exist, in a common-sense view. We might
only be left with elementary particles. This would fall too short if the
aim is to draw a general picture from the perspective of scientific realism.
I rather propose that we don’t think of a primacy of physics in a
narrow sense, but more loosely. Our different scientific disciplines pos-
tulate the existence of certain entities, and they further state that such
postulations are required in order to explain the phenomena that we aim
to describe. No matter if a theory is about molecules, particles, genes,
acids, animals, stock markets, or social institutions. It is precisely an
ontic structural realist view that helps us to accommodate the existence
of such entities, no matter if these entities are causally relevant or not.
Once it can be shown that such entities only come into existence as parts
of bigger structures, or that these entities are themselves of structural
form, it is reasonable to accept their realist status, from the perspective
of OSR.
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Let us think about the justification for the primacy of physics step.
There appears to be a conflict of motivations in the beginning. First,
by appealing to this principle, Ladyman and Ross aim to strengthen
the view that OSR does not have to be explored outside the realm of
physics, since all other sciences are in a sense subordinate to physics, and
if something changes in physics, something might have to be accomodated
in the special sciences, but not viceversa. Secondly, in a later attempt,
both authors explore the possibility of OSR in the special sciences, and
both suggest that positive applications of OSR in the special sciences
could be discovered (see their 2008 papers).
In his paper, Harold Kincaid argues in favor of OSR in the special
sciences as well. He argues that one can have a structural ontology in a
special science without even thinking of the relation to other fields, such
as physics. As he rightfully points out:
One clear sense in which social theories may be about struc-
tures and not individuals is that social structure can relate
organizations, classes, groups, practices, and so forth with-
out any explicit reference to individuals. Of course, organi-
zations are in some sense composed of individuals (Kincaid
2008: 722).
I agree with Kincaid that we should accept that in social science, there
are structures at a fundamental level as well. He goes on:
Furthermore, social structures suggest that token identity will
have to be identity at a time, since over time the same institu-
tional token will be realized by different individuals so long as
the structure persists. Finally, explanations in terms of social
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structure can be sufficiently detached from the details about
the individuals bringing it about that it is indeterminate ex-
actly which individuals at a time compose the institution.
This is in principle no different from the problem of trying
to decide which molecules make up a particular table (ibid.:
729).
Kincaid draws an interesting analogy to physics here. If we want to focus
on structures, in the sense of OSR, what is then the difference between
social science and physics? Both explore structures. One difference lies in
the status of “ontological fundamentality" that we aim to attribute to the
entities that are postulated in both disciplines. No one would reasonably
argue that structures in social science are ontologically more fundamen-
tal than structures in quantum physics. However, there is a difference
in accepting that molecules are more fundamental than societies on the
one hand, and in saying that it does not make sense to postulate OSR
outside of physics on the other hand. Consequently, I argue in favor of a
moderate version of the primacy of physics, that can now be formulated
in a slightly modified version as follows:
The moderate primacy of physics constraint: Special science hy-
potheses that conflict with fundamental physics, or such consensus as
there is in fundamental physics, should be revised and might be rejected
for that reason alone. Fundamental physical hypotheses are not sym-
metrically hostage to the conclusions of the special sciences, however in
certain cases, hypothesis of the special sciences should be accepted despite
their apparent conflict with fundamental physics.
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This weakens the primacy of physics constraint and allows us to draw a
more pluralist picture with respect to the special sciences.
5.3 OSR in the special sciences
In order to discuss the applicability of OSR in the special sciences, one
might in principle argue that, since the general motivation for structural
realism has been the pessimistic meta-induction and the problems for
traditional scientific realism (see Worrall 1989), based mainly on cases of
physics, such an expansion of structural realism bares any justification, or
motivation. There is no doubt that the original motivation of structural
realism has its origin and justification in cases of radical theory change
in physics. Anyhow, we have seen so far that exploring the possibility
of formulating OSR in other disciplines might actually become a fruitful
task.
5.3.1 Lyre’s critique
I will now focus on Lyre’s views on structural realism. He states: “Struc-
tural realism is first and foremost an ontological framework that provides
us with a tailor-made metaphysics for modern physics (Lyre 2013: 2)".
In my view, Lyre’s position is too restricted and can actually give rise to
a confusion. This is mainly so because Worrall’s (1989) paper, the one
that brought structural realism into play, is settled down in the debate on
scientific realism, and not in the discussion of the foundations of physics.
At no point, Worrall aims to provide such an ontological framework for
physics. Instead, Worrall talks about the continuity of mathematical
structure through radical theory change. As it is well known, he devel-
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oped his version of structural realism with the motivation of providing a
solution to arguments that had been raised against scientific realism, such
as the pessimistic meta-induction. His paper proposes that certain math-
ematical structures are continuous even through radical theory change.
Yet, there is never a reference to fundamental ontological questions of
physics, as Lyre understands structural realism. Nevertheless, Worrall’s
aim was clearly within the context of epistemic structural realism, settled
down in the discussion about scientific realism.
Nowadays, we are all aware that OSR has been developed years after
Worrall’s 1989 paper, and that Lyre’s view of structural realism is mo-
tivated from the perspective of OSR. Lyre’s approach addresses the im-
portant point that OSR might in principle be applicable only to physics,
just by its nature, i.e. it is about the metaphysics of the world. However,
I see his view as being too restricted, since the exploration of OSR in the
special sciences is at least an open question that needs to be addressed.
It might well be the case that Lyre is right, however, we will see this only
after a detailed look at several scientific disciplines.
What makes the epistemic part of structural realism entirely different
from Lyre’s proposal is the fact that the early epistemic structuralists like
Russell or Carnap did not talk about the ontology of physics at all, they
rather emphasized about what we can know of the world, and how we
can do so. It is clear that even Worrall mentions a case-study of physics,
when he discusses structural realism. But the general focus on structural
realism in physics started after French and Ladyman (2003). It started
to bring contemporary physics into play. It is no doubt true that physics
has a primordial status in the discussion on the metaphysics of science.
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However, the price of not studying OSR in the special sciences might be
too high, since it is not entirely clear if OSR does not play a role there.
Furthermore, Lyre’s position against OSR in the special sciences can
be best expressed by the following quote:
My point is the following: while I do believe that structural
descriptions and structural laws play an exclusive role in the
special sciences, I fail to see that they play an exclusive role
or that they should give us any reason to believe that all that
there is on the various levels is structure (Lyre 2013: 3).
Lyre rightfully attributes an importance to structural descriptions and
structural laws, but denies their exclusiveness. This sounds reasonable,
but it fails to make a strong point about OSR, since structural descrip-
tions are mainly the concern of the epistemic structural realist. In OSR,
structural descriptions are at most of a secondary importance. The OSR-
adherent interprets a scientific theory without logically reconstructing it
previously, and argues that what is in fact postulated there, are struc-
tures at a fundamental level. The way in which one should represent
these structures is primarily a concern of epistemic structural realism.
In the discussion about forms of representation, one can make use of the
Ramsey-view, the structuralist meta-theory, and other frameworks.
Furthermore, it might be true that an exclusive role of structural
entities in the sciences is not justifiable at present. But if we want to
have a broad and universally acceptable answer to this, more case-studies
are needed.
Lyre concludes:
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Nothing commits us to the existence of genuine, non-reducible
higher-level-structures. I’ve fortified my points by arguing
that structures are global entities and that the assumption of
higher-level structures as genuinely global or holistic entities
is even more arcane (ibid.: 7).
This view seems to be misleading, since for OSR, it is not necessary
to postulate structures as being only global and non-reducible. What
matters is the role such structures play in our theories and the way in
which they are connected to the entities of our theories that we take to
be objects. For OSR, a structure should play the central role in any
empirical theory, as opposed to objects.
Moreover, what matters first is the level of ontological fundamental-
ity, so to speak. Is it more reasonable for a biologist, an economist or a
linguist to postulate objects with certain properties, when they formu-
late a theory, or is it in fact the case that in the disciplines of the special
sciences, the postulation of certain objects with certain properties makes
only sense if these are interpreted as parts of bigger structures? I suggest
that for OSR to hold in the special sciences, there is one central require-
ment, that is, its ontological fundamentality. If an entity has relational
properties and if it plays a crucial role within an empirical theory (causal,
or explanatorial), we can say that this entity is ontologically fundamental
in this theory. Such entities, however, can be conceived as individuals,
or as structures, such as it is the case of contemporary physics and ontic
structural realism.
The central task for adherents of OSR in the special sciences will be
to identify such entities with relational properties and to convincingly
argue in each case that such entities are better understood as structures.
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Furthermore, if such entities turn out to play a fundamentally important
role within a theory, one can say that these entities are the ontological
basis of a theory, and that therefore, OSR makes sense in the respective
field. Below, I will argue that this is the case with the notion of trans-
formation and kernel sentence in Harris’ and Chomsky’s early theories.
5.3.2 OSR in economics
As mentioned above, Ross (2008) explores OSR in economics. He argues
positively about the application of OSR in the special sciences, as follows:
People are to economic theory roughly as tables and rocks
are to physical theory. OSR as applied to physics doesn’t
deny that there are tables or rocks, and it explains how phys-
ical theory can provide (ever improving) explanations of their
behavior despite denying that they are good models of fun-
damental reality. (I.e., it denies that fundamental reality is a
collection of objects like rocks, but smaller.) Similarly, eco-
nomic theory is not a set of propositions about entities like
people, but meaner. In this respect, economic theory exactly
resembles physical theory . . . . (ibid.: 742).
As in all other scientific disciplines, in economics a specific domain of
empirical phenomena is investigated. Further, economists study the way
in which the objects of their domain interact and are put into a structure.
Left interdisciplinary and intertheoretical connections between economics
and other sciences such as physics beside, it is not clear why one should
not assume an ontic structural realist position for economics, just as
for any other scientific discipline, where it can be reasonably argued for
5.3. OSR IN THE SPECIAL SCIENCES 101
the existence of structures in which the objects of inquiry appear as
subordinated parts of a structure. However, in order to affirm that OSR
is not only possible, but also plausible in economics, we are in need for
a detailed case study that gives us a clear result.
So far, the possibility of OSR in economics has been outlined by both
authors, Kincaid and Ross, but such a structuralist stance for economics
has yet to be developed sharply. One might start with discussing the
ontological status that the principal entities of economics have. These
entities could be markets, rational agents, but also many other entities.
In the scope of this work, I aim to emphasize that the general task of
exploring OSR outside of physics is a promising task for future investi-
gations.
5.3.3 OSR in biology
For the case of biology, French (2014) argues that structural realism in
biology has a high plausibility. By relying on Beatty (1995), French
suggests that there are no laws in biology and that “biological structures
would be temporally specific, changing in their fundamental nature under
the impact of evolution (French 2014: 331)". This would in principle
present a problem for the structural realist, since especially OSR relies
on laws and symmetries. However, a structuralist ontology for biology
seems plausible for French. He comments on Price’s Equation:
Although obviously not a symmetry principle, this covariance
equation is independent of objects, rests on no contingent bi-
ological assumptions, and can be understood as representing
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the modal, relational structure of the evolutionary process
(ibid.: 338).
This famous equation of biology relates the change in average value of
character from one generation to the next with covariance between fit-
ness and character, and the fitness weighted average of transmission bias:
∆z = Cov(w, z) +Ew(∆z). Price’s equation can be understood to “rep-
resent the structure of selection in general (ibid.: 338)", French argues.
Despite the obvious lack of mathematization in biology, we are still
able to identify mathematical structures, such as Price’s equation. The
exact level of mathematization that is needed to make structural realism
applicable is not clear. In the previous chapter, I have already argued
that once an empirical theory is formalizable, we are already in a position
to represent its structure. In this sense, whenever we are in a position to
reconstruct a mature empirical theory within a meta-framework (such as
the semantic conception of theories, specifically the structuralist meta-
theory), the structures “of the world" can be represented formally.
French (ibid.: 339) lists four topics of biology that suggest OSR in
this discipline:
1. Gene identity
2. Gene pluralism
3. Metagenomics and biological individuality
4. The heterogeneity of biological objects
These four issues in biology all involve the consideration that a relational
and structural understanding of biological entities and processes should
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be taken into account. Since the concept of gene has changed dramati-
cally during the history of biology, and since genes could be understood
as DNA sequences, the question of the individuality of genes arises. As
well as the fact that individuals in biology would rather be conceived
as “emergent entities, dependent upon the appropriate structures (ibid.:
345)."
Within the scope of this dissertation, it is not possible to address
and to discuss French’s OSR in biology abundantly. I see his proposal
as a promising approach of how to apply OSR outside of physics. The
aim in this section is merely to show that applications of OSR in the
special sciences have been discussed, and that the exploration of OSR
in linguistics is one further contribution to this enterprise. A proper
discussion of French’s version of OSR in biology is due to future research.
5.4 OSR in linguistics
Other than in physics, in linguistics, a lower level of mathematization
is achieved. This is principally due to the subject domain. Whereas
in physics, most of the claims that theories make are best expressed in
terms of equations, in linguistics, equations hardly can express what the
respective theories claim. Notwithstanding, we are able to represent the
structure of language in formal terms, especially in the field of syntax. For
this purpose, formal methods such as mathematical logic and graph the-
ory are frequently applied (I will discuss the question of mathematization
in linguistics, and how it relates to the maturity of a scientific discipline
in the following chapter). Once a formalization of certain subdomains of
linguistics is given by these methods, we are presented with mathemati-
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cal structures that represent the phenomena, quite analogously to what
physicists have, once they have formulated equations.
I see it as a central point to respond to the critiques of OSR in the
special sciences by providing a concrete and detailed case of existing
structures in a special science; structures that are ontologically more fun-
damental than the individuals that are postulated in that special science.
In what follows, I will discuss the case of one subdomain of linguistics,
namely, transformational theory.
5.4.1 Transformations
For my analysis of OSR in linguistics, I will consider transformational
theory, since it gave syntactic theory a significant progress and it can be
understood as having achieved a common acceptance in the field of syn-
tax. Before Chomsky, Harris gave linguistics (especially the disciplines
of morphology and syntax) a strong formal fundament. By doing so, he
helped linguistics to become a more mature science. This is the principal
reason why I chose this theory for my purpose of arguing for OSR in
linguistics. Harris (1968) outlines the motivation of his work broadly as
follows:
The only body of data required for the whole analysis of lan-
guage is the indication that certain sound sequences, out of
some large sample, are utterances of the language . . . while
others are not, and that certain ones are repetitions of each
other. Structural Linguistics shows how these utterances can
be characterized as a set of constructions on certain discrete
elements. Mathematical Linguistics shows that the character-
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ization can be made in terms of other sets, defined by certain
relations among these linguistic elements, and that the enti-
ties in the new sets are arbitrary and are defined only by the
relations among the new sets (ibid.: 1).
In this quote, we see that Harris has a structural linguistic theory in mind,
i.e. he emphasizes on what he calls ‘sets defined by certain relations
among these linguistic elements’. This means that he was aware of the
importance of structural and relational properties in language. More
concretely, he defined several linguistic entities as such relational entities.
He makes it clear that the entities we defined in the new sets are arbitrary
entities and that they are defined only by the relations among the new
sets. This is a pivotal point in favor of a structuralist ontology in Harris’
theory of linguistics.
In order to illustrate this, I will focus on one central notion of trans-
formational theory, the so-called kernel sentence. I propose that kernel
sentences should be understood as structural entities, for reasons that will
become clear below. In order to introduce the notion of kernel sentence,
Harris expresses as follows:
The kernel is the set of elementary sentences and combiners,
such that all sentences of the language are obtained from
one or more kernel sentences (with combiners) by means of
one or more transformations . . . our picture of a language,
then, includes a finite number of actual kernel sentences, all
cast in a small number of sentence structures built out of a
few morpheme classes by means of a few constructional rules;
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a set of combining and introducing elements; and a set of
elementary transformations . . . (ibid.: 335-339).
Let us consider the following example: The kernel sentence:
(i) Tom saw Mary
in active, is obtained from the passive
(ii) Mary was seen by Tom
through a transformation. Harris’ formalism in this case is as fol-
lows:
N1V N2 ↔ N2V ∗N1
where N1 is ‘Mary’, V the verb ‘saw’, V ∗ is ‘was seen by’, and N2
is ‘Tom’. The ↔ is the transformation operator.
A kernel sentence is a complex structure, since it is composed by words,
which are composed by the smallest units of meaning, the morphemes.
However, morphemes on their own do not suffice for the formulation of
an ontology of natural language, based on individuals. We can agree
that morphemes, such as ′− ing′, ′−hood′, or ′des−′ are (fairly abstract)
objects. Anyhow, morphemes alone are not the entity that suffices to
compose our ontology of linguistics. Most importantly, we are in need of
some ordering elements, such as rules of formation for well-formedness,
and rules of transformation, as Harris explored in detail. A sentence
should be seen as a fundamental entity of language, since it bears mean-
ings and it is what speakers utter. Of course, many times, sentences can
be uttered erroneously, or they can consist of only one word, and there
are many possibilities for other special cases.
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I propose that we conceive sentences to be relational entities, since
they are composed by relata, i.e. words (and morphemes). In this sense,
at the ontologically fundamental level of transformational theory, we have
to deal with sentences, to be more precise, with kernel sentences. These
kernel sentences are the ontological fundament of this branch of linguis-
tics, and they are structural entities, since they are composed by words
and morphemes.
The fact that kernel sentences can be transformed, such as in the
case of active-passive transformation, indicates that they should have an
ontologically more fundamental status, in comparison to other linguistic
entities. Sentences can always be subject of transformation, while words
standing alone can’t. This indicates the relational status that sentences
have in transformational theory and is a further indicator that we do
best by conceiving such sentences as structures, instead of individuals.
5.4.2 Ontological fundamentality
So far, I have argued that sentence-structures are ontologically fundamen-
tal and of central importance in Harris’ transformational theory. With
his theory, Harris provided a method of describing how complex sentences
are in fact built out of simpler ones, down to the level of kernel sentences.
Kernel sentences are the central entity in his theory, and clearly, in lin-
guistics, a sentence is understood as a structure, not as an individual.
A sentence is a structure, composed by certain simpler elements by cer-
tain syntactical and other rules. These simpler elements are phrases,
then words at the next lower level, then morphemes at the lowest level.
But for Harris’ transformational theory to work it is central that kernel
sentences are postulated, not morphemes, as single, individual entities.
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Morphemes only occur as parts of bigger structures, namely, words, and
words only occur as parts of the bigger structures, i.e. sentences. Ker-
nel sentences need to be postulated in order to be able to explain how
we build up more complex sentences out of simpler ones, by means of
transformations.
To point out the different levels of complexity in Harris’ theory, we
can proceed as follows: The following example seems to be trivial, but
since the discussion about OSR in the special sciences is far from trivial,
and given the fact that there is a lack of concrete evidence, I will focus
on this quite explicitly. Given the sentence:
(iii) The student reads the book,
we can decompose this sentence-structure into its phrases, i.e. the noun-
phrase The student, the verbal-phrase reads, and the noun-phrase the
book. At the next lower level, one can decompose the phrases into words,
then, one can proceed in decomposing the words into their morphemes.
Furthermore, from the perspective of OSR, it is the importance of the
rules that can generate well-formedness which makes the notion of phrase
structure rule (as I will outline and discuss in chapter 6) interesting.
These rules give the notion of sentence more “ontological weight". Only
with a sentence, composed by the underlying phrase structure rules, an
information is given in a correct, complete and typical sense (for native
speakers).
The notion of formal grammar also gives us information about how
to connect OSR to linguistics. According to Chomsky (1957), a formal
grammar generates a formal language, which is a set of (usually) finite
- length sequences of symbols (i.e. strings) that may be constructed by
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applying production rules to another sequence of symbols which initially
contains just the start symbol. A rule may be applied to a sequence
of symbols by replacing an occurrence of the symbols on the left-hand
side of the rule with those that appear on the right-hand side. From
the perspective of OSR, the symbols are individuals, but for themselves,
they are incapable of composing a sentence. What is needed are the
production rules, which manipulate strings of symbols, and by doing so
construct a sentence. I will discuss the phrase structure rules for English
with more detail in chapter 6.
5.4.3 Transformational rules
Transformational rules only make sense if they are applied to sentences.
And sentences are understood as structures, rather than individual ob-
jects. It does not make any sense to transform a word or a morpheme.
Since this shows us that sentences are the ontologically central notion of
Harris’ theory, and that sentences are structural entities, and not indi-
vidual objects, it is reasonable to assume OSR for linguistics. Concretely,
it is reasonable to assume OSR for Harris’ transformational theory.
Transformations are of central importance for linguistic theory, since
they show us the relations that exist between sentences. More specif-
ically, they show relations among sentences which are not immediately
detectable. To mention one further example, consider the example of a
transformation involving a relative clause:
(iv) The employee who sold the computer to me was friendly.
and
(v) The employee sold the computer to me.
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Such examples lead us to think that transformations are of central impor-
tance in syntactic theory, since they illustrate how certain sentence forms
(such as active and passive) are related, and how one form of sentence
can be generated by applying certain rules of transformation. The set
of transformational relations can be conceived as another fundamental
entity of syntactic theory. Harris (1968) explains this set as follows:
The base operators φ : A(x)→ B(x), where A,B are proposi-
tional forms, and x a particular word class or subclass . . . present
in A(x), can be taken as generators of the set of transforma-
tional relations among sentences (ibid.: 100).
This suggests that only by individuating the relational properties of sen-
tences and their transformations, we can get a correct picture of syntactic
theory, and hence it motivates an ontic structural realist picture.
5.4.4 OSR in one branch of linguistics
However, it is a fact that linguistics is a highly diverse science. There are
many linguistic sub-disciplines such as phonetics, phonology, semantics
(formal or cognitive), neurolinguistics, or sociolinguistics, among others.
And there are many different ways of working in all these disciplines, e.g.
hand in hand with cognitive science, or with a focus on statistical evalu-
ation, together with psychologists, in a speech-laboratory, etc. Anyhow,
since Harris’ transformational theory was an influential step in the de-
velopment of syntax, I argue that it can be seen as a representative case
for a mature and influential part of linguistics.
It might be rightfully argued that the case of Harris’ theory is not
fully representative for the whole of linguistics. I see no problem in this,
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since linguistics has a high level of ramification and sophistication in
the most diverse ways. It might well be that OSR cannot be plausibly
formulated for other parts of linguistics, but as far as Harris’ syntactic
theory is concerned, I argue that OSR can be upheld successfully.
Furthermore, I see Harris’ theory as an influential part of linguistic
theory in the twentieth century, since it marks specifically the change
of paradigms, from the Pre-Chomskyan era to the Chomskyan phase of
linguistic thought. In that sense, it will also be interesting from the per-
spective of theory change, since some parts of Harris’ theory might well
be overtaken from successor theories, such as structural linguistics. Ge-
offrey Pullum argues that transformational theory is not only indebted
to Chomsky’s original research, and that Harris’ and also Carnap’s con-
tributions should be given its place:
TGG is generally assumed to have sprung entirely from Chom-
sky’s work, specifically his large unpublished manuscript . . . and
the brief undergraduate lecture digest of it that was published
as SS3. While linguists are aware that the term “transforma-
tion" comes from the work of Chomsky’s mentor Zellig Harris,
and some have noted that Harris probably took the term from
Carnap (1934), it has gone almost entirely unremarked that
the underlying mathematics is largely present in much earlier
work, overlooked by linguists because Chomsky never cited it
(Pullum 2011: 284).
However, whether OSR is also reasonable in other fields of linguistics is a
question of future investigation. The aim in this chapter is to formulate
3By ‘SS’, the author refers to Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures.
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OSR in one concrete theory of syntax. As other authors that I have
mentioned above (Kincaid, Ross) have argued as well, I see interesting
analogies to the approach ontic structural realists have, when they look
at contemporary physics.
If one wants to formulate OSR in a special science, one has to argue
that there exist good reasons to believe that the structures that are pos-
tulated within a concrete theory are ontologically more fundamental than
the individuals that are part of the same theory. The relation between
the respective special science and physics should be left beside. In strict
terms, it is clear that “the world" ultimately is made of elementary parti-
cles, but within one concrete empirical theory (such as transformational
theory), the fundamental entities can well be seen as structures, and as
“real".
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that there cannot be a general claim
for the applicability of OSR to all fields of special science. What is needed
are concrete case-studies and the discussion of concrete examples, as I
have provided here.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have mentioned that OSR has been weighted mostly
in connection with results of contemporary physics. We have seen that
the primacy of physics can be better formulated in a weaker version
that allows to pay more tribute to the special sciences. Furthermore, I
have argued that Lyre’s position on OSR is problematic, by highlighting
that there is in fact a way of formulating OSR in the special sciences.
For this purpose, I have shown a concrete case of linguistics, where it
5.5. CONCLUSIONS 113
is more reasonable to assume OSR than any other ontology, in order
to give the theory a philosophically well-formulated fundament. The
kernel sentences and transformations in Harris’ linguistic theory are the
ontological fundament of this branch of linguistics, and they are closer
to be structures, than to be understood as individual objects.
As I have mentioned above, it is necessary to outline more cases of
OSR in the special sciences. It might well be the case that OSR is
applicable only to some empirical theories in some branches of science.
This might not be problematic. OSR can well work in physics, in some
parts of biology and in some parts of linguistics, maybe also in certain
branches of social science. This shall not present a contradiction or a
problem for OSR. Once we have accumulated more specific examples
of OSR in the special sciences, and case studies are worked out, the
relation between the different scientific disciplines with respect to OSR
can become clearer. With this chapter, I aim to make a contribution
towards this end.
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Chapter 6
A case study from linguistics
6.1 Mathematization and maturity
From the perspective of the philosophy of science, it is a central ques-
tion to ask when a scientific discipline achieves maturity. The notion of
mature science has been used in a widespread manner, but it is rather
unusual that philosophers who employ the term also define quite well
in which sense they employ it. A science is typically taken as mature
when there is a significant level of unification and coherence, as well as
some level of mathematical sophistication within a discipline. In a ma-
ture science, no one seriously questions fundamental postulates, e.g. in
contemporary physics, no one would ever doubt of the laws of thermo-
dynamics.
Linguistics is a polemical case in this context. It is not entirely clear
that there is an absolute consensus about certain fundamental principles
of the field. There is still a huge amount of open questions and contro-
versial subjects in this discipline. Discussions in semantics, with entirely
different approaches (such as generative, statistical, cognitive, or formal)
115
116 CHAPTER 6. A CASE STUDY FROM LINGUISTICS
are an example of this. In this context, the famous work The Linguistics
Wars, by Randy Allen Harris (1993) discusses the still immature status
of linguistics, at least in some domains. Harris famoulsy outlines the
discussion between adherents and criticizers (such as Lakoff and Ross
1967/1976) of Chomsky’s generative grammar.
However, I want to argue that at least in the development of the
linguistic discipline of syntax, a significant level of maturity has been
achieved. This might not be so in other linguistic disciplines, especially
in semantics. I argue that the phase of theoretical change from Bloom-
fieldian structural linguistics to generative grammar meant a significant
step towards the maturity of linguistics. I will rely on Bird’s (2013)
explication of the Kuhnian concept of maturity. He expresses as follows:
Kuhn describes an immature science, in what he sometimes
calls its ‘pre-paradigm’ period, as lacking consensus. Com-
peting schools of thought possess differing procedures, theo-
ries, even metaphysical presuppositions. Consequently there
is little opportunity for collective progress. Even localized
progress by a particular school is made difficult, since much
intellectual energy is put into arguing over the fundamentals
with other schools instead of developing a research tradition
(Bird 2013).
In what follows, I will outline and show that it was primarily the introduc-
tion of mathematical methods that enabled Post-Bloomfieldian linguists
to explain syntactic phenomena in a better way than structural linguists.
There is no doubt that today, there are still many different branches of
linguistics (i.e. Cognitive, Generative, Typological, etc.), which stand in
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contrast to each other. However, there is nowadays a certain consensus
on fundamental principles of syntax. These principles were discovered
by Harris and Chomsky. From a historical perspective, I aim to provide
answers to questions about radical theory change, with Harris and Chom-
sky as the founding fathers of transformational generative grammar. It
should become clearer to understand the shortcomings of structural lin-
guistics and in consequence to understand why this radical theoretical
change from one paradigm to the new paradigm of generative grammar
occurred. Through the contribution of this work, we should be able to
see with more clarity where the gaps between both paradigms lie, and
where similarities hold.
Let us now turn the focus on the role of mathematization. The discus-
sion of the historical development of this part of the history of linguistics
is of central importance for my dissertation. By showing that this phase
of theory change lead to a significant progress in linguistics, I motivate
the point that this part in the history of linguistics becomes interesting
from the perspective of the philosophy of science. One could ask how
radical the shift from Bloomfield to Harris and Chomsky was, and if
there was indeed such a radical, “revolutionary" shift. This also makes it
especially interesting for structural realism, since one could ask about the
structures that might have been continuous in this case. As I will discuss
and show below, there were some important changes in the ontology of
the theories, but there were also structural continuities.
6.1.1 Linguistics matures
Leonard Bloomfield is widely recognized as one of the most important
linguists in the first half of the twentieth century. Especially in the phase
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before Chomsky somehow revolutionized linguistics. Bloomfield’s theory
of structural linguistics provided the basic fundament for later linguis-
tic theories. His theory was extremely influential in the community of
linguists in that time. After the publication of his first book An intro-
duction to the study of language in 1914, Bloomfield dedicated his work
to the study of the Algonquian languages, especially to Menomini, as his
influential work Menomini Morphophonemics shows. Bloomfield’s main
work is his 1933 Language. He presents his whole theory in this work. Es-
pecially his theory of meaning changed from a mentalist position in 1914,
to a radical behaviorist one in 1933. Due to the whole of Bloomfield’s
work and the great influence it had, the so-called school of American
Structural Linguistics arose. Until the upcoming of Chomsky’s highly
influential early work in the late fifties, structural linguistics was seen as
the standard approach in linguistics.
Earlier and during the same time, many structuralist schools in differ-
ent places were developed. All of them had in common that they related
back to Ferdinand de Saussure’s structuralist linguistics. The so-called
Copenhagen-school, with its main representative figure Louis Hjelmslev
and the Prague-school with its main figures Roman Jakobson and Nikolai
Trubetzkoy are generally counted as the central figures. What all these
structuralist approaches have in common is their focus on language as a
structured (ordered and recurrent) phenomenon, and that the best way to
study language is to understand it as consisting of certain smaller struc-
tural parts, into which it should be decomposed. The name structuralism
may have little in common with other structuralisms in other fields like
in philosophy, mathematics, anthropology or literary theory. The main
motivation for calling these linguistic schools structuralism comes prob-
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ably out of the history of phonology. There, one of the core figures was
Jan Baudoin de Courtenay, who understood language as a composition of
small, structured units, which actually realize sounds. It was Baudoin de
Courtenay who introduced the notion of phoneme into linguistics. Later,
it was the group of european structuralists like Trubetzkoy and Hjelmslev
that systematized it4.
Besides many other works, Bloomfield’s 1926 A Set of Postulates for
the Science of Language is his own intent of axiomatizing linguistics. He
outlines a list of definitions and assumptions, which aim to state clearly
what linguistics is about. In this sense, this work of Bloomfield counts
as a work on the foundations of his own scientific discipline and can also
be seen as a contribution to the philosophy of linguistics. It is of special
importance for a logical reconstruction of Bloomfield’s theory. Bloomfield
states the importance of what he calls the postulational method :
The method of postulates (that is, assumptions or axioms)
and definitions is fully adequate to mathematics; as for other
sciences, the more complex their subject-matter, the less ame-
nable are they to this method, since, under it, every descrip-
tive or historical fact becomes the subject of a new postulate.
Nevertheless, the postulational method can further the study
of language, because it forces us to state explicitly whatever
we assume, to define our terms, and to decide what things
may exist independently and what things are interdependent
(ibid.: 153).
4For a detailed study of the history of structural linguistics, see Seuren (1998).
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In this work, Bloomfield lists the fundamental postulates and definitions
of his theory. He aims to contribute to a clarification to the object of
study of the in 1926 yet immature science of linguistics.
Bloomfield’s motivation of making linguistics a more precise science
can be seen as continuous with what has been called theWissenschaftliche
Weltauffassung by members of the Vienna Circle as Otto Neurath and
Rudolf Carnap. Bloomfield shared many meta-theoretical assumptions
with Neurath and, common in the years before World War II, also to
Bloomfield a scientistic world-view had become attractive. This can also
be seen by the fact that Neurath invited Bloomfield to contribute in his
“International Encyclopedia of Unified Science", where Bloomfield pub-
lished his article (originally from 1939) Linguistic Aspects of Science in
19555. Already in his 1926, Bloomfield points out quite clearly what he
expects of a mature science of language:
Also, the postulational method saves discussion, because it
limits our statements to a defined terminology; in particular,
it cuts us off from psychological dispute. Discussion of the
fundamentals of our science seems to consist one half of obvi-
ous truisms, and one half of metaphysics; this is characteristic
of matters which form no real part of a subject: they should
properly be disposed of by merely naming certain concepts
as belonging to the domain of other sciences (ibid.: 153-154).
I will now focus on Bloomfield’s linguistic theory. His theory was widely
accepted as the standard theory in linguistics in the first half of the
twentieth century. The important point is that his theory was widely
5see Ernst et al. 2002, for more detailed information on Bloomfield’s contact to
Neurath and Carnap.
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accepted, but it was not able to explain a lot about syntax. Typically,
structural linguistics had a clear focus on the fields of phonology and
morphology. There, linguists were able to do actual descriptive work
on languages that were unknown by the community of linguists by that
time.
An important principle for Bloomfield is that language manifests
through acts of speech. Such acts are concrete actions of utterance.
Languages are always spoken in linguistic communities. Another central
feature of Bloomfield’s theory is that recurrent sound features are lin-
guistic forms, and that these forms receive meaning through recurrent
stimulus-response-features, since Bloomfield endorsed a behaviorist pic-
ture of meaning. There is no semantics grounded on mental principles.
The only way to study linguistic meaning is by behaviorist psychology
(in Bloomfield’s scientistic view - in 1933). In fact, by the time of 1914,
Bloomfield endorsed a mentalist view of meaning, of which he had re-
trieved by 1933, most likely also inspired by logical positivism and, more
generally, scientism.
Morphology and syntax
Interestingly, Bloomfield already mentioned what was systematized later
by Harris: That certain morpheme-classes correctly combined build up a
grammatical sentence. This insight allowed a significant systematization
of syntax, since one could start classifying classes of morphemes and was
in a position to describe language in a clearer way. Another important
notion in Bloomfield is the notion of construction: “Each position in
a construction can be filled only by certain forms" (Bloomfield 1926:
158). This notion as well presented a clarification of syntactic theory.
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The insight that there exist “positions" within “constructions" already
presented a first step towards a formalization of syntactic theory. We
can see the following example, in order to make Bloomfield’s point clear:
(vi) The tree is old.
(vii) The _ is old.
In the empty slot, only certain classes of morphemes (or forms) can occur.
In this case, certain noun-classes. Furthermore, the notion of substitution
was characterized by Bloomfield in the following way:
A substitute is a linguistic form or grammatical feature which,
under certain conventional circumstances, replaces any one of
a class of linguistic forms . . . thus, in English, the substitute
‘I’ replaces any singular-number substantive expression, pro-
vided that this substantive expression denotes the speaker of
the utterance in which the substitute is used . . . the substi-
tute replaces only forms of a certain class, which we may call
the domain of the substitute; thus, the domain of the substi-
tute ‘I’ is the English form-class of substantive expressions
(Bloomfield 1933: 247).
As well as in the case of constructions, the notion of substitution provided
a clear fundament for parts of syntactic theory. By classifying certain
expressions and then sorting out in which position these could stand
within a bigger construction, a criterion for well-formed sentences was
given.
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Transformations and discourse analysis
The origins of Harris’ transformational theory can be explicated by his
interest in studying the different levels of language. Being an adherent of
structural linguistic theory, Harris primarily searched for a criteria of dif-
ferentiation between sentences. Before him, within structural linguistics,
the analysis of language had been carried out from the most elementary
level of phonemes up to the level of sentences, as Bloomfield developed
it in his 1933 Language. Bloomfield’s book was a standard introduction
to linguistic theory for decades. In syntactic theory, Harris wanted to go
further than Bloomfield and searched for a systematization of sentence-
types. He developed a method that enabled linguists to describe how
sentences are built and changed from one mood-type into another, like
from active to passive. Within structural linguistics before Harris, it was
possible to describe a text as a sequence of sentences, but with such a
description, linguists were only able to describe the relations between the
elements of one sentence, but not between a sentence and other sentences
within the same text. Harris’ transformational theory allowed to explain
more linguistic phenomena. In this sense, it helped linguistic theory to
mature significantly.
Within this context, Harris developed his Discourse Analysis. The
method of discourse analysis proceeds as follows. It is a method of ana-
lyzing complete text corpora. The proper aim is to describe the relative
distribution of the elements which occur in a text. This aim is achieved
by building the classes of the elements, which have identical or equivalent
environment in a text. Each sentence is then represented as a sequence
of such classes. By obtaining a description of the structure of a text, it
is possible to study the semantical information of the text. The idea was
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to provide semantical interpretations of text corpora. By providing such
interpretations, it was thought, results for mechanical text processing
could be obtained. Harris’ motivation came also from a semantic stand-
point. Since some definite semantic information was to be deduced from
the structure of the text, these methods could assign only such structures
as did not change this semantic information.
Phrase structure and formal grammar
Chomsky took Harris’ ideas and developed them further. This starts
already with his master’s thesis (1951) Morphophonemics of Modern He-
brew, and later with his ground-breaking (1955) The Logical Structure
of Linguistic Theory and his (1957) Syntactic Structures. As in Harris,
the mathematization consists of the application of logical tools, i.e. first-
order logic, especially predicate calculus, set-theoretic tools and, more
abundantly than in Harris, graph-theoretic methods (e.g. syntax-trees).
Chomsky went further and developed a formal theory of grammar, where
transformations manipulated not just the surface strings, but the parse
tree associated to them, making transformational grammar a system of
tree automata. It was a further development towards the same direction.
Parsing is the process of recognizing an utterance by decomposing it to
a set of symbols and analyzing each one in the grammar of the language.
As a result, the first step to describing the meaning of an utterance is to
break it down part by part and look at its analyzed form.
The phrase structure rules that were introduced by Chomsky lead to a
significant progress. In a sense, these rules were a further development on
Bloomfield’s first characterization of notions like position, construction or
substitution. Such phrase structure rules determine how the constituents
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Figure 6.1: Example of a syntax-tree for the sentence: “The student
buys the book". Such graphical representations present a central aspect
of mathematization in inguistics.
of a phrase are ordered. According to Chomsky (1957), the phrase struc-
ture rules for the english noun phrase (NP) can be formulated as follows:
(viii) John (N)
(ix) the car (Det N)
(x) a big car (Det Adj N)
(xi) a car in a garage (Det N PP)
The general phrase structure rule for the english noun-phrase, according
to Chomsy (1957):
NP → (Det) (Adj) N (PP)
This means that the typical noun phrase consists of a determiner (such
as ‘the’), if required, an adjective (such as ‘green’), then a noun (such
as ‘idea’), and then a prepositional phrase at the end, if required. After
having formalized linguistics in such a way, Chomsky also established the
notion of formal grammar. A formal grammar of this type consists of:
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1. A finite set of production rules (left-hand side → right-hand side)
where each side consists of a sequence of the following symbols:
2. A finite set of nonterminal symbols (indicating that some produc-
tion rule can yet be applied)
3. A finite set of terminal symbols (indicating that no production rule
can be applied)
4. A start symbol (a distinguished nonterminal symbol)
According to Chomsky, a formal grammar generates a formal language,
which is a (usually infinite) set of finite - length sequences of symbols
(i.e. strings) that may be constructed by applying production rules to
another sequence of symbols which initially contains just the start sym-
bol. A rule may be applied to a sequence of symbols by replacing an
occurrence of the symbols on the left-hand side of the rule with those
that appear on the right-hand side. Such a grammar defines the formal
language. The notions of deep structure and surface structure were in-
troduced later (with Chomsky 1965). Chomsky’s proposals from 1965
imply more controversial views on the relation between semantics and
syntax.
For Chomsky, every sentence had a deep structure and a surface struc-
ture. In the beginning, Chomsky claimed that deep structure determined
meaning, etc. For the 1965 Chomsky, even interrogative sentences like:
(xii) Which car did John wash?
had a deep structure, where their real meaning was
(xiii) John washed that car.
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I have argued that Bloomfield already systematized an important part
of syntactic theory. He introduced that certain linguistic forms can be
grouped into classes. Such form-classes cannot be substituted by any
other form-class. Harris took Bloomfield’s ideas on syntax and developed
them. By introducing his formalism, Harris took a first step towards
a mathematization. This made it possible to give linguistic theory a
stronger explanatory power and certainly helped linguistics to become a
mature science. With Chomsky, syntactic theory became fully “formal",
in the sense that it was possible to develop a formal grammar, as I have
shown above.
The main advantage of applying mathematical methods is clearly that
any domain of knowledge can be studied in a more precise way. It enables
us to demonstrate objectively new results. One makes the achieved re-
sults actually revisable, intersubjectively, by anyone who knows certain
formal methods. Only through mathematization, a scientific theory is
supposed to have predictive power. This can be measured, as well as the
success of the explanations it provides.
6.2 Bloomfield’s structural linguistics
In this section, I will introduce the central notions and concepts of Bloom-
field’s theory. I will provide a list of the most important concepts of the
theory, explaining them through examples and showing textual evidence
by quoting original passages of Bloomfield’s works.
One aim of this section is to provide a logical reconstruction of one
of the main representative theories of linguistics, which is Bloomfield’s
theory of structural linguistics. This theory has often been interpreted as
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Utterances
Phonemes
Forms
Free Forms Bound Forms
MorphemesWords Phrases
Sentences
Syntactic Constructions
Figure 6.2: The hierarchy of linguistic levels of Bloomfield’s theory.
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the most influential and paradigmatic theory of language in the first half
of the twentieth century6. From a historical perspective, an analysis and
a reconstruction of Bloomfield’s theory can provide answers to questions
about radical theory change, with Harris and Chomsky as the found-
ing fathers of transformational generative grammar. It should become
clearer to understand the shortcomings of structural linguistics and in
consequence to understand why this radical theoretical change from one
paradigm to the new paradigm of transformational generative grammar
occurred.
Other than the conceptual part, there is also a sociological expla-
nation for this case of theory change. This has been pointed out by
Frederick Newmeyer:
We know that there was a Chomskyan revolution - but not
because every linguist in the world was at one time, or is now,
a generative grammarian. There was a Chomskyan revolution
because anyone who hopes to win general acceptance for a
new theory of language is obligated to show how the theory is
better than Chomsky’s. Indeed, the perceived need to outdo
Chomsky has led him to be the most attacked linguist in
history (Newmeyer 1996: 30).
Newmeyer’s discussion has a strong sociological focus on the issue of
theory change. By approaching the question of theory change from a
less sociological, but a more conceptual and logical point of view, I think
there can be deeper insights to the question of theory change.
My reconstruction of Bloomfield should be seen as a necessary pre-
liminary work if one wants to find ultimate answers in this debate. Nev-
6See Newmeyer 1986, 1996 and Seuren 1998 for detailed historical reconstructions.
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ertheless, it is an indirect contribution to the study of theory change in
linguistics, since the central result of this reconstruction is the fact that
Bloomfield’s work had so much in common with the early work of Rudolf
Carnap, methodologically and epistemologically. In this sense, this re-
construction provides new insights as it shows how structural linguistics
and Carnap’s Aufbau are related.
In this sense, the present section presents both a case study of general
interest about the foundations of structural linguistics and a historical
reconstruction of the relation between Bloomfield’s and Carnap’s early
work. Both authors stand for structuralist approaches. The difference
is that Carnap’s structuralism is about epistemology, and Bloomfield’s
structuralism concerns language. I will outline that for Carnap, the fun-
dament of his constitutional system were the so-called fundamental expe-
riences (Elementarerlebnisse), and that Bloomfield grounded his system
on the notion of utterance. By applying Carnap’s method of quasianal-
ysis, we will see how Bloomfield’s theory can be constructed in an anal-
ogous way to Carnap’s epistemology in the Aufbau.
6.2.1 Quasianalysis
During the last years, there has been a revival of Carnap’s work, es-
pecially in the sense that a lot of contributions have been made to the
historical reconstruction of Carnap and intents of applying it to con-
temporary philosophical questions (see Moulines 1991, Richardson 1997,
Friedman 1999 and 2011, or Leitgeb 2007, among others). This work
should be seen as a contribution to this revival, with the focus of enrich-
ing Carnap’s approach even more by connecting it with fields of which
we might have been unaware of until now, such as linguistics.
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Bloomfield had contact with some of the main figures of logical posi-
tivism7. This is not surprising, if one takes a closer look into Bloomfield’s
work, as well as into some of Carnap’s work, especially the Aufbau. For
both, the relation of similarity was a fundamental concept. Carnap based
his system of knowledge description in the Aufbau on the so-called rec-
ollection of similarity, Bloomfield based his theory on a relation of par-
tial similarity between linguistic entities, as we will see below. Carnap
started by reconstructing knowledge of an ideal agent on the basis of the
elementary experiences. In this sense, his Aufbau was an epistemological
program.
Below, I will show how one can make use of Carnap’s quasianalysis
to construct Bloomfield’s theory. Under certain modifications, I think it
gives us a powerful logical tool. As Moulines’ (1991) states:
Quasi-analysis is one of the most interesting methodological
inventions of the first Carnap. It consists in formally deriv-
ing (= constructing) what we intuitively regard as parts of
a whole from the wholes themselves taken as prior units. In
this sense, the procedure is similar to ordinary conceptual
analysis, but it differs from it in that it derives the (intuitive)
parts as classes (of classes) of wholes ... The procedure is in
itself interesting, quite independently of the epistemological
use Carnap makes of it. It could be applied to other issues of
conceptual analysis as well (ibid.: 272-273).
7Tomalin (2006) gives a detailed presentation and discussion of the knowledge that
Bloomfield had of works of members of the Vienna Circle. According to Tomalin’s
reconstruction, especially Carnap’s work in The Logical Syntax of Language had a
strong influence on Bloomfield and on Harris and Chomsky as well.
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Figure 6.3: The points ‘R’ (a red color spot) and ‘P’ (a pink color spot)
represent color spots within the visual field, as it is presented by Car-
napian quasianalysis. These two spots are not identical, but partially
similar, since they are close to each other. For the purpose of our recon-
struction of Bloomfield, we will think of these points as utterances.
In the sense that Moulines proposes, I will apply quasianalysis as a tool
for conceptual analysis to other fields, namely, to linguistics (see figure
6.3). By his method of quasianalysis, Carnap was able to describe our
knowledge of the world stepwise, by moving on from the elementary
experiences up to macroscopical objects. We will see below that this is
analogous to Bloomfield’s intent of describing natural language by relying
on a relation of partial similarity between utterances and other linguistic
entities. If quasianalysis is applied to a concrete physical system, such
as speakers utterances, such problems might not appear. We will see
below that, whereas for Bloomfield’s theory, phonemes and forms are
theoretical entities, we can think of Carnap’s quality classes as being
theoretical entities in the Aufbau.
Considering difficulties that may arise when quasianalysis is applied,
I agree with Moulines (1991) that:
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These difficulties, however, should not be overrated. It is im-
portant to note that the counter-examples to quasi-analysis
do not show that this method is inapplicable, but that, in
some very particular cases, it won’t lead to the results ex-
pected. All criticisms of Carnap’s definitions ... recognize
through the consideration of numerous examples that nor-
mally the right items can be abstracted from a given list of
experiences through quasi-analysis (ibid.: 282).
For the reconstruction of Bloomfield’s theory and the analogy to quasi-
analysis, it will be useful to employ graph-theoretical notions. Leitgeb
(2007) already approaches Carnap’s quasianalysis with graph-theoretical
methods. I will follow Leitgeb’s proposal and employ the same notions,
since they will prove to be useful for my reconstruction of Bloomfield’s
theory. It will turn out that phonemes and speech communities can be
defined as maximal cliques, after the relations of partial similarity have
been introduced. For matters of clarification, I will introduce the fol-
lowing basic graph-theoretical notions: A clique in an undirected graph
G = (V,E) is a subset of the vertex set C ⊆ V , such that for every two
vertices in C, there exists an edge that connects both. A maximal clique
is then a clique that cannot be extended by including one more adjacent
vertex. Leitgeb (2007) argues for the representation of quasianalysis with
graph-theoretical methods as follows:
Think of a room with coloured objects, where sharing a colour
is used as a similarity relation. Each colour may be supposed
to embrace a certain range of hue, brightness, and intensity,
and colours are permitted to ‘overlap’. A set X of individuals
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which are brown (partially or completely) will then certainly
be a clique with respect to similarity, since every two mem-
bers of X share a colour. In order to turn from a set such as X
to the set of brown individuals in this room, and accordingly
for the other colours, one might take maximal cliques rather
than just cliques simpliciter in order to constitute the colour
properties. That is essentially the core of the method of quasi-
analysis, a procedure by which Carnap’s so-called ‘similarity
circles’ (see Aufbau, Sections ‘70-73, 80-81, 97, 104), i.e., our
maximal cliques, are constituted (Leitgeb 2007: 187).
In what follows, we will see an example of how quasianalysis can be
successfully applied to the reconstruction of Bloomfield’s theory. First,
I will give a list of the central concepts of Bloomfield’s structural lin-
guistics, followed by examples. This will be a first part of the logical
reconstruction. In this reconstruction, the main focus lies on analyzing
how Bloomfield constructs a natural language on the basis of a relation
of partial similarity between utterances. By starting with the utterances,
it is possible to construct phonology.
Before I start with my logical reconstruction of Bloomfield’s theory,
there is one further outstanding historical fact about the interrelation be-
tween Carnap’s quasianalysis and linguistic methodology that needs to
be outlined, i.e. the fact that Chomsky already recognized this method-
ological similarity in his master’s thesis:
Thus Carnap in the Aufbau . . . begins with a primitive rela-
tion between slices of experience and attempts to construct,
by a series of definitions, the concepts of quality class, qual-
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ity, sensation, etc., i.e., he tries to construct concepts for
the most general description of experience. Similarly, it can
be shown that the theoretical part of descriptive linguistics,
beginning with three 2-place predicates of individuals, and
restricting its individuals to a tiny domain of experience (i.e.
speech sounds) can construct concepts such as ‘phoneme’,
‘morpheme’, etc., which are available for a general descrip-
tion of that part of experience called linguistic phenomena
(Chomsky 1951: 1-2).
This highlights that the methodological analogy between Carnap’s epis-
temological program and Bloomfield’s approach to linguistics has to be
extended to Chomsky. At least, we can safely presume that Chomsky
was aware of this methodological similarity, and that he fully endorsed
it.
6.2.2 Bloomfield’s central notions
I will now introduce Bloomfield’s central notions. For this purpose, I
will quote relevant passages of Bloomfield’s work and I will start with a
set-theoretic and logical characterization of these notions.
I. Utterances: Bloomfield introduces the notion of utterance as one
central notion of his theory. Utterances (as tokens) are acts of
speech. The following quotes illustrate Bloomfield’s position: “An
act of speech is an utterance" (1926: 154), and “A speech-utterance
is what mathematicians call a continuum; it can be viewed as con-
sisting of any desired number of successive parts" (1933: 76).
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Let U be a set of utterances, which will be qualified below. The
set U is the basic domain of Bloomfield’s theory.
Bloomfield does not mention whether his notion of utterances is al-
ways restricted to a specific point in time, a language and whether
these utterances are all the possible utterances. He implicitly pre-
supposes that each utterance is always made by a speaker of a
specific language.
II. Forms: The following quote illustrates Bloomfield’s notion of forms:
“... a form is a recurrent vocal feature which has meaning, and
a meaning is a recurrent stimulus-reaction feature which corre-
sponds to a form (1926: 155)." Bloomfield’s use of the notion of
form suggests that forms are types and that they are abstract enti-
ties. This furthermore suggests that forms are theoretical entities,
and likely to be understood as theoretical terms. Forms are non-
observational, as opposed to utterances, with which the empirical
linguist is confronted in the actual descriptive work. Furthermore,
any word instantiates a form. Also the components of words, in
their minimal occurrence, the morphemes, are forms. Following
Bloomfield, a form is then any vocal feature which frequently is
uttered and which is at least partially alike to further utterances.
This will become clear as we move on with the reconstruction. Let F
be a set of forms. Furthermore, it is important to note that several
linguistic forms can be concatenated. We introduce the function
concat : F× F→ F. This is the concatenation function on forms.
III. Partial similarity: The relation of partial similarity is of central
importance in Bloomfield’s theory. Very much analogous to Car-
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nap’s recollection of similarity in the Aufbau, Bloomfield builds up
the whole of phonology on this notion. We will distinguish between
two relations of partial similarity, the first one holding between ut-
terances, and a second one which is necessary to constitute speech
communities, as we will see below. Let ≈1 be the relation of partial
similarity one: ≈1⊆ U × U , meaning that an utterance u is in the
relation ≈1 to an utterance v iff u is at least partially similar to
v. The relation is reflexive and symmetric, but not transitive. If
it were transitive, it would mean that all utterances are partially
similar to each other. But this is clearly not the case. There is
without a doubt a partial similarity between the utterances ‘car’
and ‘cat’, but there is no partial similarity between ‘car’ and ‘bet’.
Let ≈2 be the relation of partial similarity of the second type. This
is a different relation than the already defined relation ≈1, since ≈2
holds between utterances of speakers in speech communities. The
relation ≈1 is represented in figure 6.4.
We will consider the following example: Imagine a speaker S. Dur-
ing a certain interval of time, this speaker utters the following words
(in English):
(ivx) I am in my house.
(xv) I am tired.
(xvi) He was bored.
We are now able to identify partial similarities between parts of
these three uttered sentences. ‘I am’ in (ivx) stands in this relation
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to ‘I am’ in sentence (xv), and ‘tired’ in sentence (xv) stands in
this relation to ‘bored’ in sentence (xvi).
In order to make sense of Bloomfield’s fundamental thesis of alike-
ness of utterances, which is of central importance to distinguish
between speech communities, the following quote will be helpful:
. . . the study of significant speech-sounds is phonology or
practical phonetics. Phonology involves the considera-
tion of meanings. The meanings of speech-forms could
be scientifically defined only if all branches of science, in-
cluding, especially, psychology and physiology, were close
to perfection. Until that time, phonology and, with it,
all the semantic phase of language study, rests upon an
assumption, the fundamental assumption of linguistics:
we must assume that in every speech-community some
utterances are alike in form and meaning (1933: 77-8).
By relying on his behaviorist criterion of meaning, Bloomfield needs
to assume such a thesis. If this assumption is not made, it is im-
possible to move on and describe the structure and, in general, the
grammar of a natural language. By working with this assumption,
the structural linguist can start to distinguish one group of speaker
from another one and, most importantly, to classify all so-called
speech-forms. Out of these speech forms, the linguist classifies the
whole grammar of a language.
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Figure 6.4: This represents how utterances (u1 to u3) stand in the relation
of partial similarity ≈1.
IV. Phonemes: The phonemes are related to the linguistic forms and
are necessary to constitute the field of phonology within the whole
discipline of linguistics. For Bloomfield:
. . . a minimum same of vocal feature is a phoneme or dis-
tinctive sound. The number of different phonemes in a
language is a small sub-multiple of the number of forms.
Every form is made up wholly of phonemes (1926: 157).
. . . we can find forms which partially resemble pin, by al-
tering any one of three parts of the word. We can alter
first one and then a second of the three parts and still
have a partial resemblance . . . pin-tin-tan . . . and if we
alter all three parts, no resemblance is left, as in pin-tin-
tan-tack. Further experiment fails to reveal any more
replaceable parts in the word pin: we conclude that the
distinctive features of this word are the three indivisible
units. Each of these units occurs also in other combina-
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tions, but cannot be further analyzed by partial resem-
blances: each of the three is a minimum unit of distinctive
sound-feature, a phoneme (1933: 79).
We can see here that Bloomfield characterizes explicitly the notion
of phoneme, by stating that what is a minimum unit of distinctive
sound-feature, is a phoneme.
I will now introduce more formal notions. Let P be a set of
phonemes. Above, I defined the relation of partial similarity be-
tween utterances: ≈1⊆ U × U : meaning that an utterance u is in
the relation ≈1 to an utterance v iff u is at least partially similar to
v. The relation is reflexive and symmetric, but not transitive. The
above quote fundaments the postulation of this relation, given that
Bloomfield explicitly mentions the partial resemblance between ut-
terances.
Let us consider the following example: Our speaker S utters the
following words (with phonetic transcription in parentheses): cough
(kaf), car (kar), cat (kæt), cutter (k@t@). Every concrete occurrence
of a sound is a phone, and its abstracted and classified version is
a phoneme. For Bloomfield, it is possible to individuate phones
through his relation of partial similarity ≈1. In the case of our
example, this relation holds between all k that are uttered by S
in all four utterances. Therefore, these four phones stand in the
relation ≈1. We are now able to define phones as follows:
Definition 3: x is a phoneme :↔ x is 〈u,C〉
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where C is a maximal clique with respect to ≈1 and u is an
utterance, u ∈ C
The constitution of the maximal cliques of utterances is also shown
in figure 6.5. Furthermore, we want to express that two or more
phonemes can be combined in order to build bigger units of sound.
Phonemes are connected and construct such larger units. These
then can be connected to build up morphemes and bigger units such
as words, phrases or sentences. Hence, we introduce an ordering
relation on the set of phonemes. We call this the parthood relation
for phonemes (symbolized by @). It is a reflexive, antisymmetrical
and transitive relation:
@⊂ P × P
As an example, we can think of the word ‘undeniable’ which we can
decompose into the three morphemes ‘un’, ‘deny’ and ‘able’, and
into the three phonemes ‘@n’, ‘d@naj’, and ‘@b@l’ . By concatenating
these three morphemes, the word ‘undeniable’ is built.
V. Speech communities: As Bloomfield states, “A speech commu-
nity is a group of people who interact by means of speech" (1933:
42), and “The totality of utterances that can be made in a speech
community is the language of that speech-community" (1926: 155).
As simple examples, we can think of the group of speakers of En-
glish and the group of speakers of German. I will now introduce
the following formal notions:
- Let T be a set of time intervals.
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Figure 6.5: On the basis of our relation of partial similarity ≈1, we are
able to build the maximal cliques of utterances. On the basis of this, we
define phones as pairs of utterances and maximal cliques.
- The function t : U → T, from the set of utterances into the set
of closed subintervals of T , where the value t(u) of the function t
at u is the least temporal interval in which the utterance u was
produced (which we assume to exist).
Let us consider the following example, to illustrate this point fur-
ther: we imagine two speakers of English, our speaker S and one
further speaker, called D. Both utter house. We label the first
utterance as h1, the second as h2. Both utterances are partly alike,
they stand in our similarity relation: h1 ≈1 h2. They are different
insofar that they are produced by different speakers, giving a dif-
ferent pronunciation to it8. They are different tokens of the same
type of utterances. By studying utterances through this similarity
relation, it is possible to individuate groups of speakers. As the
similarity relation between utterances gets looser and is obtained
8This difference might be small or big. We can think of an English speaker from
Australia and of a speaker form Cornwall, England. There, the difference between the
two utterances would naturally be bigger than if both speakers were from Cornwall.
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less and less, the distinction between two groups of speakers can be
drawn. Naturally, the step from one group to another one is grad-
ual. We can think of the group of speakers of Dutch and the group
of speakers of German. The utterance huis from a Dutch speaker
and the utterance haus from a German speaker are still partly alike,
but the utterances haus and maison of French are not. On the one
side, it would then be possible to set up a clear division line be-
tween German and French, but not between German and Dutch.
It becomes clear that the similarity relation is not transitive.
Bloomfield’s similarity relation is compelling in the sense that in
fact, a clear distinction between groups of speakers cannot be drawn.
Many times, dialects build the intermediary between groups of
speakers. A speaker of Dutch might still understand a speaker
of Low German (Plattdeutsch), a dialect spoken close to the Dutch
border, but might in fact struggle to understand standard German,
or another German dialect, like Swabian, spoken in southwestern
Germany. For matters of simplicity, I will not discuss further soci-
olinguistical topics in this work. But it should be mentioned explic-
itly that there are of course many other complex sociolinguistical
factors that influence on the devlopment and on the distinction be-
tween speech communities. Anyhow, I take Bloomfield’s approach
to be of high originality, and we have to see his theory in the light of
the nineteen-thirties of the twentieth century. At that time, practi-
cally no work in sociolinguistics had been developed. In this sense,
Bloomfield’s work is a pioneer work in sociolinguistics.
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- Furthermore, we need a formal characterization of speech commu-
nities. For this purpose, let L be a set of speakers, which will be
qualified below.
The constitution of speech communities is then as follows. Speech
communities are maximal cliques with respect to the relation of
partial similarity ≈2 (see Figure 6.6). We can then proceed and
define the partial similarity of speakers utterances as follows:
Definition 4: S1 ≈2 S2 :↔ many utterances of S1 are par-
tially similar (in the sense of ≈2) to many utterances of S2.
It should be clear that this is a vague characterization. I con-
sider this to be unproblematic, since in the real world, boundaries
between natural languages are in fact ambiguous and not strict.
Speakers at the German/Dutch border may understand each other
more easily, than a German speaker from Dresden and a speaker of
Dutch.
We can quantify over ‘many’ in different ways. It is an idealization,
and we can consider ‘many’ in a strict, or in a looser sense. For
example, we can think of the whole of all speakers of German as
a speech community. But if we only take the German dialect of
Bavarian, we can say that the speakers of Bavarian already build a
speech community, since the utterances of all speakers of Bavarian
are partially similar in a stricter sense than they are to all other
speakers of German, in a looser sense.
Moreover, it is important to note that there is also a way of con-
sidering small speech-communities, such as the community of all
speakers of an endangered language, (say Otomí, spoken in central
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Figure 6.6: The vertices represent speakers (Sn), the edges represent the
relation of partial similarity ≈2. Each circle represents a speech commu-
nity, called L1 and L2.
Mexico). A speech community with few speakers, (in the case of
Otomí 20.000, according to Hecking et al. 1984), would not be a
maximal clique, but a clique, in the sense of graph-theory. We can
now define speech communities as follows:
Definition 5: L is a speech community :↔ L is a maximal
clique with respect to ≈2
The relation ≈2 holds between speakers. On the basis of the partial
similarity between the utterances of speakers, we are able to classify
speech communities and to separate them from each other.
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6.2.3 Potential models of SL
In what follows, I will define the set-theoretic predicates for Bloomfield’s
structural linguistics, giving it the set-theoretic predicate SL1. I will fol-
low the usual way of structuralist methodology.
Definition 6: Mp(SL) : x is a potential model of the theory of Bloom-
field’s structural linguistics (x ∈Mp(SL)) iff there exist: U,F, P, L, T,T, t,≈1
,≈2,@, concat
such that:
1. U , F, P and L are finite and non-empty.
2. T is a closed interval of R of positive length.
3. T is a set of closed subintervals of T of positive length.
4. t : U → T
5. ≈1⊆ U × U
6. ≈2⊆ U × U
7. @⊂ P × P
8. concat : F× F→ F.
This represents the general framework of Bloomfield’s theory. All con-
cepts of the theory are explained within the potential model of SL. The
basic intended interpretation is as explained above.
1It is a well known fact that Bloomfield had a behaviorist theory of meaning. Since
his theory of semantics presents no further relation to the rest of his linguistic work,
and, more importantly, since the shortcomings of behaviorist semantics have been
abundantly discussed (see Chomsky 1959), I will not include Bloomfield’s semantics
into my reconstruction.
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6.2.4 Actual models of SL
SL is an empirical theory of natural language. Being an empirical the-
ory requires that it contains some laws, or at least lawlike statements.
The issue of lawlikeness in the philosophy of science is varied and con-
troversial. It might be intuitively clear that in physics, laws are easily
identifiable and their range of applicability is almost always empirically
testable. But not so in linguistics. If we want to contribute to the dis-
cussion of lawlikeness in linguistics, the correct way to go, I argue, will
be to proceed from a concrete empirical theory of language, as it is our
example of SL. If laws or lawlike statements can be identified in SL, it
might help to establish more general conclusions on the issue of lawlike-
ness in linguistic theory. For the determination of the laws, or lawlike
statements of SL, we define an actual model of SL. The fundamental
principles of the theory, which are also required for the determination of
the theoretical terms of SL, are given:
Definition 7: M(SL) : x is an actual model of the theory of Bloomfield’s
structural linguistics (x ∈M(SL)) iff there exist U,F, P, L, T,T, t,≈1,≈2
,@, concat, such that:
1. x = 〈U,F, P, L, T,T, t,≈1,≈2,@, concat〉 ∈Mp(SL)
2. ≈1 is reflexive and symmetric.
3. ≈2 is reflexive and symmetric.
4. @ is reflexive, antisymmetrical and transitive.
5. x is a phoneme :↔ x is a maximal clique with respect to ≈1.
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6. L is a speech community :↔ L is a maximal clique with respect to
≈2.
7. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f1 (f1 is a form and f1 can be concatenated
with f).
Basic intended interpretation: Condition 1 states that the actual model
is also element of the potential model. But further conditions are nec-
essary for becoming an actual model of SL. Condition 2 states that the
relation of partial similarity ≈1 is reflexive and symmetric, in the same
way as condition 3 states this for the relation ≈2. Condition 4 expresses
the parthood relation for phonemes, whereas condition 5 expresses the
definition of a phoneme. Condition 6 expresses the definition of speech
communities L. Condition 7 expresses the fact that forms can be con-
catenated.
6.2.5 Theoretical terms in SL
In order to address the question of theoretical terms in SL, we adopt the
structuralist criterion for theoreticity. In SL, we say that the forms (F),
the phonemes (P ), @, concat and speech communities (L) are theoretical.
They are newly introduced by Bloomfield’s theory. Only if the conditions
of the actual model M(SL) are presupposed, they can be determined.
The relations ≈1,≈2 are basic observational terms. Their characteristic
of being reflexive and symmetrical is an empirical claim and a general-
ization, based on what the structural linguist does in fact observe when
languages are descriptively studied. Furthermore, utterances and the
notion of parthood are observational, since both are directly observable.
The linguist is first directly confronted with utterances, and after this, she
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will also be able to observe parts of utterances. This is why the notion of
parthood should also be understood as being observational. The forms,
phonemes and speech communities are theoretical terms, since they are
in no relation to direct observation and no part of the phenomena that
can be experienced. All three notions can only be constructed after the
analysis of the observational phenomena has been carried out.
6.2.6 The partial potential models of SL
After having clarified and determined which terms are theoretical in
Bloomfield’s theory, we are able to define the Partial Potential Mod-
els of SL, where the theoretical terms are cut out. The partial potential
models are the data-models of a theory. A linguist starts with the Mpp
of a theory, once she describes a language. She will start by identifying
utterances through similarities. This enables her to classify the forms,
and then the phonology of a language, by making use of the relation ≈1.
After that, she will be able to define speech communities on the basis of
the relation ≈2.
Definition 8: Mpp(SL) : x is a partial potential model of the the-
ory of Bloomfield’s structural linguistics (x ∈ Mp(SL) iff there exist:
U, T,T, t,≈1,≈2, t such that:
1. U is finite and non-empty.
2. T is a closed interval of R of positive length.
3. T is a set of closed subintervals of T of positive length.
4. t : U → T
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5. ≈1⊆ U × U
6. ≈2⊆ U × U
6.2.7 The empirical claim of SL
As I have mentioned in the introductory section, the aim of a recon-
struction of a particular empirical theory within the framework of the
structuralist meta-theory is to formulate its empirical claim. Formally,
the empirical claim can be best understood if we think of a core K as
follows. Suppose we are given sets Mp and Mpp. Since Mpp is a set of
all possible applications of some theory, we can interpret P(Mpp) as the
set of all combinations of applications for such a theory. Each element
of P(Mpp) is a set of possible applications and therefore a candidate for
the set I of intended applications. Usually, not all elements of P(Mpp)
will have this property. So we can say that M , GC and GL are used as
means of selection for picking out certain elements from P(Mpp) or for
picking out a subset of P(Mpp).
The empirical claim consists in the statement that I, the set of in-
tended applications, belongs to the content of K. In the framework of
the structuralist meta-theory, the idealized empirical claim of T is that
I ∈ Cn(K). However, some empirical theories might have an empty em-
pirical claim. This happens especially when no relevant constraints or
links can be found. The elements of Cn(K) can be described as combi-
nations of partial potential models which can be "subsumed" under the
theory, or which can be "treated by means of" T , or to which T can "be
applied successfully". The empirical claim of SL can be expressed as
follows:
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K(SL) = 〈Mp(SL),M(SL),Mpp(SL)〉
T (SL) = 〈K(SL), I(SL)〉
I(SL) ⊆ Mpp(SL) is such that members of I(SL) are systems of utter-
ances. The utterances build the empirical basis of T (SL), on which SL
is constructed via the relations ≈1 and ≈2.
The result of this reconstruction is that in fact, Bloomfield’s theory
has an empty empirical claim, since its theoretical terms can be defined
explicitly. This goes very much along with Carnap as well, since he
intended to give a framework for the construction of empirical science.
Carnap’s constitutional system is a framework for explaining the con-
struction of scientific knowledge. In the same sense, Bloomfield wanted
to define a framework for the description of language.
6.2.8 Conclusions for the reconstruction of SL
I have provided a formalization of Bloomfield’s theory. We defined the
models of SL in the framework of the structuralist meta-theory and I
showed the information about laws in SL. The result of this reconstruc-
tion is that Bloomfield constructs phonology based on two relations of
partial similarity and that it is also possible to individuate groups of
speakers via his method. In a sense, Bloomfield’s theory is empirically
empty, but presents us rather with a conceptual and logical framework
for linguistic theory. This holds especially for the disciplines of phonology
and morphology. In this sense, with the logical reconstruction of Bloom-
field, I provided a framework for linguistic theory, based on Bloomfield’s
structural linguistics.
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One further important aspect is the historical fact that Bloomfield’s
method of distinguishing speech communitites was an early contribution
to sociolinguistics. It is clear that nowadays, sociolinguistics has devel-
oped strongly and grown to be an independent discipline of linguistics.
However, due to our reconstruction, it becomes apparent that Bloomfield
made an early contribution to this field of linguistic inquiry.
One further result is a historical one. It is now clear that Bloom-
field’s method of developing a logico-conceptual framework for scientific
inquiriy is analogous to Carnap’s method in the Aufbau. Both authors
rely on the method of quasianalysis, and on relations of partial similarity
to construct their respective systems. Whereas Carnap outlined a struc-
turalist program for the logic and the epistemology of science, Bloomfield
developed a structuralist method of describing natural language based on
utterances.
This result will be useful in order to clarify the relation between struc-
tural linguistics and transformational grammar. The former is clearly
focused on phonology and morphology, whereas the latter approach is
mostly an approach about syntax. In this sense, it might be compelling
to ask if there could have been a radical theoretical change from struc-
tural linguistics to transformational grammar.
For the philosophy of science and its history, it is positive to see that
methods that had been developed by Carnap found their applications in
more remote fields such as linguistics. Carnap’s methodological develop-
ment of quasianalysis is applicable to the analysis of natural language,
as Bloomfield showed us. This should also motivate us to search for fur-
ther applications of this method in other scientific disciplines, and, most
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importantly, it shows us that Carnap’s Aufbau is still of high actuality if
we aim to reconstruct our knowledge of the world.
6.3 Harris’ theory
In chapter 5 and in section 6.1, I have already presented and discussed
the central elements of Harris’ theory. In what follows, I will give a struc-
turalist reconstruction of Harris’ theory, similar to my reconstruction of
Bloomfield’s theory in the previous section.
6.3.1 Structuralist reconstruction of Harris’ theory
I will begin with the definition of the potential models for the theory of
Harris’ linguistics, to which I will give the set-theoretic predicate THL.
6.3.2 Potential models of THL
Definition 9: Mp(THL) : x is a potential model of the theory of Harris’
linguistics (x ∈Mp(THL)) iff there exist: F, T,T, concat,@, trans
such that:
1. x = 〈F, T,T, concat,@, trans〉
2. F is finite and non-empty.
3. T is a closed interval of R of positive length.
4. T is a set of closed subintervals of T of positive length.
5. concat : F× F→ F.
6. @⊂ F× F
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7. trans ⊂ F× F
I will now give the following intended interpretation. As in SL, F is a
set of linguistic forms. T is a set of time intervals, with T being a set of
closed subintervals of T . Furthermore, as in SL, there is a concatenation
function on forms, concat and the parthood relation @ on forms, since
THL is a theory of syntax, and no longer classifies phonemes. What is
new in THL, and of central importance, is the notion of transformation,
represented by the relation trans. The introduction of the transformation
relation on forms makes the ontology of Harris’ theory radically different
from the ontology of SL. It is true that the potential models of both the-
ories are similar. However, the addition of the notion of transformation
allowed Harris to explain more linguistic phenomena, as I have already
explained in previous sections.
A significant change in the ontology of linguistic theory in this phase
of theory change is of central importance for my argument on epistemic
structural realism and theory change. If we look at both theories, SL
and THL, they are similar, but at the end, there is the addition of
transformations in Harris, which changes the ontology significantly. This
could be seen as a case of radical theory change, where an anti-realist
could find corroboration and argue against scientific realism. This is
exactly where I will show that, despite the difference of ontologies, there
is a continuity of structure, expressed by the relation of reduction between
SL and THL. We will discuss this further in the following sections.
6.3.3 Actual models of THL
The actual models of THL are now as follows:
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Definition 10: M(THL) : x is an actual model of the theory of Harris’
linguistics (x ∈ M(THL)) iff there exist F, T,T, concat,@, trans, such
that:
1. x = 〈F, T,T, concat,@, trans〉 ∈Mp(TBL)
2. trans is reflexive, symmetrical and transitive.
3. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f1 (f1 is a form and f1 can be concatenated
with f).
4. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f1 (f1 is the transform of f).
The lawlike information about the transformation relation is added in
M(THL). Condition two expresses the form of relation that trans is.
Condition 3 states that forms can always be concatenated with other
forms. Condiion 4 expresses the fact that forms have transforms, i.e.
that forms can be transformed into other forms. We have seen this in de-
tail in previous sections. The standard example being the active-passive
transformation.
6.3.4 Theoretical terms in THL
By following the structuralist criterion for theoretical terms, we say that
trans is a T-theoretical relation in THL, since it is newly introduced by
THL, and it has to be presupposed in order to determine THL com-
pletely. F is no longer T-theoretical, since it was introduced by SL
already.
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6.3.5 The partial potential models of THL
Consequently, we now define the partial potential models for THL, where
the T-theoretical notions are cut out.
Definition 11: Mpp(THL) : x is a partial potential model of the theory
of Harris’ linguistics (x ∈ Mp(THL)) iff there exist: F, T,T, concat,@,
such that:
1. x = 〈F, T,T, concat,@〉
2. F is finite and non-empty.
3. T is a closed interval of R of positive length.
4. T is a set of closed subintervals of T of positive length.
5. concat : F× F→ F.
6. @⊂ F× F
In this case, only the relation trans is cut out. We are now in a position
where it is possible to have full insight into the structure of Harris’ theory.
It turns out that it is a similar theory to SL, however, it is different in
its ontology in a crucial aspect, namely, the fact that the relation trans
is introduced.
With this step, I will finish my reconstruction of THL, since all the
relevant information for the question of intertheoretical relations to SL
and to Chomsky’s theory is obtained. In what follows, I will give a
structuralist reconstruction of Chomsky’s early theory, before I will show
that there is in fact a structural continuity between these theories.
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6.4 Chomsky’s generative grammar
The development of generative grammar has caused enormous impact on
linguistic theory. As it is well known, Chomsky developed a theory of
language that was able to explain more linguistic phenomena than all
previous theories, especially in the field of syntax.
Since Chomsky’s theories have been developed over a time span that
comprises more than half a century, and due to the fact that his theory
has evolved strongly, it is important to be clear on the distinction of the
theoretical development of the whole of his work. John Collins (2008: 5)
provides a clarifying outline of Chomsky’s work, and characterizes the
different phases as follows:
Period Framework
1. 1955-59 Early transformational grammar
2. 1962-66 The Standard Theory
3. 1968-72 Extended Standard Theory
4. 1973-80 Revised Extended Standard Theory/Conditions
5. 1980-90 Government and binding / principles and parameters
6. 1991-99 The Minimalist Program
7. 2000- Phase Derivation / Level Free
For the purpose of this dissertation, I will analyze the first two periods
of Chomsky’s work, which comprises his books The Logical Structure of
Linguistic Theory, Syntactic Structures, and Aspects of the Theory of
Syntax. I argue that the early phase of theoretical development between
structural linguistics and generative grammar should not be interpreted
as a paradigm shift in a Kuhnian sense. This shift was neither that
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radical, nor was it a “revolution". Most certainly, there was no incom-
mensurability, since at the structural level, there is continuity (as I will
show below). The crucial role of an intermediary between both paradigms
was Harris. With respect to other possible paradigm shifts within the
theoretical developments of Chomsky’s work, I agree with Collins that
“the history is complex; it is not a series of jumps into the unknown a
la the standard caricature of Kuhn’s picture of science (ibid.: 6)". It is
precisely the change from structural linguistics to generative grammar
that presents us with the idea of a radical, Kuhnian scientific revolution.
After my reconstruction it will become clear that such a radical Kuh-
nian shift did not occur in a drastic sense. My thesis is strengthened
by the fact that there is a form of structural continuity from structural
linguistics to generative grammar.
Chomsky’s introduction of the notions of deep structure and surface
structure clearly presents a significant change of ontology in the theoret-
ical development of syntactic theory, specifically in the phase of change
from Harris to Chomsky. The following quote illustrates the role that
Chomsky adscribes to these notions:
A deep structure enters the semantic component and receives
a semantic interpretation; it is mapped by transformational
rules into a surface structure, which is then given a phonetic
interpretation by the rules of the phonological component
(Chomksy 1965: 141).
The mapping by transformational rules, from a deep structure into a
surface structure, is the central element in this phase of Chomsky’s theo-
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rizing. In my structuralist reconstruction of Chomsky’s theory, this will
become apparent.
6.4.1 Chomsky’s theory TCL
Analogously to my reconstruction of Bloomfield’s and Harris’ theories,
I will now procede to show how Chomsky’s theory (giving it the set-
theoretic predicate TCL) can be formalized within the framework of the
structuralist meta-theory.
6.4.2 Potential models of TCL
Definition 12: Mp(TCL) : x is a potential model of the theory of
Chomky’s linguistics (x ∈ Mp(TCL)) iff there exist: F,FD,FSconcat,@
, trans
such that:
1. M = 〈F,FD,FSconcat,@, trans〉.
2. F,FDandFS are finite, non-empty sets.
3. FD ⊆ F.
4. FS ⊆ F.
5. FD
⋂
FS = ∅.
6. concat : F× F→ F.
7. @⊆ F× F.
8. trans ⊂ F× F
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This represents the general framework of Chomsky’s theory. The basic
intended interpretation is as follows. There exist three base sets, F, FD,
and FS. F is a set of forms, just as in SL and in THL. What is new
in TCL, and what presents a significant shift of ontology, are the sets
FD, and FS. FD, is a set of “deep-structure forms", and FS is a set of
“surface-structure forms". This aims to adequately represent the fact that
Chomsky introduced the notions of deep structure and surface structure,
by expressing the fact that both, deep structure and surface structure
are forms. Linguistic forms have both levels of structures, and hence, the
set F includes both FD, and FS as subsets. concat, @ and trans are the
same notions than in SL and in THL.
6.4.3 Actual models of TCL
For the determination of the laws, or lawlike statements of TCL, we de-
fine an actual model of TCL. The fundamental principles of the theory,
which are also required for the determination of the theoretical terms of
TCL, are given:
Definition 13: M(TCL) : x is an actual model of the theory of Chom-
sky’s linguistics (x ∈ M(TCL)) iff there exist F,FD,FSconcat,@, trans,
such that:
1. x = 〈F,FD,FSconcat,@, trans〉 ∈Mp(TCL)
2. trans is reflexive, symmetrical and transitive.
3. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f1 (f1 is a form and f1 can be concatenated
with f).
6.4. CHOMSKY’S GENERATIVE GRAMMAR 161
4. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f2 (f2 is the transform of f).
5. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f3 (f3 is the deep structure of f) &∃f4 (f4 is
the surface structure of f).
Basic intended interpretation: Condition 1 states that the actual model
is also element of the potential model. As in THL, conditions 2, 3 and
4 express the lawlike facts about the relation trans, and the transfor-
mational apparatus. The new law is expressed by condition 5. This
condition states the fact that all forms have a deep structure and a sur-
face structure.
6.4.4 Theoretical terms in TCL
In TCL, FD and FS are T-theoretical. Both are newly introduced by
TCL, and are required to satisy the fundamental laws of TCL. All other
terms are T-non-theoretical, since they are already present in SL, or in
THL.
6.4.5 The partial potential models of TCL
After having clarified and determined which terms are T-theoretical in
Chomsky’s theory, we are able to define the partial potential models of
TCL, where the T-theoretical terms are cut out.
Definition 14: Mpp(TCL) : x is a partial potential model of the theory
of Chomsky’s linguistics (x ∈ Mp(TCL)) iff there exist: F, concat,@
, trans such that:
1. M = 〈F, concat,@, trans〉.
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2. F is a finite, non-empty set.
3. concat : F× F→ F.
4. @⊆ F× F.
5. trans ⊂ F× F
Analogously to the case of SL and THL, by this definition, we obtain the
“data model" of TCL. The Chomskyan linguist starts by working with
linguistic forms, which can be understood to be “somehow" empirical,
and observational. Forms are observational in the following sense. The
Chomskyan linguist will “see" some linguistic forms written down some-
where, and start manipulating these forms, by sorting out their deep
structure and the surface structure and by determining phrase structure
rules, etc. But in the beginning of the application of TCL, the linguist
will start with the forms.
6.5 Structural continuity
As an example of structural continuity, I will first discuss a case of re-
duction in linguistics. The relation of reduction between theories will
be taken as an exemplar case of structural continuity. This continuity
is expressed in the reduction relation as defined in the framework of the
structuralist meta-theory.
I will quickly introduce both the potential models of Bloomfield’s
and of Harris’ theories of syntax. I restrict here to syntax because there,
structural continuity is most eminent. For the purpose of this work, it
is sufficient to outline that both theories are related through the struc-
turalist reduction-relation (see chapter 3 for my outline of the concept
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of reduction of the structuralist meta-theory), concerning the linguistic
sub-discipline of syntax.
MB (for Bloomfield) is a set of models mB, such that:
1. mB = 〈F, concat,@〉.
2. F is a finite, non-empty set.
3. concat : F× F→ F.
4. @⊆ F× F.
5. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f1 (f1 is a form and f1 can be concatenated
with f).
The basic intended interpretation is as above in the reconstruction of SL.
We will now look at Harris’ model of syntax:
MH (for Harris) is a set of models mH , such that:
1. mH = 〈F, concat,@, trans〉.
2. F is a finite, non-empty set.
3. concat : F× F→ F.
4. @⊆ F× F.
5. trans ⊂ F× F
6. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f1 (f1 is a form and f1 can be concatenated
with f).
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7. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f2 (f2 is the transform of f).
The model of Harris’ syntactic theory states the same as the model of
Bloomfield, but expresses one more crucial fact, the fact that linguistic
forms do always have a transform. The function trans expresses that
forms are always transformed to other forms. This aims to adequately
represent cases like the active - passive transformation.
6.5.1 Continuity from Bloomfield to Harris
Now, structural continuity between SL and THL is expressed through
the reduction of SL to THL, in the following reduction relation ρ:
1. ρ ⊆M(THL)×M(SL), 〈x∗, x〉 ∈ ρ, iff:
2. x∗ = 〈F, concat,@, trans〉 ∈M(THS)
3. x = 〈F′ , concat′ ,@′〉 ∈M(SL)
4. F = F′ , concat = concat′ ,@=@′
5. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f1 (f1 is a form and f1 can be concatenated
with f).
6. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f2 (f2 is the transform of f).
Condition one states that the models of both theories are related through
the reduction relation ρ, where in condition two and three, x∗ and x are
one set of the actual model (of syntax). In four, it is expressed that
the entities of both theories are identical, both theories deal with the
same entities, namely, linguistic forms and their combination. Condition
five expresses the syntactic law of both theories, that every form can be
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concatenated with another form. The new law, which makes THL the
reducing theory over SL, is expressed in condition 6, where it is stated
that every form has a transform, such as the example sentence John
saw Jill. We have seen that in our case-study, Bloomfield’s theory is
reduced to Harris’ theory. But the important fact for structural realism
is that, the structure of Bloomfield’s theory is completely overtaken and
continuous with the structure of Harris’ theory. It is just that Harris’
theory is more complex, it has one law that is not part of Bloomfield’s
theory, but all other parts of the structure of SL are continuous with
THL. It is a structural continuity for the following reason. Both theories
are represented as structures themselves. Now, the reduction relation
provides the continuity of structure.
I argue that the structuralist meta-theory provides tools for a clarifi-
cation of the notion of structural continuity. Empirical theories are taken
to be structural entities themselves (in the formal sense explained above).
Some information about intertheoretical relations might be trivial and
not really informative. Anyhow, I argue, the structuralist framework
provides formal notions for capturing all kinds of structural continuities,
trivial and non-trivial. Here, I have given a case of a non-trivial reduction
relation in linguistics.
Where Worrall mentions the continuous appearance of certain equa-
tions in different theories, the structuralist meta-theory provides us with
a more universal and abstract notion of structural continuity of more so-
phisticated and detailed formal explanatory power. The notion of struc-
tural continuity, in this case, has the form as in the definition of the
reduction above. But in each particular reconstruction of an empirical
theory, a theory-net will have a certain structure. In this sense, when a
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theory has reached sufficient development and sophistication, it can be
possible to identify a structural continuity of some form. The important
question is whether there is a relation of structural continuity which pro-
vides us with any important information concerning questions on theory
change and structural realism.
In the case of Bloomfield and Harris, it is the structure of their the-
ories of syntax, that is preserved. As I have shown in the reduction
relation above, Harris’ theory adds more features to the theory, but all
structures in Bloomfield are continuous with those in Harris. However,
there is a significant change of ontology, since THL introduces the trans-
formational apparatus, expressed by the transformation relation trans.
This is something entirely new and, since it is part of the domain of
THL, it is an addition to the ontology of syntactic theory, an example
for theoretical change in syntactic theory.
6.5.2 Continuity from Harris to Chomsky
A stronger case of structural continuity occurs in the change from Bloom-
field’s and Harris’ to Chomsky’s theory. Let us remember the fact that
structural realism comes into play when there is an apparent disconti-
nuity on the referential level. The ontology of the theories in question
changes, but at the structural level, there is still continuity. This happens
in the shift from Bloomfield to Chomsky, since in Chomsky’s theory, the
notions of deep structure and surface structure are introduced. I will
recall Chomsky’s syntactic theory as follows:
MTCL is a set of models mTCL, such that:
1. mTCL = 〈F,FD,FSconcat,@, trans〉.
6.5. STRUCTURAL CONTINUITY 167
2. F,FDandFS are finite, non-empty sets.
3. FD ⊆ F.
4. FS ⊆ F.
5. concat : F× F→ F.
6. @⊆ F× F.
7. trans ⊂ F× F
8. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f1 (f1 is a form and f1 can be concatenated
with f).
9. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f2 (f2 is the transform of f).
10. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f3 (f3 is the deep structure of f) &∃f4 (f4 is
the surface structure of f).
Analogously to the reduction between SL and THL, there also holds
a reduction relation (and hence a relation of structural continuity) be-
tween THL and TCL. This can be expressed as follows, in the reduction
relation ρ:
1. ρ ⊆M(TCL)×M(THS), 〈x∗, x〉 ∈ ρ, iff:
2. x∗ = 〈F,FD,FS, concat,@, trans〉 ∈M(TCL)
3. x = 〈F′ , concat′ ,@′ , trans′〉 ∈M(THS)
4. F = F′ , concat = concat′ ,@=@′ , trans = trans′
5. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f1 (f1 is a form and f1 can be concatenated
with f).
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6. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f2 (f2 is the transform of f).
7. ∀f (f is a form) → ∃f3 (f3 is the deep structure of f) &∃f4 (f4 is
the surface structure of f).
THL is reducible to TCL in a similar way than SL reduces to THL. In
both cases, the ontology of the theories changes significantly. However,
the reduced theory can be seen as a simpler version of the reducing one,
since it explains the same facts, but the reducing theory explains more,
adds entities and lawlike statements to its ontology and says “more"
about linguistic phenomena. Where it is commonly held that Chomsky’s
theory strongly revolutionized syntactic theory, we can now see that this
revolution was not as dramatic as it has been seen. Harris did not intro-
duce the concepts of deep structure and surface structure to his ontology.
In this sense, the ontology changes through the theory change from THL
to TCL. But through the reduction relation, all the three theories are
related, and this is where the structural continuity is expressed.
6.6 Conclusions
The mentioning of the structuralist concept of reduction in this chapter
should be understood as an illustrative example in order to promote the
idea of approaching structural realism by applying the framework of the
structuralist meta-theory to it. It is clear that the whole framework
of the structuralist meta-theory offers a whole series of other concepts
which all might be applicable to address the structural realist concern
for structural continuity.
I have argued that the structuralist concept of reduction fits for the
purpose of formally representing structural continuity. I have shown
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that there is a case of reduction between theories in linguistics, where
there is in fact structural continuity, expressed by this relation. SL is
reducible to THL, and THL is reducible to TCL. This holds explicitly
for the field of syntax, as I have shown. The main result of this case
study is, besides the fact of a theory reduction in linguistics, that we
can see that there is a case of structural continuity in linguistics, and
that it is possible to formulate structural realism with a focus on theory
change in linguistics. This also implies that one is in no need of a high
degree of mathematization in the sciences, if the aim is to find structural
continuities. This means furthermore that structural continuity can also
be found in non-highly-mathematized fields of science, and shows that
the framework of the structuralist meta-theory allows us to include the
special sciences in case studies about theory change and scientific (and
structural) realism.
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Chapter 7
Objections and a defense
7.1 The objections
I will now present a series of objections, which have been raised to struc-
tural realism. The proposal of structural realism made by Worrall raised
several objections. These objections have been presented especially by
Stathis Psillos7. I will shortly mention Psillos’ objections (and others).
The following list summarizes the objections which are relevant for my
proposal in this dissertation:
7.1.1 The standard-realism objection
Psillos argues that the notion of structural continuity can be fully ex-
plained by standard scientific realism. Mathematical equations have been
retained because they form an integral part of the approximately true
theoretical content of theories. But furthermore, there needs to be some
theoretical content beyond the equations. Psillos explains this as follows:
7See Psillos 2001a and his 1999: 146-161. There, he presents several objections to
structural realism.
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If the empirical success of a theory offers any grounds for
thinking that some parts of a theory have ‘latched on to’ the
world, those parts cannot be just some (uninterpreted) math-
ematical equations of the theory, but must include some the-
oretical assertions concerning some substantive properties as
well as the law-like behaviour of the entities and mechanisms
posited by the theory . . . let me just stress the main point:
if one admits that there is substantive (not just formal) re-
tention at the structural-mathematical level, then one should
admit that some theoretical content, too, gets retained. But
such an admission would undercut the claim that predictive
success vindicates only the mathematical structure of a the-
ory (Psillos 1999: 148).
And for Psillos, one would end up with the standard scientific realism
picture again. As soon as one accepts more than pure mathematical
structure, he is more than a structural realist, Psillos argues. Worrall
seems to state that all that is preserved, are the equations. It is not clear
in which part of our theories the theoretical content enters. It is a part
of our equations, but, as Psillos argues, there is also theoretical content
that is not part of our equations. And if such content is preserved, we
would get standard scientific realism again.
7.1.2 The uninterpreted-structures objection
That certain structures are retained through theoretical change does not
imply that these structures (as equations) tell us anything about the
structure of the world. It is not clear whether these equations represent
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relations between physical entities which would be otherwise unknowable.
The descriptions of the world, obtained through our empirical theories,
cannot be only expressed by equations. Some theoretical assumptions
which are not part of equations are also required in order to justify the
success of an empirical theory. In Psillos’ words: “. . . in empirical science
we should at least seek more than formal structure. Knowing that the
world has a certain formal structure (as opposed to natural structure)
allows no explanation and no prediction of the phenomena (Psillos 2001a:
S21)".
One might think in a first step that this sounds very much like the
standard-realism objection. However, the uninterpreted-structures ob-
jection is different in the following sense. One can interpret equations
in a merely instrumentalist setting, e.g. one can give purely technical
explanations on how certain functions look like, but this does not com-
mit to scientific realism, since giving purely technical interpretations to
mathematical structures does not imply any commitment the scientific
realist wants to make.
7.1.3 The structure-nature objection
This objection states that the distinction between structure and nature
of an entity, as Worrall proposes, has no justification. Following Psillos,
scientists normally describe the nature of an entity by ascribing certain
properties and relations to it. The nomological behavior is then expressed
by some equations. There is no need for the distinction between structure
and nature of an entity, since it is metaphysically inflationary. In Psillos’
words:
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Is the nature of a theoretical entity something distinct from
its structure? Equivalently, can one usefully conceive of the
physical content of a mathematical symbol (that is, of the
entity or process it stands for) as distinct from the totality
of the interpreted mathematical equations in which it fea-
tures, (that is, from the totality of laws which describe its
behaviour)? When scientists talk about the nature of an en-
tity, what they normally do -apart from positing a causal
agent- is to ascribe to this entity a grouping of basic proper-
ties and relations. They then describe its law-like behaviour
by means of a set of equations. In other words, they endow
this causal agent with a certain causal structure, and they
talk about the way in which this entity is structured. I think
that talk of ‘nature’ over and above this structural descrip-
tion (physical and mathematical) of a causal agent is to hark
back to the medieval discourse of ‘forms’ and ‘substances’.
Such talk has been overthrown by the scientific revolution of
the seventeenth century (Psillos 1999: 149).
7.1.4 The structure-loss objection
Chakravartty (2004), Bueno (2008) and others claim that there are not
only cases of structural continuity, but also of structural loss through
theory change. This objection relies on historical facts of theoretical
change and is hard to reject at first sight. Bueno rightly refers to Laudan
(1996), who first discussed such cases of structural loss:
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However, structural realism also faces a further difficulty. It
arises not from the existence of different structures that do
the same job, but from the existence of structural losses in
scientific change. There are well-known cases that support
the existence of these losses. For example, when we moved
from Descartes’s celestial mechanics to Newton’s, the struc-
ture provided by Descartes’s theory of vortices was entirely
lost. The latter theory explained why the planets moved in
the direction that they did, and this was an issue left un-
explained by Newton’s own theory. In other words, some
structure was lost in this case (Bueno 2008: 223-224).
It is right that in the shift from Descartes’ to Newton’s celestial me-
chanics, there was a loss of structure. Below, we will see how one can
counter this objection, or at least turn it into the favour of the structural
realist that aims to apply the structuralist meta-theory in the debate on
structural realism.
7.1.5 Structure correspondence
Not an objection, but an open question in the debate is the following,
formulated by Frigg and Votsis (2011):
How does the exact relation of correspondence between two structures, the
one in the abandoned and the one in the successor theory, look like?
In other words, the question Frigg and Votsis ask is about the form of in-
tertheoretical relations between the theories in question, and about how
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such relations between the structures of the theories in question look like
in a formal sense. In the Fresnel-Maxwell case, how does the formal rela-
tion between Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s equations look like, since Fresnel’s
theory is the abandoned one and Maxwell’s theory is the successor the-
ory? It is clear that this question can only be answered by working out
careful and detailed case studies, where the logical structure of the theo-
ries in question is reconstructed. It is exactly here, where I argue that the
structuralist meta-theory has the adequate formal tools for explicating
this open question. I have shown an example of this in the previous chap-
ter. In that case, the relation of correspondence between the structures
looks like the reduction relation in the structuralist meta-theory.
The matter of correspondence between the two structures is closely
connected to some of the objections that I have mentioned. First, if
we are able to explicate formally how such a correspondence looks like,
we can refer to that relation of correspondence as the structure that
guarantees a continuity between both theories. This structure is not just
an uninterpreted one, since it will hold between two concrete empirical
theories. Secondly, the explication of such a relation will also serve to
show how a structural loss is not affecting structural realism. For this to
work, of course, it is required that the correspondence relation between
two structures includes all relevant facts of both theories.
I have already outlined the tools of the structuralist meta-theory in
chapter 3, and I have shown a concrete case of structural continuity,
formulated in the framework of this approach, in chapter 6. In this sense,
the correspondence between two structures can be seen as a relation of
reduction, as it is the case for Harris and Bloomfield, and in the case of
Harris and Chomsky.
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7.2 Defending structural realism
Finally, I want to propose the following answers to the objections to
structural realism mentioned above. First, I argue that the standard-
realism objection is blocked if we accept the framework of the structuralist
meta-theory. In the case of the reduction from Bloomfield to Harris,
there are not even equations that could be a part of these theories. This
makes it such an important case, for if structural realism wants to be
a tenable position, it should be applicable to all domains of empirical
science, and not only to physics, or to sciences that have equations as a
necessary part of them. By equations, I mean differential equations, as
they appear in physics, for instance. But generally, there cannot be a
need for mathematical equations (in the sense of differential equations)
for structural realism to make sense.
What about linguistics, again? I do not think it is necessary to have
such equations to make sense of structural realism. But of course, the
more mathematized a scientific discipline becomes, the easier it gets for
structural realism to sort out relevant structures that can become rele-
vant for the discussion on structural continuity. A syntax-tree is also a
mathematical structure, and henceforth it enters into the discussion on
structural realism.
My answer to the first objection goes very much along with my an-
swer to the next objection. To the uninterpreted-structures objection, I
propose that if we approach structural realism with the framework of the
structuralist meta-theory, we will not only talk about equations as struc-
tures, but of the whole empirical theories as structures, in a formal sense.
We will never have the problem of having only uninterpreted structures,
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if we rely on structuralist reconstructions of real empirical theories. In
the case of SL and THL, the structures of both theories are not un-
interpreted, for they represent real physical entities, namely, linguistic
forms, and the ways in which they are put together. It is important to
mention that linguistic forms, as existing physical entities, have to be
understood as tokens, just analogous to physics. When physicists mea-
sure the movement of electrons, they measure tokens, but when a theory
about electrons is formulated, it is about types. This is the same case in
linguistics. Within a theory, linguistic forms are types, but as entities,
measured in a physical system (in this case, a natural language), they
are tokens.
The structure-nature objection, I argue, can be answered in a Car-
napian way, if we think of the Aufbau (§16), where Carnap explains the
distinction between structure and nature, where he calls it the mate-
rial. From the perspective of the structuralist meta-theory, our empirical
theories describe the structure of the material, to speak with Carnap’s
words. The tools of the structuralist meta-theory allow to represent all
empirical theories as structural entities. Hence, there is a well-established
distinction between these two levels. It is true that Worrall’s use of ‘na-
ture’ is somehow misleading, for it gives the debate a problematic and
unnecessary metaphysical touch. But if we rely on Carnap’s concept
‘the material’, I argue, we don’t get that surplus flavor of metaphysical
connotation.
It is well known that Carnap was not a realist, and that he aimed to
stay neutral with his program, in the Aufbau as well as in his later works.
Nevertheless, I see that Carnap’s structuralist methodology of the Aufbau
can be applied to structural realism. I argue with Carnap that, for the
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structural realist, only the structural components guarantee objectivity,
since all other ways of describing our knowledge (e.g. via ostension) will
end up being subjective. Now, if we put this into the context of structural
realism, I want to recall that one of Worrall’s main points in his 1989
paper is exactly that the names of the entities to which we refer with the
terms that are postulated in our theories can change completely, and that
we therefore should better focus on certain structural than on referential
continuities. In this sense, I find Carnap’s structuralist methodology
helpful in order to strengthen structural realism. And in this way, such a
distinction between structure and nature does make sense, without being
inflationary or metaphysically unnecessary.
To the structure-loss objection I propose the following answer. It is
exactly through concrete case studies that one can show concrete cases
of structure-loss. The same holds for the inverse case, i.e. one can also
show how a structural continuity looks like. It might well be the case
that there exist cases of structural loss. But what the adherent of this
objection is urged to do is to work out careful case studies on these
supposed structural losses. The same, again, for the structural realist. It
is exactly one central aim of my dissertation to contribute to this with the
case study of linguistics that I have provided here. It can be seen that,
with the approach I am proposing, the question of structural continuity
becomes a matter of accumulating convincing case studies. I argue that,
once we have a certain amount of case studies, we can at least make
an inductive step in the way Laudan (1981) does it with the pessimistic
meta-induction, but towards the other direction.
It might well turn out that the result will be that there are more cases
of losses than cases of continuities, but this is a question, I argue, which
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cannot be answered normatively, and must be pursued in a way of ac-
cumulating logical reconstructions of concrete cases of scientific change.
The crucial point for the solution of the question of structural losses
is concerned with the importance of every specific case-study. As the
structural realist will have to find representative cases of structural con-
tinuities, the same holds for those arguing in favor of structural losses. Is
the case of the continuity of structure from Fresnel’s to Maxwell’s theory
convincing enough? Surely not. There is a need for more case-studies.
At the end, both sides will have to argue for the importance of each case
in question.
7.3 Structure choice and underdetermination
The problem of underdetermination (as outlined in chapter two) can also
be approached from the perspective of structural realism (see Brading
and Skyles 2012). These authors present a discussion of underdetermi-
nation and ontic structural realism, by discussing contemporary issues
in the philosophy of physics, connected with ontic structural realism and
the metaphysics of science.
My approach here is different. I argue that only after a rational and
logical reconstruction of the respective empirical theory under issue, we
are able to see the full structure of the theory, and to understand its
full meaning. We always have to step to the meta-level of looking at the
empirical theory in its reconstructed form, as a meta-representation. By
doing so, we can have a clear vision of the theory in question. If problems
of underdetermination emerge, one then needs to sort out the “best" and
the “relevant" structure that is available.
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This move aims at answering the problem of underdetermination by
appealing to pragmatic or epistemic virtues. One can argue for the choice
of a certain theory over another one, because it might be more elegant,
economical, simple, coherent, or it might have a better explanatory struc-
ture. In this same way, we can also think of a choice we can make between
structures, and not between theories in the sense of scientific realism.
This means that, after having analyzed and reconstructed an empirical
theory, we focus on the way in which we have provided the formal re-
construction. This means that we have to argue why our theory has
been reconstructed in a specific formal framework, and not in another
one. For example, one could reconstruct classical mechanics in a fini-
tist framework, or in a framework that permits the existence of infinite
sets. This difference is crucial, since it radically changes the underly-
ing ontological assumptions that we make by when we use one specific
framework.
Furthermore, we can think of the tools that are provided by the struc-
turalist meta-theory, and of the reconstruction of linguistics I have given
in this dissertation. One could always provide an alternative formal re-
construction, within another formal framework. This is in principle log-
ically possible. In this case, it could be within the framework of first
order logic, or within the framework of category theory. After having re-
constructed the same empirical theory with different formal approaches,
one could then see clearly the similarities and differences in the “struc-
ture" of the theory, by looking at its meta-representation. This move
would allow us to decide, by relying on the classical epistemic virtues,
which structure would fit best, and to argue why we would prefer one
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representation over others. In this sense, one could answer the problem
of underdetermination.
Chapter 8
Structural realism and
neutralism
8.1 Introduction
After having examined structural realism, I will turn the focus now on
a view which is called neutralism. This view, I argue, should be seen as
being emergent out of the debate on scientific realism, and especially of
the debate on structural realism. I argue that, once we leave standard
scientific realism beside and move to structural realism, we are able to
defend a form of realism, although this form of realism is primarily fo-
cussed on the notion of structure and structural continuity. It turns out,
however, that structural realism can still be sophisticated in a way that
allows a strong modification. In fact, it changes from structural realism
to neutralism, where one can remain “neutral" with respect to questions
of scientific realism. In a way, one “arrives" at such a neutralist view,
after having moved to structural realism, or at least to structuralist epis-
temologies, in the sense of Carnap. My intent to develop a neutralist
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view goes along with the fact that for most adherents of the structuralist
meta-theory, neutralism is an attractive option. I will discuss this point
in detail below. I will now discuss and develop a neutralist view for the
dynamics of scientific theories, and in general for the debate on scientific
realism.
This neutralist view aims to incorporate both scientific realism and
anti-realism, but especially the developments of structural realism. In
this sense, the move to neutralism goes from standard scientific realism,
through structural realism to neutralism. The idea is that the structural
descriptions of empirical theories that we can give by means of the frame-
work of the structuralist meta-theory can strengthen structural realism,
as I have shown. But they also guarantee objectivity and enable us to
remain neutral.
Since the early work of Carnap (1928), and more explicitly during
the last decades, the debate on scientific realism has been enriched by
the discussion of neutralism. This view has been carefully examined by
Stathis Psillos (1999) and Michael Friedman (1999, 2001 and 2011). In
this chapter, I will start by discussing Carnap’s neutralism, and Psillos’
and Friedman’s analysis of this view. I will then define different forms of
neutralism, namely, metaphysical, semantic, framework-dependent, and
interpretational. By doing so, I hope to clarify the distinctions between
the different kinds of neutralism, by laying out a proper typology, but
also to examine some limitations of the view.
Neutralism seems an attractive alternative to both realism and an-
tirealism. As is well known, scientific realism involves a number of com-
mitments, such as: the existence of unobservable objects, real modality
in nature, and some correspondence between the unobservable super-
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structures of a theory and the corresponding objects in the world. Scien-
tific antirealism, in turn, although typically involving fewer metaphysical
commitments, still countenances some metaphysics. For example, in the
case of constructive empiricism, there is an ultimate commitment to ab-
stract objects, given that the aim of science is understood as the search
for empirically adequate theories and such theories are formulated as fam-
ilies of models (Rosen 1994). But models are abstract objects, and the
relation of empirical adequacy, for the constructive empiricist, requires
the existence of an isomorphism between the empirical substructures of a
model and the structures obtained by measuring relevant features of the
world (van Fraassen 1980, p. 64). A neutralist stance would try to avoid
such commitments, whether based on realism or on antirealism. This is
very much in the spirit of a Carnapian scientific philosophy, which aims
to guarantee objectivity without the metaphysical difficulties that real-
ism and antirealism seem to generate. This goal, if it can be reached,
makes a neutralist position very tempting. For these reasons, I think
neutralism is an attractive option.
8.2 Defining neutralism
Neutralism can be thought of as an alternative to ontologically loaded
views, such as realism and antirealism. There are also less committing
versions of antirealism that are neutral about the existence of a certain
range of objects, for instance, unobservable entities. This is the case of
van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (van Fraassen 1980). But this
form of antirealism is not neutral about the existence of other objects,
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such as observable entities, given that the constructive empiricist is realist
about them.
8.2.1 A typology of neutralism
Given the formulation of scientific realism presented in chapter 2, and
my discussion of structural realism, different types of neutralism can now
be characterized. The purpose of developing a typology is to identify
different levels of neutralism, even though, with some work, there may
be some overlap. This just means that one can consistently maintain
neutralism about several—in fact, about all—of the categories in this
typology.
Metaphysical neutralism
This is a rather unpopular position, according to which one should be
neutral about the question of what there is. This view can be motivated
by some ideas alluded to in Carnap’s Aufbau:
Are the constituted forms “generated by thought", as the
Marburg-School teaches, or are they “only recognized", as re-
alism states? Constitutional theory uses a neutral language;
and there forms are neither “generated", nor are they “rec-
ognized", but “constituted"; and it should be emphasized
strongly already here that the word “constitute" is always
meant completely neutral (Carnap 1928: §5).
Carnap notes that the application of his constitutional theory (outlined
in the Aufbau) prevents the generation of pseudo-philosophical questions,
such as the classical dispute between realists and idealists. In this sense,
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his proposal is metaphysically neutral, and is motivated by the attempt
at avoiding engaging with pseudo-philosophical issues. Of course, not ev-
eryone shares Carnap’s assessment that the dispute between realists and
idealists addresses a pseudo-philosophical question. But even those who
maintain that this is a genuine philosophical issue may find in the meta-
physical neutralist position a safe haven, given the inherent difficulties in
settling it.
Epistemological neutralism1: Framework-dependent neutralism
Just as epistemological realism involves both the interpretation of scien-
tific theories and the conceptual resources they provide, epistemological
neutralism also has two components: one focusing on the relevant con-
ceptual resources, which I want to call framework-dependent neutralism,
and another highlighting the interpretation of the theories under consid-
eration, which I will call interpretational neutralism.
According to framework-dependent neutralism, one should remain
neutral with respect to the framework that is used to reconstruct sci-
entific theories. The choice of a certain formal framework, at least in
principle, should not shape one’s ontology. One could use a variety of
available frameworks, such as, naïve set-theory, Zermelo-Fraenkel set the-
ory (with or without Urelemente), category theory, type theory, mere-
ology (whether formulated in a first- or in a second-order language) etc.
Since the neutralist is not committed to any particular framework, it’s
possible to avoid any ontologically problematic assumptions made by a
framework while exploring the expressive resources it provides. I will
discuss below to what extent this form of neutralism can, in fact, be
implemented.
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Epistemological neutralism2: Interpretational neutralism
On this view, one should be neutral on how to interpret the results of
scientific inquiry. In particular, given a scientific theory, one ought to
remain neutral on how to interpret it. That is, the interpretational neu-
tralist remains neutral about the different possible interpretations of the
relevant theories, resisting the commitment to any one in particular. In
this way, they provide understanding of significant features of the world
that the theory alone does not settle, since an interpretation is supposed
to supplement features of the original theory while still remaining com-
patible with it rather than becoming a rival theory. The Copenhagen
interpretation and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics provide well-known examples. By not settling on any particular in-
terpretation, this kind of neutralist emphasizes the contribution made
by each interpretation to one’s understanding of the world without the
commitment to any of the assumptions (metaphysical, epistemological,
or mathematical) made by the proposals in question.
Semantic neutralism
According to this view, one should be neutral on the reference of scientific
terms, that is, on whether the terms of our scientific language refer to
existing entities or not. The postulation of the existence of such entities
is given a pragmatic justification. Neither realist nor antirealist accounts
of the reference to such entities are acceptable to a semantic neutralist.
This goes hand in hand with Carnap’s well-known Principle of Tolerance:
In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build
up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language as he wishes.
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All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it,
he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules
instead of philosophical arguments (Carnap 1937: 52).
This principle, in fact, meshes well with neutralism more generally. On
Carnap’s view, philosophical disputes should be a matter of a meta-
theoretical discussion regarding logical syntax, instead of a debate in
which terms such as ‘real’, ‘existence’, or ‘world’ occur. Once again, inde-
pendently of whether one shares Carnap’s assessment of meta-theoretical
disputes, a semantic neutralist will avoid getting involved in settling the
thorny issues of securing reference to scientific objects or explaining how
to account for their failure.
It may be complained that the semantic neutralists are unable to
accommodate significant features of scientific practice, in particular, to
explain the success of science. Why is it that scientific theories are able
to explain novel empirical phenomena? Since neutralists are not commit-
ted to (any particular account of) the reference of scientific terms (they
remain neutral about this issue), the scientific realist will no doubt argue
that scientific success will likely remain a mystery for them.
In response, one can note that the semantic neutralist does not deny
that scientific terms refer—neutralism is not a form of dogmatic skep-
ticism about science, after all—it does not assert that they do. And it
is possible to explain the success of science without a commitment to
the reference of scientific vocabulary: those scientific theories that were
empirically unsuccessful were eventually rejected, and it is not surprising
that theories that were not shown to be empirically inadequate remained
(van Fraassen 1980).
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Scientific realists may insist on the need to provide a mechanism in
terms of which the success of novel predictions can be accounted for. But
this assumes that there is something that still needs to be accommodated
beyond the sheer fact that certain theories have not been shown to be
empirically inadequate. The neutralist will resist the requirement that
an underlying mechanism ought to be provided—typically, in terms of
reference and truth, or, at least, approximate truth. For these notions
take a particular stance on the issue of scientific progress, and one of the
key motivations for the neutralist is to resist such maneuvers. This is, of
course, a deflationary approach to this problem, but it is one that meshes
very well with the deflationary approach to ontology that underlies the
various forms of neutralism I have identified.
8.3 Carnap’s neutralism
A neutral interpretation of our theories with respect to both scientific
realism and scientific antirealism is a methodological move that goes very
much along with Carnap’s own proposal. As he tells us:
It is obvious that there is a difference between the meanings of
the instrumentalist and the realist ways of speaking. My own
view, which I shall not elaborate here, is essentially this. I
believe that the question should not be discussed in the form:
“Are theoretical entities real?" but rather in the form: “Shall
we prefer a language of physics (and of science in general)
that contains theoretical terms, or a language without such
terms?" From this point of view the question becomes one of
preference and practical decision (Carnap 1974: 256).
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Despite acknowledging the difference between realist and anti-realist in-
terpretations of science, Carnap also highlights the central point that that
difference ultimately amounts to a choice between two different frame-
works: one that includes theoretical terms and another that doesn’t.
Carnap’s neutralism amounts to insisting that the choice between such
frameworks is ultimately a matter of preference, a “practical decision",
as he notes.
Carnap’s neutralism incorporates all four kinds of neutralism we dis-
cussed above. In particular, we find the collapse of the distinction be-
tween framework-dependent neutralism and interpretational neutralism,
since he interprets the latter in terms of the former. On his view, the
difference between realist and anti-realist interpretations of science (the
issue about which the interpretational neutralist remains neutral about)
is ultimately a difference between two rival frameworks, that is, two dis-
tinct languages in which to raise and examine questions about science
(framework neutralism). Not surprisingly, Carnap also interprets seman-
tic neutralism in terms of framework neutralism: whether the theoretical
terms in one’s language should be taken as referring or not is, for him,
also a “practical decision” regarding the choice of one’s language. In his
hands, semantic neutralism also emerges from framework neutralism.
Finally, as noted above, Carnap embraces metaphysical neutralism
by emphasizing that the language he adopts, for instance in the Aufbau,
commits him neither to assert that objects exist independently of one’s
language (for these objects would then be recognized or discovered) nor
does the language require him to generate such objects (which would
then be created). Rather, Carnap insists that the language “constitutes”
the objects in question, where such “constitution” is neutral between
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the two possibilities just highlighted. So even on the most fundamental
issue about metaphysics—the basic nature of objects—Carnap adopts a
neutralist stance.
Thus, Carnap’s neutralism incorporates metaphysical, semantical, in-
terpretational and framework-dependent components, and throughout
his writings he emphasizes that the corresponding disputes are linguis-
tic. As one may expect, given the centrality of framework-dependent
neutralism in his thinking, Carnap also argues that the only way to dis-
cuss philosophical questions is to lay out the relevant syntactic rules and
the reasons for the adoption of a given framework. However, in contrast
with Carnap, I argue that the discussion of the syntax of the chosen
framework is more than a linguistic dispute, since it aims to provide a
comparison and an assessment of those frameworks that will be adopted
in philosophical research. And as will become clear below, the adoption
of a framework commits one to the particular ontology that is associated
with that framework.
At this stage, one may worry whether it is possible to provide a
genuine form of neutralism in the philosophy of science. In his discussion
of Carnap’s neutralism, Psillos has raised some concerns:
Carnap’s own aim is to defend a sort of genuine neutralism
with respect to the question of the existential implications of
scientific theories: no ontological commitments to unobserv-
able entities are dictated by scientific theories, but scientific
theories are not merely instruments for prediction and control
either (Psillos 1999: 40).
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Psillos concludes that Carnap eventually fails to achieve a neutralist
stance, since his view ends up collapsing into one or the other of these
extreme positions. On his view:
It seems as though Carnap’s neutralism is difficult to main-
tain: every attempt to restore an empiricist equidistance be-
tween scientific realism and instrumentalism makes him fall
towards one of these positions. Carnap has to take sides,
doesn’t he? (Psillos 1999: 56).
This does not seem entirely clear, since the very idea of neutralism is not
to take sides. In fact, the whole point of being a neutralist is precisely to
navigate, as carefully as possible, between these extremes, and to avoid
taking sides on metaphysical debates. And it is ultimately by framing
the debate between realist and anti-realist interpretations of science as
a choice between different frameworks—as a matter for a framework-
dependent neutralism—that Carnap manages to achieve that.
Crucial for Psillos’ case for the instability of Carnap’s position is
a passage in the first edition of Carnap’s (1966) book. There Carnap
claimed that the conflict between realism and anti-realism—he explicitly
mentions instrumentalism—is basically linguistic, and that to state that
a theory is a reliable instrument is basically equivalent to maintain that
the theory is true. In his own words:
It is obvious that there is a difference between the meanings
of the instrumentalist and the realist ways of speaking. My
own view, which I shall not elaborate here is that the conflict
between the two approaches [realism and instrumentalism] is
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essentially linguistic. It is a question of which way of speak-
ing is to be preferred under given circumstances. To say that
a theory is a reliable instrument -that is, that the predictions
of observable events that it yields will be confirmed-is essen-
tially the same as saying that the theory is true and that
the theoretical, unobservable entities it speaks about exist.
Thus, there is no incompatibility between the thesis of the
instrumentalist and that of the realist. At least so long as
the former avoids such negative assertions . . . but the theory
does not consist of sentences which are either true or false, and
the atoms, electrons and the like do not really exist’ (Carnap
1966: 256, quoted in Psillos 1999: 56).
This passage is admittedly quite puzzling. Realism and anti-realism (in
particular, instrumentalism) clearly are not compatible views. One would
need to provide an exceedingly non-standard characterization of instru-
mentalism to make these views consistent with each other. For exam-
ple, one could strip instrumentalism of its anti-realist components. In
fact, this seems to be the route Carnap entertains at the end of the
passage, suggesting that the instrumentalist could avoid asserting that
scientific theories lack truth-value or that atoms and subatomic particles
do not exist. But it’s unclear that the resulting view would be a form
of instrumentalism, since the distinctive features of the view would have
been eliminated. Suppose, however, that the adjustments were made in
the other direction. For instance, one could recommend that the realist
should avoid asserting that scientific theories have a truth-value or that
atoms and subatomic particles exist. In this case, it would be unclear
that the resulting view would be a form of scientific realism, given the
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lack of commitment to those traits that are distinctive of the view. In
either direction, the adjustments suggested clearly would not work.
To his credit, prompted by correspondence with Grover Maxwell, Car-
nap agreed to revise the passage I just quoted above (see Martin Gard-
ner’s forward to Carnap 1974: ix-x; see also Friedman 2011: 250, footnote
2). The result is the version I have reproduced in the beginning of this
subsection, which was published in the revised edition of Carnap (1966):
It is obvious that there is a difference between the meanings of
the instrumentalist and the realist ways of speaking. My own
view, which I shall not elaborate here, is essentially this. I
believe that the question should not be discussed in the form:
“Are theoretical entities real?" but rather in the form: “Shall
we prefer a language of physics (and of science in general)
that contains theoretical terms, or a language without such
terms?" From this point of view the question becomes one of
preference and practical decision (Carnap 1974: 256).
Carnap also added in a footnote:
In my view greater clarity often results if discussions of whether
certain entities are real are replaced by discussions of prefer-
ence of language forms. This view is defended in detail in my
“Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” [Carnap 1950] (Car-
nap 1974: 256, footnote 4).
This change is very telling. It explicitly highlights that Carnap is reinter-
preting the ontological dispute between realists and anti-realists in terms
of the choice between different frameworks. By doing that, although he
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cannot maintain that these rival views are compatible, he can preserve
a neutral stance toward them. Framework-dependent neutralism is the
key feature here.
More recently, Michael Friedman has suggested that Carnap’s neu-
tralism can be thought of as a symbiosis between van Fraassen’s con-
structive empiricism and contemporary structural realism:
The circumstance that Carnap has this much in common
with both van Fraassen’s instrumentalism and contemporary
structural realism suggests, at least to me, that Carnap’s at-
tempt at neutrality may have succeeded after all. He may
in fact have articulated a version of structuralism that recog-
nizes the strengths of both instrumentalism and realism while
simultaneously avoiding the philosophical “pseudo-questions"
on which they appear substantively to differ. But this can
only be fully appreciated, I shall argue, when we place Car-
nap’s views on theoretical terms within his wider conception
of the task of philosophy of science—which he calls Wis-
senschaftslogik, the “logic of science"—more generally (Fried-
man 2011: 252).
This is an intriguing claim, which suggestively brings Carnap’s work di-
rectly to bear on recent discussions in the philosophy of science. In
support of his view, Friedman starts by examining the relation between
Carnap’s conception and constructive empiricism, before exploring the
connections between Carnap’s view and structural realism. First, Fried-
man identifies a similarity in van Fraassen’s characterization of the proper
commitment of a scientific theory and Carnap’s representation of the em-
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pirical content of a scientific theory via its associated Ramsey-sentence.
He notes:
. . . despite his lack of patience with Carnap’s approach, van
Fraassen’s view of what a scientific theory should properly
assert is virtually identical with Carnap’s conception of the
Ramsey-sentence representation of a theory’s synthetic or em-
pirical content. [On a footnote, Friedman adds: “This point
is first emphasized in Demopoulos (2003)”.] Van Fraassen
thinks that we should only assert that the observational phe-
nomena are embeddable into an abstract model for the the-
ory, and the Ramsey-sentence, on Carnap’s account, asserts
precisely the same—that there is some abstract (mathemati-
cal) model of the theory such that all observable phenomena
behave in the way that the theory requires (1966, 1974: 254-
255): “Some physicists are content to think about such terms
as ‘electron’ in the Ramsey way. They evade the question of
existence by stating that there are certain observable events,
in bubble chambers and so on, that can be described by cer-
tain mathematical functions, within the framework of a cer-
tain theoretical system. Beyond that they will assert nothing
(Friedman 2011: 251-252).
There are, however, difficulties with this suggestion. One of the key
benefits of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism is that, as opposed to
the logical positivist view, it takes scientific theories literally. That is,
if a scientific theory states that there are electrons, one will not try to
reconstruct such a theory avoiding reference to electrons (van Fraassen
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1980). Van Fraassen’s innovation is to highlight that one can make per-
fectly good sense of scientific practice without the commitment to the
existence of unobservable entities—as long as one does not assent to any-
thing more than the theory’s empirical adequacy (and remains agnostic
about what goes on at the unobservable level). One of the central reasons
why van Fraassen rejects the syntactic approach to theories is because it
requires that such theories be reconstructed—reformulated, for instance,
in terms of its Ramsey-sentence. As a result, one cannot make sense of
scientific practice in its own terms, and a layer of artificial reconstruc-
tion is introduced. This point cannot be ignored; otherwise a significant
benefit of constructive empiricism is lost.
In contrast, Carnap’s strategy requires the reconstruction of every
scientific theory, so that its Ramsey-sentence can be formulated. On
his view, some physicists, who are sympathetic to the Ramsey-sentence
approach, will not assert anything beyond the content of the theory’s
Ramsey-sentence. But this doesn’t say anything about the full content
of the original unreconstructed theory—precisely the theory the construc-
tive empiricist is empiricist about—nor does it specify the nature of one’s
commitment to the original theory.
It should now be apparent that van Fraassen’s constructive empiri-
cism and Carnap’s reconstructive view are importantly different, despite
any formal similarity between them. To specify the content of one’s em-
piricism by means of a Ramsey-sentence is significantly different from
stating that a theory is empirically adequate—even if the same observa-
tional structures are picked out in each case. For the Ramsey-sentence
weakens the theory, emptying it of any theoretical significance, in a way
that the focus on its empirical adequacy doesn’t. To embed the models
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of data into the empirical substructures of a given model of a theory—
as van Fraassen requires for the theory’s empirical adequacy ([1980], p.
64)—is to highlight the significant role that theoretical considerations
play in understanding the phenomena, even if one need not take these
considerations to be true, but empirically adequate only. In contrast, to
formulate the Ramsey-sentence for a given scientific theory is to move
away from the original theory in a double way: by reformulating the the-
ory in the first place, and by weakening it further by explicitly identifying
one’s commitment to only what is expressed via the relevant Ramsey-
sentence. The formal similarity between the two views underscores a fun-
damental difference in attitude toward the theoretical content of science:
van Fraassen’s conception is neither eliminativist nor re-constructionist
regarding that content; Carnap’s is.
This point goes through despite Carnap’s acknowledgement that the
Ramsey-sentence approach is problematic (Carnap 1966/1974). Not sur-
prisingly, Carnap does not recommend that the original theory be re-
placed by its Ramsey-sentence, but thinks that that sentence’s role is to
specify the empirical content of a scientific theory, that is, it should be
used in the “explication of experiential import” (Carnap 1963: 963). As
Friedman (2011: 257) notes, Carnap ultimately suggests a combination
of both the Ramsey-sentence and the Carnap sentence for the task of
expressing the original theory, where the Carnap sentence is the condi-
tional whose antecedent is the Ramsey-sentence for the theory and the
consequent is the theory itself. Thus, the original theory is equivalent
to the conjunction of the Carnap sentence with the Ramsey-sentence.
However, Carnap’s view requires the reconstruction of the theory so that
its Ramsey-sentence can be specified. Moreover, the explanation of the
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phenomena ultimately is not articulated in terms of the theoretical con-
tent. At best, as Carnap emphasizes, the phenomena are described by
the mathematical features that are part of the framework of the the-
ory (Carnap 1966/1974: 254-255). In this sense, his proposal ends up
downplaying the significance of the theoretical content, and ultimately
becomes a form of eliminativism regarding that content, since it is not
invoked in the explanation of the phenomena.
Furthermore, Friedman goes on to argue that Carnap’s position also
bears significant similarities with contemporary structural realism. I see
this as a problematic interpretation. On his view:
It is equally true, as Psillos has argued, that Carnap’s view
also has much in common with contemporary structural real-
ism. Indeed, Carnap himself ends Philosophical Foundations
of Physics with what looks like a ringing endorsement of that
view (Friedman 2011: 252).
In support of this interpretation, Friedman quotes the concluding sen-
tences of Carnap (1966/1974), in which, speaking of our understanding
of quantum mechanics, Carnap notes:
Some physicists believe that there is a good chance for a new
breakthrough in the near future. Whether it will be soon or
later, we may trust - provided the world’s leading statesman
refrain from the ultimate folly of nuclear war and permit hu-
manity to survive -that science will continue to make great
progress and lead us to ever deeper insights into the structure
of the world (Carnap 1966/1974: 291-292).
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The crucial point here is to understand Carnap’s reference to the struc-
ture of the world. It’s indeed tempting to read this as a forceful en-
dorsement of contemporary structural realism. But in order to do that,
‘structure’ needs to be understood as those fundamental features of re-
ality that are preserved through theory change, since that’s the relevant
sense in contemporary literature. But this kind of realist commitment is
precisely the sort of metaphysical view that Carnap wants to avoid (as
Friedman is, of course, aware). As Carnap emphasizes:
The usual ontological questions about the “reality” (in an
alleged metaphysical sense) of numbers, classes, space-time
points, bodies, minds, etc., are pseudo-questions without cog-
nitive content (Carnap 1956: 44-45; quoted in Friedman 2011:
254).
Thus, a better understanding of ‘structure of the world’ here would be
in terms of something that is not committed to the reality of the partic-
ular features under consideration. More likely, in the relevant passage,
Carnap is not using ‘structure of the world’ in any metaphysically robust
sense. But this means, as one would expect from him, that he is avoiding
precisely the realist components of structural realism. By making use of
‘structure’, Carnap does not aim at a structural realist picture, but more
generally aims to say something like ‘construction’, ‘ordering’, or ‘com-
position’. I argue that Friedman is reading too much into this passage,
since we also have to keep in mind that the German word ‘Aufbau’ can
well be translated into ‘structure’, but equally well into the other words
I have just mentioned. In any case, Carnap endorsed a structuralist
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epistemology, but not structural realism per se, and the quote to which
Friedman refers is not sufficient to prove otherwise.
The point here is that no such a combination of views—constructive
empiricism and contemporary structural realism—seems possible at all,
since clearly the views have incompatible components. What Carnap
ultimately does is to implement a form of framework-dependent neutral-
ism, which could be applied to a variety of different versions of realist and
anti-realist views about science, but without ever combining them simul-
taneously; otherwise, the result would be an inconsistent combination of
conceptions.
It is noteworthy that Carnap has held neutralism since his early work.
Friedman (1999) highlights this, by mentioning that in the Aufbau:
The world of physics is univocally determined via the physical-
qualitative coordination plus conventional stipulations . . . the
Aufbau instead anticipates Carnap’s (1950) later strategy of
“Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology": the question of the
reality of the external world dissolves into the “external ques-
tion" of whether or not to accept and use the forms of ex-
pression of the “thing language" (Friedman 1999: 123-124).
Friedman is right in noting the continuity in Carnap’s view on ontology,
although the explicit distinction between internal and external questions
won’t be formulated by Carnap until the later paper from the 1950’s. For
the purpose of this dissertation, it is important to note that in distin-
guishing between internal and external questions, Carnap is ultimately
supporting a form of neutralism, since questions of existence (of numbers,
propositions, physical objects) are dependent on the explicit framework
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in which they are formulated. The relevant concepts need to be formu-
lated in order that the corresponding question of the existence of objects
falling under these concepts can be properly raised. It may then be simply
an analytic issue, given the framework, whether numbers or propositions
exist. But this does not settle the metaphysical question as to whether
numbers, propositions or physical objects exist independently of the rele-
vant frameworks. In Carnap’s hands, as we saw, these questions become
pragmatic issues involving the choice of a framework.
However, one has to acknowledge the fact that, in choosing between
frameworks, Carnap is not, in effect, introducing different concepts of
existence, one for each framework under consideration. He is trying to
avoid any form of commitment to metaphysical issues of existence, and
to claim that there are different concepts of existence is to take a stand
on exactly that issue. In this sense, the form of ontological pluralism
that Matti Eklund tentatively tries to rescue on Carnap’s behalf probably
would not have been of much help to Carnap himself, since it presupposes
that there is a “multitude of existence-like concepts” (Eklund 2009: 148),
which is a proposal Carnap would ultimately resist.
It seems in fact that Carnap’s neutralism is both a methodological
position and metaphilosophical. It is metaphilosophical in the sense that
it aims to avoid philosophical disputes, it prescribes and discusses how
to do philosophy.
However, one could argue that the following problem emerges for
neutralism: If one is supposed to choose rationally between different
frameworks, on what logical grounds would such a choice be made? As
Florian Steinberger argued:
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According to Carnap’s [neutralism]1, logical norms are self-
imposed. We impose logical norms upon ourselves by adopt-
ing a linguistic framework that gives rise to the corresponding
logical laws. But then on the basis of what rational norms
do we choose a linguistic framework? Presumably, our choice
ought to be guided by certain logical norms. It would appear
that in order to be able to rationally impose logical laws on
ourselves, we must already be subject to something like such
norms. This problem strikes me as fundamental to Carnap’s
entire tolerance-based philosophy (Steinberger 2014: 18).
This may seem to be a fundamental problem for any neutralist approach.
We cannot choose a framework before accepting certain logical principles.
But this principles could be chosen by considering fragments of different
logical systems and evaluating what follows from them. This would allow
a neutralist to get off the ground.
There are, however, problems for Carnap’s neutralism. In particular,
his rejection of metaphysics as being meaningless is interestingly non-
neutral. Carnap takes a particular anti-metaphysical stance on the status
of metaphysics that violates, in part, his own neutralism. Even though
he admits that the “constituted forms” that are discussed in the Aufbau
are neutral, in that they are neither “generated” nor “recognized” (Carnap
1928: §5), he still seems to regard metaphysical views as deeply misguided
and inadequate, specifically in the domain of science and in scientific
philosophy:
The decision concerning the two main questions about meta-
physics, that is, if it makes sense at all and if it has a justifi-
1Steinberger uses the term voluntarism where I use the term neutralism.
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able [daseinsberechtigt] existence, and if so, if it is a science,
depends apparently on what we call “metaphysics”. . . . If it
is about the first knowledge . . . we can use the name “fun-
damental science” [Grundwissenschaft] instead; if it is about
the ultimate, most general knowledge, we can use the name
“world view” [Weltlehre]. . . . On the other hand, the name
“metaphysics” is used for the result of a non rational, but
merely intuitive process; and this seems to be the common
use of language (Carnap 1928: §182).
His rejection of metaphysics becomes clearer later on in the same para-
graph, where he argues:
The fact that intuitive metaphysics makes use of words to
express itself must not lead us to the opinion that it would
belong to the domain of concepts, and in that sense, to the
domain of (rational) science. . . . Also in spheres of life other
than the one involving conceptual knowledge, words are used;
for example, in the practical transmission of will from one per-
son to another, in art, in the field of myth (to which intuitive
metaphysics perhaps belongs), which stands between science
and art, and in other fields (Carnap 1928: §182).
Carnap’s rejection of metaphysics, as not belonging to the domain of
the rational and conceptual, is apparent. This results from the fact that
he places (intuitive) metaphysics in the field of myth, and also that he
sees an absence of rational concepts in metaphysics. For him, meta-
physics falls outside the domain of the rational and the scientific, and
there is no place for it in scientific philosophy, that is, in philosophy as
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Carnap understands it. From the perspective of this discussion, rather
than adopting a proper neutralist stance toward metaphysics, Carnap
ultimately rejected metaphysics, and was not neutral in this sense.
Having said that, it should be clear that by choosing a certain formal
framework, one implicitly accepts its ontological commitments. If we
are rational agents, it seems that we are in principle unable to approach
philosophical questions neutrally, because the framework has those com-
mitments. But what kind of neutralism is ultimately possible? In order
to examine this point, I will develop a neutral form of neutralism.
8.4 Neutral neutralism
I aim to defend a neutral form of neutralism that avoids the rejection
of metaphysics championed by Carnap. I argue that the resulting form
of neutralism does not face the difficulties faced by Carnap’s, and it
incorporates several advantages as well.
The neutral neutralist will embrace neutralism about all of the com-
ponents of the typology that I have discussed above (in this respect,
there is full agreement with Carnap). First, with regard to metaphysical
neutralism, the neutral neutralist will resist the temptation of settling
the metaphysical issue of what there is: are there universals, properties,
relations, tropes, particulars, objects, individuals? Different metaphysi-
cal views have been advanced throughout the history of philosophy in an
attempt to settle this issue. We find, for instance, one-category ontolo-
gies, based only on tropes, and suitable reduction relations with regard
to the remaining categories (see, e.g., Campbell 1990); two-category on-
tologies, either based on objects and universals plus suitable reduction
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relations (see, e.g., Armstrong 1997), or based on objects and tropes plus
reduction relations (see, e.g., Martin 1980 and 1993); three-category on-
tologies, based on universals, objects, and tropes (see, e.g., Lowe 2006),
and four-category ontologies, based on universals, objects, tropes, and
modes (see Lowe 2006). In each case, there are a variety of arguments
in support of each particular ontology. They range from the minimal
commitments involved when only tropes (and, thus, only particulars)
are assumed in one’s ontology all the way to the significant expressive
advantages of having maximal commitments to a four-category ontology.
Not surprisingly, these arguments have been for the most part incon-
clusive, and there is no agreement as to which of these ontologies should
be preferred. The epistemological considerations that support a meager
ontology are counterbalanced by the expressive richness of less spare on-
tologies. The result is a standoff, and the neutral neutralist recommends
suspending judgment about the issue. Not surprisingly perhaps, one can
make perfectly good sense of scientific activity without settling meta-
physical issues of this sort, given that scientific practice itself is neutral
on the answers that can be given. Typically, that practice is compatible
with any of the different metaphysical packages available.
A similar recommendation would be made in other sorts of metaphys-
ical issues about the sciences in which the weight of the evidence does
not favor one view over others, such as, whether there are laws of nature,
natural kinds, dispositions, or causes—and if so, in each case, what their
nature ultimately turns out to be. As opposed to Carnap, the neutral
neutralist does not deny that these and other metaphysical issues are
meaningful: there’s nothing wrong with raising them, even if it may not
be clear how they can be settled in the end.
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Furthermore, the neutral neutralist will adopt neutralism about the
particular frameworks that are invoked in a given context. The result is
a form of framework-dependent neutralism. Depending on the particular
framework one adopts, different commitments will be involved: some will
be about mathematical objects and structures invoked in the formulation
of scientific theories; others will involve assumptions about the nature of
the objects, relations, events, and processes that are referred to in the rel-
evant theories. Whatever these frameworks turn out to be, they each will
embody commitments of a particular kind. The neutral neutralism will
register these commitments in each case, and will contrast with different
commitments involved in alternative frameworks.
The neutral neutralist, although clearly a pluralist about frameworks,
is not a relativist about them. The claim is not that any framework is
just as good as any other, and thus that everything goes. For example,
a framework that is based on classical logic is not adequate to capture
constructive features of mathematical reasoning. But one that relies on
constructive logics is. Since there are several such logics, there are several
different frameworks for the task at hand. Some frameworks are better
than others for certain purposes, and hence they should be preferred.
For example, certain constructive frameworks may have a richer class of
consequences than others, but may be equivalent to other constructive
frameworks on this score.
Typically, more than one framework can be adopted for the same
purpose (and, clearly, several frameworks can be implemented for differ-
ent purposes). Classical mechanics admits of Hamiltonian or Lagrangian
formulations (Arnold 1989). Non-relativist quantum mechanics can be
formulated in terms of matrices (matrice mechanics) or waves (wave me-
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chanics) (von Neumann 1932). Quantum field theories, in turn, have no
canonical formulation and can be expressed in a variety of different ways,
depending on the constraints that are imposed (Kuhlmann 2010). There
is, thus, a plurality of frameworks, but since some are better than others
for certain purposes, relativism is still avoided.
My view also embraces neutralism about the interpretation of science,
and thus will recommend an interpretational neutralism. The various
interpretations of science also provide additions to scientific practice that
are not strictly needed to make sense of that practice. Whether scientific
activity is understood as involving the search for true (or approximately
true) theories, or whether it is characterized as aiming for empirically
adequate theories, is not something that can be established on the basis
of the activity alone. After all, the practice itself does not require any of
the particular interpretations in order to function, and in this sense it is
neutral on interpretational issues.
Moreover, each interpretation requires specific commitments regard-
ing issues the practice is typically silent about. For instance, realist views
normally presuppose a particular conception of truth (or truth approxi-
mation) in order to specify the nature of the relation between theory and
reality. Anti-realist views normally invoke norms that are weaker than
truth, such as empirical adequacy or problem-solving effectiveness, but
they also need to determine the nature of the relation they posit between
reality and theory. In the end, however, it is unclear to what extent these
additions are in fact needed to understand the sciences.
Furthermore, there are several arguments that favor realist interpre-
tations (from the no-miracles argument to arguments regarding how to
secure epistemic access to unobservable objects) and several arguments
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that favor anti-realist interpretations (from arguments based on Kuhnian
losses and discontinuities in scientific change to arguments highlighting
the fewer commitments anti-realists require to make sense of scientific
practice). But it is unclear that these arguments successfully establish
one party in the dispute. It’s perhaps not surprising that none of the
proposed forms of realism or anti-realism have received widespread ac-
ceptance so far. Once again, being unable to choose between these con-
flicting arguments, the neutral neutralist will suspend judgment about
the relevant issues.
Also, neutral neutralism takes no stand on semantic considerations
in the sciences. Thus, a form of semantic neutralism emerges. Whether
scientific terms refer or not, and if they do, what exactly they refer to, is
something the neutral neutralist will not attempt to settle. Many con-
siderations seem to support the successful reference of scientific terms—
typically invoked by standard scientific realists (such as Psillos 1999).
But opposing considerations question whether this is indeed the case—
having to do with concerns about the falsity of many scientific theories.
The neutral neutralist is unable to settle which of these competing con-
siderations provide the right answer in this case.
By reflecting on the fact that it is unclear how to settle the scientific
realism debate, the neutral neutralist will encourage the development of
alternative proposals that attempt to move away from the rigid categories
of realism and anti-realism. In the end, these categories don’t seem to be
as illuminating as one would expect them to be to make sense of crucial
details of scientific practice.
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The natural ontological attitude
But perhaps there is an earlier form of neutralism in contemporary phi-
losophy of science, namely, Arthur Fine’s (1984a, 1984b) suggestive po-
sition: the natural ontological attitude (NOA). This proposal tries to
resist the need for adding to scientific practice a layer of metaphysical
and epistemological interpretation, commonly found in both realist and
anti-realist approaches to science. Realists typically add a particular
conception of truth—or approximate truth, or some other form of corre-
spondence between theory and world—as part of their interpretation of
science. Anti-realists, in turn, often resist the appropriateness of invoking
truth—or the other alternative norms recommended by realists—in the
context of theory assessment, and advance weaker norms instead, such
as empirical adequacy, problem-solving effectiveness, or some other way
of assessing the relation between theory and world. From the point of
view of NOA, these are all unnecessary additions to what takes place in
scientific practice:
What binds realism and anti-realism together is this. They
see science as a set of practices in need of an interpretation,
and they see themselves as providing just the right interpre-
tation . . . . The quickest way to get a feel for NOA is to
understand it as undoing the idea of interpretation, and the
correlative idea of invariance (or essence) . . . NOA is inclined
to reject all interpretations, theories, construals, pictures, etc.
of truth, just as it rejects the special correspondence theory
of realism and the acceptance pictures of the truth-mongering
anti-realisms . . . . NOA is fundamentally a heuristic attitude,
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one that is compatible with quite different assessments of par-
ticular scientific investigations . . . . NOA tries to let science
speak for itself, and it trusts in our native ability to get the
message without having to rely on metaphysical or epistemo-
logical hearing aids (Fine 1984b: 61-63).
But it is unclear whether there is such a “natural ontological attitude”
to begin with. NOA seems to presuppose that the identification of an
ontological attitude could be made in a metaphysical or epistemological
vacuum, as something that is simply given irrespectively of any particu-
lar philosophical commitments. But it is unclear exactly how, in letting
“science speak for itself”, one could detect the particular commitments
“naturally". On the basis of what kind of evidence can one affirm that we
have a “native ability" that allows us to avoid unnecessary metaphysical
or epistemological commitments? The very content of a scientific theory
and how it is supported by the evidence often depend on how such a
theory is interpreted, that is, on whether it is taken as a description of
an independently existing range of phenomena or of some artifact that
needs to be explained away. For Fine, NOA puts us in a position in
which we can avoid any unnecessary interpretation of science. However,
it is not clear how that can be implemented, and even whether we can
draw the line between the content of science and its interpretation as
neatly and easily as he suggests. The mere appeal to our native ability
to understand science is not sufficient to make sense of scientific practice.
After all, that practice is often embedded in metaphysical and epistemo-
logical assumptions—although such assumptions are not typically made
explicit, unless in those cases in which controversies arise.
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If we contrast NOA and neutral neutralism, it seems that Fine’s pro-
posal is not a form of neutralism, since it accepts the commitments that
are “naturally” found in scientific practice—whatever these commitments
are and however they end up being expressed. However, absent some ac-
count of what these commitments are, it is not clear how one can identify
them. To do so, we need a particular framework in which the relevant
commitments are explicitly stated. In contrast, the neutral neutralist of-
fers an alternative that explicitly identifies the commitments of particular
views—in light of the specific framework that is adopted—but resists the
attempt at settling which of these views is ultimately right.
Furthermore, even if NOA did provide a form of neutralism, it should
be noted that it is primarily concerned with interpretational issues in
science—in particular with the issue of how realist and anti-realist inter-
pretations provide what turn out to be ultimately unnecessary maneu-
vers to the understanding of scientific practice. Thus, NOA would be, at
best, a form of interpretational neutralism. But as my typology of neu-
tralism indicates, there are additional issues about science that one may
need to be neutralist about too (metaphysical, semantic, and framework-
dependent). In this way, neutral neutralism provides a broader setting
for neutralism than NOA does. Neutral neutralism, however, offers a
characterization and a typology of the different neutralisms that can be
formulated and upheld, as well as an assessment of their viability and
adequacy.
Is the proposed neutral neutralism just Carnap’s overall neutralism?
Not really. As I have argued, Carnap’s considered view involves a rejec-
tion of metaphysics as being cognitively inadequate: According to him,
it is not conceptual in nature nor is it rational or scientific. In contrast,
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I propose no such rejection. Metaphysicians, including those working on
the metaphysics of science, are certainly raising cognitively significant,
meaningful, rational questions.
What emerges is a neutral form of neutralism that engages with de-
bates in the sciences, including those concerned with scientific realism,
structural realism, and anti-realism, but without taking a stand and the
resulting troublesome and problematic commitments. In the end, what
one gains is understanding: of how the world could be if the relevant
theories under consideration were true (see van Fraassen 1991). One can
learn something significant by examining the issues in this way quite
independently of settling which of the proposed answers is ultimately
correct.
8.5 A framework for neutralism
After having discussed the possibility of neutralism, and after having
argued for what I have called neutral neutralism, I will now proceed and
discuss if the framework of the structuralist meta-theory can be used to
represent neutralist views.
8.5.1 Neutralism in the structuralist meta-theory
In the structuralist meta-theory, there is almost no explicit work on ques-
tions of the scientific realism debate (see Sneed 1983 for the only explicit
work on scientific realism). In personal conversation with some of its
main representative figures (Ulises Moulines, Wolfgang Balzer, Jose Díez,
Pablo Lorenzano, and others), it has been repeatedly pointed out to me
that questions of scientific realism are not the main interest of the struc-
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turalist meta-theory, and that most likely, the structuralist meta-theory
would fit best in a neutralist picture. In this section, I will discuss this
question further and analyze in detail if the structuralist meta-theory is
in fact a neutralist view.
Theoretical terms
Let us first have a look at the criterion of theoretical terms that is en-
dorsed by the structuralist meta-theory. The structuralist concept of
theoretical terms reveals us that the adherents of the structuralist meta-
theory do not endorse a realist view:
Term t is T -theoretical if every t-determining model is a
model of T . Or, in other words, if the set of all t-determining
models is included in M(T ), or if any method of determina-
tion for t is contained in M(T ). The intuitive idea of the-
oreticity thus is the following. Term t being T -theoretical
means that t can be determined only if T ’s fundamental laws
are presupposed. In other words: The determination of t
only works in situations in which T ’s fundamental laws are
satisfied (Balzer et al. 1987: 65).
First, theoretical terms, their meaning and their reference, matters that
are usually central to a scientific realist, are all left out by the structural-
ist criterion. Of course, the structuralist meta-theory is a model-theoretic
conception of theories, where one implicitly accepts that the notion of
truth, if there is one, would be Tarskian. But in this particular view,
there is at no point in the literature a development of a concept of truth.
Structuralists introduce T-theoretical terms in order to determine the
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structure of a theory, and to separate terms that are newly introduced
into a theory from terms that ‘come’ from other theories, via intertheo-
retical relations. This is a merely methodological approach to theoretical
terms. It is never asked whether such terms refer or what they mean,
as long as they can be determined by means of the satisfaction of the
fundamental laws of a theory in question.
Furthermore, it is also remarkable that in the whole literature of the
structuralist meta-theory, classical notions of scientific realists such as
truth and approximate truth, correspondence, predictions or any other
notions that are needed in order to fulfill metaphysical, epistemological
and semantic realism, are completely left beside. All this suggests that
the structuralist meta-theory is not a realist view. But is it therefore
necessarily an instrumentalist view? In what follows, I will discuss the
two only textual evidences in the whole structuralist corpus, where a
concrete answer to this question could be found, namely, Sneed’s (1983)
work and Stegmüller’s notion of a relative a-priori.
The structuralist meta-theory relies on set theory as its basic formal
framework, and the considerations above make this point very clearly.
Given that set theory is not ontologically innocent, at least in its usual
interpretation, some more work is needed in order to ensure that the
structuralist meta-theory provides a framework-independent neutralism.
Given the structuralist meta-theoreticians’ goal of remaining neutral with
respect to all theories to which their framework is applied, the commit-
ment to abstract objects that emerges from set theory should be avoided.
After all, a conflict may emerge between this goal and set theory’s most
natural interpretation.
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If one assumes, for the sake of argument, a platonist interpretation
of mathematics, then numbers, functions and sets are indeed impor-
tantly different from symphonies and theory-elements. In the structural-
ist meta-theory, we read:
The fact that the formal characterization of theory-elements
may include mathematical entities such as sets of real num-
bers and numerical functions (which constitute infinities in
the peculiar sense of mathematics) should not be confused
with the idea that they themselves coincide with those math-
ematical universes. Ontologically speaking, theory-elements
are more like symphonies or political ideologies than like num-
bers. That they apparently are more amenable to formal
representation than other cultural products is a purely con-
tingent fact that has nothing to do with the possibility of an
infinite construction (Balzer et al.: 412).
Whereas mathematical objects are abstract entities (which are neither
spatially nor temporally located, nor are they causally active), sym-
phonies and theory-elements are curiously hybrid objects: they are clearly
temporal, but not spatial, entities. Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony didn’t
exist in the thirteenth century, and arguably it will no longer exist if
all of its scores and recordings are destroyed, and no one recalls how to
play it anymore. Similarly, Newtonian mechanics didn’t exist in the thir-
teenth century, and arguably it will no longer exist if all of its written
formulations are destroyed, and no one recalls how to express it either.
In this respect, both are temporal objects. But neither symphonies nor
theory-elements are spatial objects, since arguably one cannot identify
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a symphony with its score (since different token scores still encode the
same symphony), nor can one identify a theory-element with its physical
inscription (there are, after all, different ways of formulating the same
theory). There is, however, an important difference between symphonies
and theory-elements: although theory-elements are not causally active,
symphonies—when performed—can be heard, and thus have some causal
power.
Despite the fact that structuralist meta-theorists suggest that theory-
elements are closer to symphonies than to numbers (and other mathe-
matical objects), the point still stands that, by invoking a particular
mathematical framework (a particular set theory), they are committed
to those entities that are posited by that framework—unless some nomi-
nalization strategy is presented that explains how one can use the frame-
work without commitment to the corresponding entities that it posits. In
the absence of such a nominalization strategy, one cannot simply assume
that ontological commitments can be avoided.
One may argue that the choice of frameworks is ultimately a mat-
ter of convenience. For the structuralist proposal can also be developed
within category theory (Mormann 1996). The fact that these different
formulations—set-theoretic or categorial—are available suggests a form
of neutralism about the underlying theoretical resources, which thus pro-
vides a form of framework neutralism.
Architectonic
Besides the formal requirements and implicit commitments that we have
to accept when we decide to apply a certain framework, there are fur-
ther meta-philosophical issues with the structuralist meta-theory that
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suggest a neutralist view. If we want to analyze the supposed neutralist
commitments of the structuralist meta-theory, it is of central importance
to take a look into what can be called the structuralist main work, An
Architectonic for Science (Balzer et al. 1987). In this work, the formal
framework of the whole approach is developed, applied and discussed.
The authors develop many case studies, discuss issues of theory change
and theoretical terms, and outline the technical tools for applying the
structuralist meta-theory. Moreover, the authors of Architectonic clearly
commit themselves to a structuralist, a holist and a neutralist view. Re-
garding structuralism, they note:
Our present aim is more modest. We want to provide a de-
scription of those structural features of empirical knowledge
which, we think, could serve to distinguish it in an interesting
way from other things (ibid.: xvii).
Their commitment to holism is also highlighted as follows:
This view commits us to a certain kind of “holism". We be-
lieve that those features of empirical science that fully dis-
tinguish it from non-scientific enterprises can only be seen
clearly by viewing sufficiently “large" fragments of scientific
knowledge. That is, they are only apparent when one has a
sufficiently “global" perspective (ibid.: xvii-xviii).
Finally, their neutralism is characterized as follows:
. . . In a restricted sense ‘perspective’ means “historical per-
spective". Our representations of scientific knowledge should
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be “historically neutral" in the sense that knowledge in ev-
ery historical time period should be treated in the same way.
. . . “perspective" requires that the representation scheme be
“neutral" with respect to all the theories to which it is applied
(ibid.: xvii-xviii).
The commitment to holism emerges from the formal framework that is
used and the concrete case studies that are developed. The holism is re-
stricted to theory-nets and is not of a global Quinean form. There is no
web of belief, but only a web of theories. The holism of the structuralist
meta-theory states, more moderately, that by looking at empirical theo-
ries from a more global perspective, some of their features might become
more apparent. But it is clear that in the structuralist meta-theory, no
one would claim that molecular biology has a strong and necessary in-
tertheoretical connection with value theory in economics. In this sense,
it is a restricted and moderate holism about scientific theories.
For my discussion of neutralism, one further concept is central for the
structuralist meta-theory, the so-called theory-holons. These holons are
bigger theory-nets; more exactly, they are sets of theory-elements related
by intertheoretical links. Formally, they are defined as follows (for the
full definition, see Balzer et al. 1987: 389):
H is a theory-holon if, and only if, there exist N and λ, such that
H = 〈N, λ〉 and
1. N is a non-empty set of theory-elements;
2. λ : N × N → ⋃{P(Mp(T ) × Mp(T ′))/T, T ′ ∈ N} is a partial
function.
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Given that the logical reconstructions provided by the structuralist meta-
theorists are carried out in naïve set theory (Balzer et al. 1987: xii), im-
plicit ontological commitments are made. Left untamed, naïve set theory
is inconsistent, and hence a commitment to inconsistent objects imme-
diately emerges. Presumably, this is not something structuralist meta-
theorists intend, and perhaps rather than using naïve set theory, they
aim to adopt an axiomatic formulation of set theory, such as Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC). This would avoid
the commitment to inconsistent objects (assuming that ZFC is consis-
tent), but does entail the commitment to a multitude of sets, which are
abstract objects.
One of the main purposes of this section is to shed more light on the
ontological commitments of the structuralist program. It is problematic
to maintain that the use of formal methods is just a heuristic tool for
the representation of scientific theories, and does not have any additional
commitments of its own, without, however, providing any account of how
exactly such commitments are avoided.
It also comes out clearly that the structuralist meta-theory refuses to
commit to a position in the debate about scientific realism:
A theory-element T = 〈K, I〉 may be regarded as an instru-
ment for formulating empirical claims. We do not think that
this statement forces on us any particular epistemological po-
sition like instrumentalism, or anti-realism with respect to
theoretical terms, as has sometimes been claimed by critics of
our program ... Our main intention here is to give an account
of how to construe empirical claims which we find in scien-
tific practice, and this account does not seem to fit squarely
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into such labels as "instrumentalism", "anti-realism" or their
opposites for that matter (ibid.: 90).
Here, one can see the explicit commitment to a neutral perspective. The
authors apparently take it for granted that a formal framework, what
they call a representation scheme, is neutral. I argue that this is not
possible in general. Since one has to accept the underlying ontological
postulates of whatever framework one applies. It is not the same to apply
naïve set-theory or Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Although these set-
theories share many ontological commitments, they also differ in many
respects. I think that in this precise sense, one can never be completely
neutral with respect to a representation scheme. What can be done is to
adopt a pragmatic way of justifying the choice of a certain framework, in
the sense of Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance, as I have discussed above.
Sneed’s 1983 paper
I will now analyze Sneed’s paper on the relation between scientific re-
alism and the structuralist meta-theory. So far, I have outlined that in
Architectonic, its adherents argue for a neutralist and a moderate holist
view. Sneed’s work was published before Architectonic, and reveals that
the same approach was already in place in the earlier phase of the struc-
turalist meta-theory. Sneed motivates the structuralist meta-theory as
follows: “Structuralism is essentially a view about the logical form of the
claims of empirical theories and the nature of the predicates that are
used to make these claims . . . Roughly, the claims of empirical theories
are rendered as set-theoretic versions of a Ramsey-sentence" (Sneed 1983:
350). This gives us a first hint regarding its motivation.
8.5. A FRAMEWORK FOR NEUTRALISM 223
Later on, Sneed describes in which sense both the scientific realist
and the structuralist would agree:
. . . Structuralists see the mathematical structures associated
with a theory to be much more “essential" features of the the-
ory than the claims it makes. The claims may change with
the historical development of the theory, but the mathemati-
cal apparatus remains the same. Thus both structuralist and
realist would agree that empirical science makes descriptive
claims but disagree about the extent to which empirical sci-
entists, speaking professionally, “mean what they say" (ibid.:
351).
If the mathematical apparatus remained the same, our representation
scheme would always be the same, no matter what developments in
mathematics influence on our framework. However, since there is clearly
progress and theory change in mathematics as well, Sneed’s view seems
to bear problems. As noted above, in the applications of a framework,
it is not the same to adopt a finitist set-theory or to posit the existence
of infinite sets. There are always ontological commitments in the back-
ground.
Furthermore, the Kuhnian aspect in structuralism is also important.
Structuralists usually argue that:
Structuralism is not committed to the view that any kind of
revolutionary development has, in fact, occurred at any point
in the history of science. At most, structuralism provides
the formal methods to reconstruct the theories associated
with scientific traditions putatively separated by “revolution"
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. . . revolutionary scientific change is just different from nor-
mal scientific change but not, in any apparent way “irrational"
(ibid.: 354).
This reveals that Sneed does not accept a kind of revolutionary theory
change in the sense of the early Kuhn. In fact, Kuhn recognizes the
virtues of the structuralist framework, as I have discussed in chapter 3.
This suggests that the structuralist motivations are in fact on the side of
logical rigor, detail and objectivity, altogether Carnapian virtues, so to
speak.
For Sneed, the difference between structuralism and scientific real-
ism appears to be as follows: “Structuralist reconstructions of empirical
theories attribute claims to them whose logical form departs so widely
from the logical form of claims apparent in the literature of the theory
that realists find them implausible (ibid.: 355)". He appeals to the fact
that structuralists provide logical reconstructions of theories but make
no metaphysical claims, as scientific realists do.
Later on, Sneed mentions that the distinction between T-theoretical
and T-non-theoretical terms is rejected by realists: “The structuralist the-
oretical - non-theoretical distinction between the elements of the models
for a theory entails an ontological distinction between properties or indi-
viduals that the theory is about which realism rejects (ibid.: 355)". An-
other point of conflict between both views appears to be that the classic
scientific realist has a different conception of the meaning of theoretical
terms:
Structuralism is committed to a kind of ‘contextualism’ for
the meaning of terms referring to theoretical elements that is
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incompatible with the realist’s view that the reference of all
predicates and singular terms in an empirical theory is nailed
down ‘near’ the beginning of the theory’s development (ibid.:
356).
By what Sneed calls contextualism, we see again the commitment to a
form of holism by the structuralist meta-theory. One might criticize that
Sneed takes it that scientific realists have a pretty simple notion of the
meaning of theoretical terms, where it is in fact the case that the issue
about the reference of theoretical terms is still a live question in the
scientific-realism debate. It seems that this difference can be highlighted
by carefully sorting out a theory of reference, as it has been done by
contemporary scientific realists (see Psillos 1999). However, one has to be
aware of the fact that Sneed’s work dates from the phase of the scientific
realism debate where Puntam just had developed what we call today a
simple scientific realism (as I have discussed in chapter 2), and therefore
one should not be too harsh on the evaluation of Sneed’s views in the light
of contemporary views. Sneed draws an interesting conclusion, relying
on the structuralist criterion for theoreticity:
One way of understanding the implications of structuralism
for realism is then this. Assuming structuralism is true, if one
wants to be a realist about the meaning of terms referring to
theoretical elements, then one must also be a realist about
theoretical laws (ibid.: 358).
This follows from the criterion for theoreticity, introduced above. We
have seen that in the structuralist meta-theory, terms are introduced
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through the presupposition of the fundamental laws of the theory in
question. In this sense, one has to be a realist about laws as well.
Sneed concludes without placing the structuralist meta-theory clearly
on either the realist or the antirealist side. This could be seen as one
indication in favor of neutralism, but is too weak as a single evidence,
since it leaves too much room for speculation.
Stegmüller’s relative a-priori
One further hint to neutralism in the structuralist meta-theory is Stegmül-
-ler’s notion of a relative a-priori (see my discussion in chapter 3). This
notion, as he develops it, suggests that the structuralist meta-theory is
not neutralist at all. It rather suggests an ontologically committed view,
at least in a very abstract sense.
Besides Stegmüller, also Friedman (2001) mentions a relativized a
priori in the philosophy of science. His conclusion about a stable core,
which can also undergo changes, is very much alike to the view advocated
by Stegmüller:
Reichenbach distinguishes two meanings of the Kantian a pri-
ori: necessary and unrevisable, fixed for all time, on the one
hand, and “constitutive of the concept of the object of [scien-
tific] knowledge," on the other. Reichenbach argues, on this
basis, that the great lesson of the theory of relativity is that
the former meaning must be dropped while the latter must be
retained. Relativity theory involves a priori constitutive prin-
ciples as necessary presuppositions of its properly empirical
claims, just as much as did Newtonian mechanics, but these
principles have essentially changed in the transition from the
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latter theory to the former . . . [what we end up with, in this
tradition, is thus a relativized and dynamical conception of
a priori mathematical-physical principles, which change and
develop along with the development of the mathematical and
physical sciences themselves, but which nevertheless retain
the characteristically Kantian constitutive function of mak-
ing the empirical natural knowledge thereby structured and
framed by such principles first possible (Friedman 2001: 30-
31).
If one accepts that there are a priori mathematical and physical princi-
ples, it might be hardly possible to be a neutralist. The neutralist would
rather have to suspend judgement on this issue and appeal to the choice
of a certain framework, in which such principles can be analyzed in the
best way. In this sense, Stegmüller does not seem to defend a neutralist
view, but rather a weak form of scientific realism, since the a priori he ac-
cepts would be relativized. But this is something that the usual scientific
realist would not accept. Of course, such a realist view would most likely
not be a semantic one, but at least metaphysical and epistemological.
It turns out that by looking into the views of the two early main
figures of the structuralist meta-theory, Sneed and Stegmüller, we are
not able to draw a general conclusion on their views. Sneed connects the
structuralist meta-theory to the debate on scientific realism, but avoids a
general conclusion on where the structuralist meta-theory stands in this
debate. Stegmüller discusses a relativized a priori and seems to defend
a weak form of scientific realism. But this alone is not sufficient for
positioning his approach on either the realist or the antirealist side, since
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the structuralist meta-theory has developed in many different ways since
both Sneed and Stegmüller developed it in the beginning.
Category theory
Despite the explicit commitment to naïve set-theory by the adherents of
the structuralist meta-theory, Mormann (1996) shows that central con-
cepts of this approach can be formulated alternatively in the framework
of category theory. Mormann explicitly shows that this holds for the con-
cepts of constraint, link and theory-holon. He argues that these concepts
can be generalized when they are reformulated in a categorial setting,
and that relevant categories can be formulated in each case.
From an ontological point of view, we may try to determine what
are the commitments of the structuralist meta-theory. One may argue
that, given the usual set-theoretic formulation of the view, it is at least
committed to sets. By showing that core concepts of the structuralist
meta-theory can be formulated in category theory, one could resist this
conclusion. After all, the commitment to sets can be avoided by introduc-
ing categories as the basic framework. One would then have a significant
form of framework neutralism.
It turns out, however, that the particular categorial framework adopted
by Mormann presupposes set theory, given that a category is defined by
a collection of objects such that for each ordered pair of objects, there is
a set of morphisms involving these objects (see Mormann 1996: 269). Of
course, the typical characterization of the concepts of collection, ordered
pair, and set are all set-theoretic in nature. As a result, unless they
are reformulated in some other way, in the particular version of category
theory that Mormann employs, sets are ultimately presupposed. Thus,
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a truly neutralist maneuver, according to which it doesn’t really matter
which particular framework one adopts, cannot be made: sets are as-
signed a privileged status within the structuralist meta-theory if not in
theory, certainly in practice.
8.6 Why frameworks matter
It may be argued that it should not matter which particular formal frame-
work one ends up using to reconstruct a scientific theory: any such frame-
work should do. But the situation is not so simple. Suppose one uses
naïve set theory (in classical first-order logic) as the underlying frame-
work. The theory has a number of benefits: it is simple, elegant, and
extremely general. However, given that Russell’s paradox can be formu-
lated in it, the theory turns out to be inconsistent—and, given classical
logic, trivial (that is, everything follows from it). Clearly, this would not
be a suitable framework for the reconstruction of scientific theories.
In response, it may be noted that the relevant framework should
be, at least, consistent. But this grants that particular features of the
framework do matter after all—consistency being a significant feature of
such frameworks, and one that, depending on the framework, is often not
easy to establish. An additional concern emerges at this point. Suppose
that one is trying to reconstruct Bohr’s original model of the atom. As is
well known, according to electrodynamics, that model would be unstable,
since the electron would fall onto the nucleus. To secure the stability
of the model, Bohr stipulated that such an event would not happen.
As a result, Bohr’s model was inconsistent with electrodynamics, and
any faithful reconstruction of that model presumably should take into
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account this inconsistency. This means that no consistent framework
that assumes classical logic would be adequate for this task. In the
end, consistency cannot be a general requirement for any framework, for
it is too strong and basically nothing would be reconstructable in any
framework.
Moreover, I have emphasized that the structuralist meta-theory has
been formulated in set theory, and it has also been formulated in cate-
gory theory. From an ontological point of view, these two theories are
significantly different: the former (in its usual characterization and as-
suming a Quinean doctrine of ontological commitment) is committed to
sets, whereas the latter (also in its usual characterization) is commit-
ted to categories. But sets and categories are different kinds of things:
sets have members, categories need not (they involve objects and mor-
phisms); sets are not morphisms (although they can be associated with
a characteristic function), and a category is not a set (nor does it even
presuppose one). So we have here two different ontologies.
In light of this, what does the structuralist meta-theory ultimately
presuppose, sets or categories? It may be argued that it does not presup-
pose either: it does not presuppose sets, since the view can be formulated
in category theory; it does not presuppose categories, since the view can
be formulated in set theory. It is, therefore, truly neutral between these
two frameworks.
But is this maneuver adequate? Compare the analogous move about
natural numbers. We can formulate number theory in set theory (in fact,
as is well known, there are many different ways of doing that, using dis-
tinct set-theoretic reductions). We can also formulate number theory in
category theory. Thus natural numbers, one could argue, do not presup-
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pose sets, nor do they presuppose categories. They are truly independent
from both. In fact, Fregeans (or neo-Fregeans) about numbers would in-
sist on that, since for them numbers can be formulated in second-order
logic plus some definitions alone.
But if we were to run the corresponding argument for the structuralist
meta-theory, it is unclear what the view would be independently of some
framework, that is, independently of either set theory or category theory.
What would a theory-element, a global constraint or a global link be
without the framework in which these components can be expressed?
The proper answer is far from clear, since at least one framework seems
to be indispensable, but each framework provides a different answer—
one in terms of sets, the other in terms of categories. As a result, the
ontological status of the structuralist meta-theory becomes puzzling.
So far, I have characterized a typology of neutralism and then outlined
and discussed the relation between neutralism and the structuralist meta-
theory. I will now give the following interpretation of neutralism with
respect to the structuralist meta-theory:
1. Metaphysical neutralism: It seems clear that for the structural-
ist meta-theory, metaphysical neutralism seems to match. As we
have seen above, adherents of this view explicitly commit to this
form of neutralism. The possibility of applying the framework of
the structuralist meta-theory to questions of theory change and
structural realism suggests that it is indeed metaphysically neu-
tral.
2. Epistemological neutralism1: Framework-dependent neu-
tralism: This view matches with the structuralist meta-theory as
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well, since it usually employs naïve or Zermelo-Fraenkel set-theory,
but there are important differences. As I have outlined, Mormann
(1996) reconstructs the formal apparatus of the structuralist meta-
theory in the framework of category-theory. This suggests that
structuralists are flexible with respect to the choice of their formal
tools and hence framework neutralists.
3. Epistemological neutralism2: Interpretational neutralism:
The structuralist meta-theory is not neutral with respect to issues
of interpretation. The criterion for T-theoreticity is well-defined
and applied broadly in the literature. A clearly defined criterion for
the meaning of theoretical terms cannot be advocated by interpre-
tational neutralists. I conclude that the structuralist meta-theory
does not count as being interpretationally neutral.
4. Semantic neutralism: For the case of a semantic neutralist view,
it seems that the structuralist meta-theory would enter this char-
acterization. Whenever there is talk of scientific terms, these are
taken to occur within scientific theories and especially in the case of
the structuralist meta-theory, theoretical terms, receive their mean-
ing only through those theories.
5. Carnapian neutralism: For the case of the structuralist meta-
theory, a similarity to Carnap’s approach becomes apparent. This
becomes clear due to the fact that nowhere in the literature, ques-
tions of the realism debate are explicitly addressed. Only in Sneed’s
paper, we can find a comparison of realism and the structuralist
8.7. CONCLUSIONS 233
meta-theory. But this work is more a characterization, than a po-
sitioning of the structuralist meta-theory as a realist or antirealist
position. Since in this view, the main aim is to provide a neutral
description of the structure and dynamics of theories, it suggests
in fact a compatibility with the Carnapian approach.
8.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have analyzed different forms of neutralism and I de-
veloped my own view, neutral neutralism. I and discussed whether the
structuralist meta-theory can be called a neutralist position. It turned
out that different forms of neutralism are accepted sometimes implicitly
by this view. The analysis I provide here aims to establish more clarity
with respect to the ontological commitments of neutralism itself and of
the structuralist meta-theory. It is now clear in which way this view is
neutralist, and also in which sense it relates to Carnap’s neutralism.
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Chapter 9
General conclusion
In this dissertation, I have shown how structural realism developed out
of the debate on scientific realism. I discussed the influence that several
authors had on the early development of structural realism and high-
lighted Carnap’s early program of the Aufbau as especially relevant for
the development for epistemic structural realism.
Furthermore, I have argued that an adequate tool for characterizing
structural realism in a clear way is by means of the structuralist meta-
theory. By applying certain technical notions of this program, namely,
the notion of reduction, the notion of structural continuity can be under-
stood in a broader sense than only in the sense of a mere reappearance of
certain mathematical equations, and the Ramsey-sentence. This result
helps both to clarify Worrall’s original proposal and to amplify struc-
tural realism. Nevertheless, It is clear that only after taking out further
concrete case studies, structural realism will find its corroboration or
refutation. These case studies have to be worked out of all scientific
disciplines which provide representative cases of theory change. In this
sense I have pointed out which way might be a promising one to pursue
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for both structural realists and its opponents in order to bring out clear
results within the debate.
It should also be clear that by no means my case study of linguistics
does provide an ultimate answer to all objections that have been raised
against structural realism. Moreover, it is a specific proposal of how to
approach epistemic structural realism with a focus on theory change in
a new way in order to provide solutions to some of its problems.
By developing my view of pragmatic structural realism, I have high-
lighted a way out of the Newman objection. The price of sorting out
“relevant" structures in each case might be too high for the pure struc-
turalist. Nevertheless, we have seen that it is the only way of avoiding
the Newman problem, and hence if we want to make sense of structural
realism, such a pragmatic stance has to be taken.
The possibility of ontic structural realism has also been discussed in
this dissertation. I concluded that there is indeed a way of accepting a
form of ontic structural realism, based on linguistics. For this purpose, I
highlighted Harris’ notion of kernel sentence as the most important entity
in his whole theory of syntax. It is, however, an open question in which
way ontic structural realism should be accepted as a general claim, and
there is a need for case studies in different disciplines. My result of ontic
structural realism in linguistics has to be restricted to Harris’ syntactic
theory, and should not be understood for the whole of linguistics.
In chapter 7, I have answered some objections that have been made
to structural realism, and I have argued that by adopting my version of
structural realism, there is a way to avoid the problem of underdetermi-
nation.
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Finally, in chapter 8 I argued that by modelling structural realism
within the framework of the structuralist meta-theory, one is driven to
the question of neutralism and, more specifically, to the question if the
structuralist meta-theory is in the end neutral to questions of scientific
and of structural realism, as some of its adherents claim. My form of
neutralism, which I called neutral neutralism tries to incorporate the
best of Carnap’s proposals and challenges both scientific realism and
anti-realism in their views.
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